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Looking towards Japan, there is a growing number of studies concerned with 
migration and migrant integration, especially in urban contexts. However, within the 
Japanese context, and indeed more widely, more investigation is needed into the 
actors and institutions involved in the integration policy-making process. In 
particular, the roles played by government and non-government actors and their 
relative influence on integration policies have been underexplored. 
Hence, this study has sought to investigate how the configuration of actors and 
institutions in Japan has helped shape the policies affecting migrants in Japanese 
cities. In order to do so, it presents findings from qualitative research carried out in 
the two Japanese cities with the highest numbers of foreign residents, namely Osaka 
and Yokohama. The research has sought to investigate the key actors involved in the 
development of integration policies, the institutional structures that have developed 
to take formal responsibility for these policies, and the competing narratives and 
discourses bound up with integration policy-making processes.  
Rather than viewing the relationships between institutions and actors as ‘multilevel’, 
with its emphasis on vertical hierarchy, this study argues that it may be more fruitful 
to view these interconnections as multi-spatial and multi-scalar. This project has also 
been carried out with the aim of examining integration-related issues from a 
relational perspective, by using a Bourdieu-inspired field analytical framework that 
draws on concepts from governance and citizenship-based research on integration. 
Using a relational approach, this study contributes to our understanding of how the 
balance of control over integration policy-making has changed since the 1990s, 
highlighting the practices and processes at work within and across the institutions 
that are shaping integration-related policies and policy-making processes in Japan. 
Although integration policies are now appearing at the national scale as a result of 
the reconfiguration of actors involved in the production of these policies, this study 
also considers how actors are negotiating structure and agency in the development of 
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Citizen (shimin) The word shimin in Japan has two meanings: one is citizen in the 
legal sense and the other is city resident (akin to the French term citadin). 
Citizenship (shiminken, shitizunshippu) Either the legal rights and duties of 
individuals attached to nationality under domestic law (also called national 
citizenship in this text), or the practices and virtues of individuals and organisations 
oriented towards the common good or to membership and activities of individuals in 
civil society associations. 
Denizenship A set of rights for long-term resident foreign nationals that includes at 
least the following: long-term residence permits, access to employment, enhanced 
protection from deportation/expulsion (compared to short-term residents) and 
provisions for family reunification in the country of residence. In Japan, denizenship 
is associated with the rights of ‘special permanent residents’. 
Ethnonationality Membership of a nation sharing a common history, culture, 
language or descent (which does not necessarily coincide with the totality of persons 
holding the ‘nationality’ of a country in the legal sense) or membership of an 
ethnonational minority living within a state, which may be culturally linked to an 
external kin-state. 
Foreign resident (gaikokujin jūmin) Used more frequently in policy discourse than 
the Japanese term imin (‘immigrant’), foreign residents are defined as first-
generation immigrants and individuals from subsequent generations who do not hold 
Japanese citizenship. 
Immigrant (imin) Although the Japanese term imin is rarely used in political 
discourse, here immigrants are taken to mean first-generation migrants, i.e. those 
who were born outside of Japan and migrated to Japan at some point in their lives. 
This definition excludes migrants born to Japanese expatriates, or ethnonationals 
living temporarily abroad, such as kikokushijō (‘returnee children’). 
Japanese (nihonjin) In this study, Japanese people are understood to be those who 
identify their ethnonationality with Japan. This description overlaps with, but is not 
equivalent to, those who possess Japanese nationality. 
 
Korean (korian/kankokujin/chōsenjin) An individual with ethnonationality 
pertaining to the Korean peninsula, Japanised as korian. The term kankokujin 
connotes South Koreans, while the term chōsenjin connotes North Koreans. 
National (kokumin) A person holding nationality of a particular state. The Japanese 
term kokumin has been the subject of frequent debate—as it has also been interpreted 
as referring to people living in Japan regardless of legal nationality—and is often 
used to refer to Japanese ethnonationals. 
Nationality (kokuseki) The legal relationship between a person and a state as 
recognised in international law (cf. ethnonationality). 
Naturalisation (kika) Any mode of acquisition after birth of a nationality not 
previously held by the target person that requires an application by this person or 
his/her legal agent, as well as an act of granting nationality by a public authority. 
Nikkeijin A Japanese term referring to people of ‘Japanese origin’, which includes 
Japanese nationals who emigrated to other parts of the world (particularly South 
America in the first half of the nineteenth century) and their descendants. 
Non-profit organisation (hieiri soshiki) Any organisation in Japan legally 
recognised as a specified entity under the provisions of the 1998 NPO Law. 
Oldcomer (ōrudokamā) A Japanese neologism, based on the word ‘newcomer’, 
used to describe more established immigrants in Japan, especially Zainichi Koreans 
and Chinese. 
Seikatusha The meaning of seikatusha ranges from ‘consumer’ to ‘person who 
actively organises their own life’ (Seifert 2007). 
Special permanent resident (tokubetsu eijūsha) A legal status available to Zainichi 
people in Japan, who have not naturalised, which guarantees them greater rights than 
other permanent residents. 
Tabunka kyōsei A policy approach concerning the integration of immigrants in 
Japan, usually translated as ‘multicultural coexistence’ or ‘intercultural living’. 
Zainichi A Japanese term used to describe people living in Japan, originally from the 
Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and parts of China, who were once regarded as Japanese 
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Japanese Prime Minister’s name is written as Abe Shinzō, rather than Shinzō Abe. 
All Japanese words have been italicised (apart from place names) and macrons are 
used to indicate long vowels in certain words, except where those words are already 
familiar to English speakers. For example, the Japanese word for ‘coexistence’ is 
written as ‘kyōsei’, while the capital of Japan has been written as ‘Tokyo’ rather than 
‘Tōkyō’. 
All translations in this text are the author’s own. Where a translation was produced 
by an interpreter or translator, these have been marked with a dagger (†) for the sake 
of economy. To illustrate: 
This quotation was translated by a third party, and subsequently edited by the 
author to remove inconsistencies and to modify any turns of phrase that would 
seem unclear to a native English speaker without changing the intended meaning. 
(Interview X, Tokyo†) 
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Although one starts any effort at thick description, beyond the obvious and  
superficial, from a state of general bewilderment as to what the devil is going on—
trying to find one's feet—one does not start (or ought not) intellectually empty-
handed. Theoretical ideas are not created wholly anew in each study; as I have said, 
they are adopted from other, related studies, and, refined in the process, applied to 
new interpretive problems. If they cease being useful with respect to such problems, 
they tend to stop being used and are more or less abandoned. If they continue being 
useful, throwing up new understandings, they are further elaborated and go on being 
used. 
Clifford Geertz (1973, 27)  
2 
1 Introduction: integration policies and policy-
making in Japan 
1.1 Background 
Against the backdrop of declining fertility rates and population aging, the stock of 
foreign-born people as a proportion of the population has gradually increased in most 
economically developed countries (OECD 2017, 295–97). While the benefits of 
immigration to host societies seem to receive much less attention than the challenges, 
it is fair to say that the issues surrounding the admission and incorporation of 
migrants into host societies are posing multiple challenges for policymakers and 
other integration policy stakeholders.  
Immigration is not a linear or universal process; it is, predominantly, an urban or 
metropolitan trend with immigrants clustering in cities and suburban areas. While 
immigration is a major concern on national policy agendas, the impacts are local. A 
focus on cities as sites of migrant integration brings attention to the spatial and 
socioeconomic contexts of migration and highlights the implications of immigration 
for local politics. Local officials are on the front line, but may lack adequate support 
or acknowledgment from central government regarding the pressures they face.  
In the case of Japan, the foreign resident population has grown fairly steadily since 
the late 1980s to the point where registered foreigners now account for almost 2.4 
million people within the country, or 1.9% of the population (see Figure 1.1). Upon 
closer examination, the figures reveal that a third of all registered foreigners live in 
the 23 special wards of Tokyo
1
 and five other major cities: Osaka, Yokohama, 
Nagoya, Kobe and Kyoto (see Table 1.1). Understanding what these cities are doing 
to address the issues affecting local foreign residents, and how, is essential if we are 
to better understand the migration process in Japan. 
Over the last decade or so, there has been a growing trend to look at these issues in 
terms of the policy-making process itself, exemplified by the work of several 
                                                 
1
 Administratively speaking, the 23 special wards of Tokyo (akin to the boroughs of London) have not 
constituted a single entity since 1943 when the city of Tokyo (Tōkyō-shi) was merged with the 




 In what Giovanna Zincone and Tiziana Caponio describe as 
a ‘sort of fourth generation research topic’ of migration research (Zincone and 
Caponio 2006, 6), scholars are seeking to understand the political processes through 
which immigration and immigrant integration policies come into existence and how 
their implementation is steered. In particular, these researchers have been exploring 
the governance of migration. Since 2014, researchers at the University of Sheffield 
have also been exploring issues relating to migration governance as part of the 
Prospects for International Migration Governance (MIGPROSP) project. 
Figure 1.1 Number of registered foreign nationals in Japan, 1980–2016 (stock) 
 
Sources: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2015); Zairyū gaikokujin tōkei (kyū-
tōroku gaikokujin tōkei) tōkei-hyō, Ministry of Justice 
(http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html) 
As Borkert and Bosswick suggest, the ‘making of migration policies is a 
multidimensional and complex process’, involving and affecting ‘different spheres of 
society (local, regional, national, international) as well as it is influenced by the 
interaction between a multitude of social-political actors’ (Borkert and Bosswick 
2011, 95). These processes are often said to be characterised by phases of ‘policy 
formulation, operationalisation and instrumentalisation and actual policy 
implementation’ (Borkert and Penninx 2011, 10–11) and understanding these 
processes in the case of migration policy-making can give us valuable insights into 
the variances between policy intentions and outcomes. 
                                                 
2
 IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe) is a European 













































































































Table 1.1 Number of foreign residents in the 23 special wards of Tokyo and the 




As percentage of all foreign 
residents in Japan (%) 
23 special wards Tokyo  439,821 17.8 
Osaka Osaka  130,378 5.3 
Yokohama Kanagawa  92,117 3.7 
Nagoya Aichi  77,668 3.1 
Kobe Gunma  46,831 1.9 
Kyoto Kyoto  43,230 1.7 
Total  830,045 33.5 
Note: The 23 special wards of Tokyo comprise the area that was, until 1943, the city of Tokyo 
Source: Zairyū gaikokujin tōkei (‘foreign resident statistics’). Available at http://www.e-
stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001196143) 
However, there are several issues regarding the research that has been carried out to 
date. To begin with, the research that has been conducted in this domain has focused 
primarily on European countries while other countries and contexts remain to be 
investigated. This is particularly evident in the scant number of articles concerning 
Japan, or East Asia, in some of the key journals in the field.
3
 
In addition, the relationships between the institutions under investigation have been 
explored as ‘vertical’ and hierarchical, and researchers have tended to approach these 
relationships through ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ approaches. Rather than viewing the 
relationships between institutions and actors as ‘multilevel’, with its emphasis on 
vertical order, this study approaches these interconnections as multi-spatial and 
multi-scalar. 
The number of studies concerned with immigrant integration in Japan, especially in 
urban contexts, is growing (for example, Douglass and Roberts 2000; Tsuda 2006a; 
Kawamura, Kondō, and Nakamoto 2009; Chung 2010). However, within the 
Japanese context and more widely, what is needed is more investigation into the 
actors and institutions involved in migration policy-making processes, to understand 
the roles they play and their relationships with one another. Hence this project offers 
a timely, non-European perspective on an innovative branch of migration scholarship. 
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 For instance, searching for articles on Japan (i.e. articles where Japan is the key focus or one of the 
key sites) in journals such as Migration Studies or the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
yields many fewer results than countries such as Germany, France, the UK or the US. 
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1.2 Japanese migration research:  key developments 
There is a growing corpus of academic scholarship focusing on migration in East 
Asia and the Asia Pacific (including Haines, Lee, and Chan 2014; Chan, Fung, and 
Szymańska-Matusiewicz 2015). While researchers have engaged in multiple strands 
of research in order to understand the Japanese integration regime, three in particular 
are worth highlighting for their originality, for their connection to wider issues within 
Japanese policy studies, and for their relevance to this study. 
1.2.1 The human rights approach: activism and global norms 
The human rights based approach was a natural consequence of grassroots activism 
to win greater rights for Japan’s minorities, in particular the Buraku and Zainichi 
Korean communities. 
As Neary (2002) explains, the human rights cause was first taken up and promoted 
by the Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaihō Dōmei), created in 1955, to the 
point where human rights became synonymous with Buraku discrimination in some 
areas. Buraku communities are descended from an underclass of butchers, tanners 
and executioners, who were legally and socially excluded from mainstream society 
in the premodern era due to their association with ‘death’. Their struggle for greater 
equality and recognition for the issues they were facing helped shine a light on 
postwar Japan’s commitment to human rights and gradually led to measures to 
improve their socioeconomic status (Neary 2002, 35–42). It also provided a source of 
inspiration for activism by Zainichi Koreans (Chung 2010). 
Political mobilisation by Zainichi Koreans was less successful in the fifties and 
sixties, but from the late 1970s onward their efforts were rewarded with greater civil 
and social rights, and to a lesser extent political rights. Tsutsui and Shin (2008) 
suggest that this is all the more remarkable given that Zainichi Koreans were unable 
to exert pressure on elected officials or influence national politics through other 
direct means. Instead they argue that global human rights instruments, combined 
with local mobilisation efforts, helped produce policy changes.1 
Research by predominantly Japanese scholars helped shine a light on the 
discrimination facing foreigners in Japan. A classic work in this vain is Kōmai 
Hiroshi’s Migrant Workers in Japan (Komai 1993). Kōmai is well known as an 
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activist, who, among other things, has called for amnesty for ‘illegal immigrants’ in 
Japan as a matter of human rights (Kashiwazaki 2000, 466). Works by Kōmai and 
other activists/scholars in the 1980s and 1990s produced detailed accounts of the 
problems facing migrants through a right-based framework. 
Activist groups, especially academics and civil society organisations, impatient with 
the national government’s neglect of non-entry control aspects of international 
migration see local governments as a viable alternative site for action (for example 
Komai 2004). In Japan, migrant-supporting organisations have worked with local 
government officials to target the national bureaucracy and the Supreme Court to 
influence policy outcomes on immigration (Shipper 2008). Local government 
officials, dedicated to fostering a distinct collective identity for their community, 
make good partners in such endeavours. 
Other scholars, such as Amy Gurowitz, have focused on developments at the 
transnational scale, beginning with Japan’s ratification of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights in 1979, as a way of understanding domestic policy 
changes. Addressing claims that advocates of international human rights standards 
have not adequately demonstrated their importance in domestic policy-making, 
Gurowitz (1999) argues that international norms have helped bring about significant 
changes to discriminatory policies in Japan. While Japan might have adopted 
international norms as part of its role as an international player, ‘Japanese lawyers, 
activists, and government officials have attributed the various improvements in 
policy toward Korean-Japanese (as well as toward Burakumin and Ainu) in large part 
to ratification of these agreements’ (Gurowitz 1999, 429).  
The work of Gurowitz and others highlights the role of the Japanese state in 
absorbing international ideas and in working with other nation-states to agree 
domestic and regional policies. This is not to say that transnational actors have no 
part to play in Japanese integration policy-making, but that much of what we 
consider to be transnational activities are conducted between states and subnational 
actors, rather than via supranational agencies. Nonetheless, few researchers have 
explored integration policy-making in relation to the concurrent activities of 
transnational and domestic actors. 
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In Japan, although the proportion of foreign residents among the total population is 
small in comparison to other industrialised countries, several hundred support groups 
exist to offer a variety of services to foreign workers and to advocate for their rights 
and welfare. Piper and Ball (2001) estimated there to be over 200 such groups at the 
turn of the century, but the current number is likely to be much higher. Among these, 
women’s groups in particular often promote and appeal for strong transnational 
linkages against human trafficking and the violation of human rights. Most have 
established local ‘networks’ within their own country, and some have begun to 
establish transnational links, particularly with an Asia-Pacific focus (Piper and Ball 
2001). 
1.2.2 The citizenship approach 
Drawing on citizenship-based approaches developed in the European context in the 
1980s and 1990s (for a critical overview, see Favell 2001), migration studies scholars 
focusing on the Japanese context have used similar approaches to investigate 
integration policies in Japan (for example, Chung 2010).  
Looking towards the transnational scale, the global human rights norms and 
instruments discussed in the previous section have also been characterised in terms 
of ‘postnational’ forms of citizenship (Soysal 1994; Sassen 2002). Based on 
universal ideas of personhood, it has been suggested that postnational rights and 
claim-making may challenge citizenship at the nation-state level (Soysal 1994). 
Looking at the phenomenon of so-called guest workers in postwar Europe, Yasemin 
Soysal argued that ‘the recent guestworker experience reflects a time when national 
citizenship is losing ground to a more universal model of citizenship anchored in 
deterritorialized notions of persons’ rights’ (Soysal 1994, 3). As well as the global 
human rights culture, Soysal also argued that the development of transnational 
political structures has acted to ‘constrain the host states from dispensing with their 
migrants at will’ (Soysal 1994, 144), which could be described as a form of ‘soft 
governance’ (Geddes and Scholten 2016, 170–71). 
By contrast, several scholars have been critical of postnational citizenship. Joppke 
(2010), for instance, argues that postnational citizenship leaves second-generation 
immigrants, and their descendants, in a vulnerable position, as they continue to lack 
the political rights that are conferred by national citizenship. In addition, states have 
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also used national citizenship ‘as a tool for integration, with distinctly disciplinary 
and coercive connotations’ (Joppke 2010, 22), which is evident in the increasing use 
of language proficiency as a prerequisite for settlement, naturalisation or even 
immigration (S. W. Goodman 2010). Thus national citizenship continues to play an 
important role in integration policy-making and this shows no signs of abating 
(Joppke 2010). 
While transnational institutions may be able to encourage change, it has been pointed 
out that they do not necessarily challenge the sovereignty of the state (Tsuda 2006b, 
10). Moreover, if we look beyond the European Union, although we should not 
discount the importance of the intangible influence of transnational institutions, the 
tangible impact of transnational political structures on domestic policy-making is 
arguably much weaker. 
Other scholars have approached the issue of migrant integration by looking at 
citizenship at a subnational scale. There are several reasons for looking at 
subnational institutions, including local governments, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and, potentially, trade unions or businesses. In the absence of 
an overarching national strategy to address the issues faced by immigrants, many 
observers have commented on the role played by local government in supporting the 
integration of migrants into Japanese society (Komai 2001, 118–37; Komai 2004; 
Tsuda 2006a). While state-migrant relations are important, foreign residents in Japan 
do not have access to the formal rights conferred by national citizenship. However, 
some researchers have treated the relationship between local government and 
minority groups as a new type of citizenship. Local governments are said to be acting 
to fill the void, left by the national government, by treating foreign residents in their 
areas of jurisdiction as ‘local citizens’ (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000; Tsuda 2006a).  
Although foreign residents are not guaranteed the same access to social services as 
‘ordinary’ citizens under national policy, many local authorities and NGOs are 
tackling discriminatory practices at a ‘local’ level (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000, 245). Under 
this schema, migrants are entitled to rights conferred by local governments as 
residents within particular areas under the aegis of those governments. Even with 
‘local citizenship’, however, other practical issues such as Japanese language 
illiteracy or unfamiliarity with local procedures may pose a problem for migrants 
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wishing to exercise those rights. It may therefore be expected that policy approaches 
towards migrants would aim to resolve such problems. Local governments and civil 
society organisations are in a good position to transform the (in)formal rights of that 
foreign residents possess as local citizens into substantive rights. 
Although the focus of citizenship-based migration studies has conventionally been 
on the state–migrant nexus, and the rights and obligations attached to this 
relationship, Japanese migration studies have pushed the boundaries of this research 
in line with research on local citizenship and local governance in other parts of the 
world (for example, see the contributions in the volume by Tsuda 2006b; including 
Agrela and Dietz 2006). However, mapping out the roles and responsibilities of local 
institutions and foreign residents, with reference to the urban and national context, is 
the first step in determining whether local citizenship has any mileage as a scholarly 
concept. 
1.2.3 The governance approach 
While the ‘conventional’ focus of citizenship is the relationship between individuals 
and ‘the state’ (as exemplified by Marshall 1950), governance focuses our attention 
on the constellation of actors involved in the policy-making process. In particular, 
governance approaches concentrate on actors’ roles, inter-relationships and various 
strategies of policy-making (Rhodes 1997; Daly 2003; Swyngedouw 2005), 
including the participation and agency of migrants themselves. As Chhotray and 
Stoker point out, governance approaches may also address ‘the role of government in 
governance and the degree to which governance undermines or supports democratic 
accountability in public decision-making’ (Chhotray and Stoker 2009, 18). Moreover, 
the decisions made by these actors are enacted in different spaces and at different 
scales—the transnational, national, regional, and local. The roles of space and scale, 
and their interconnectedness, can also be explored through a governance lens (Martin, 
McCann, and Purcell 2003; Kennett 2017). 
The discussion so far has shown that an increasing number of Japanese migration 
scholars have examined the roles of actors apart from the national government since 
the 1990s. Several studies have looked at the roles of, and relationships between, 
actors and policy instruments from the transnational sphere (Gurowitz 1999; Flowers 
2016), local government sphere (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000; Tegtmeyer Pak 2006; 
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Kashiwazaki 2003),and ‘civil society’ (Shipper 2008; Chung 2010), particularly from 
legal and policy perspectives (Kashiwazaki 2000). 
Governance takes account of the autonomous nature of local governments and NGOs 
as policy innovators. Tegtmeyer Pak (2006) notes that local government has a history 
of proactive policy-making going back to the 1960s and 1970s and that policies 
concerning foreign residents fit into this trend. This policy-making role has arguably 
been strengthened since the 1990s with decentralisation (chihō bunken) featuring 
firmly on the political agenda. Shipper (2008, 128–29) contends that local 
governments have acknowledged the work performed by NGOs and have developed 
innovative policy initiatives with the expertise of these foreigner support groups. 
This position is backed up by Takezawa’s (2008) research into the Great Hanshin-
Awaji Earthquake, where volunteers from the affected areas and beyond 
subsequently set up NGOs providing various services to foreigners, including non-
registered foreigners. Such services may fill vital gaps in the absence of national 
schemes. 
Despite the growth of research into the roles of, and relationships between, various 
actors involved in the integration process, a more comprehensive overview has been 
lacking. Typical of this work is the edited volume by the doyen of Japanese 
migration research, Kōmai Hiroshi (2004). The authors in that volume offer a 
detailed description of local government policies and NGO initiatives in three 
municipalities—the cities of Hamamatsu and Kawasaki and the town of Ōizumi—as 
well as a discussion of local community and trade union activities. However, as with 
many other studies from this period, the discussion is confined to the normative and 
never moves into the theoretical space. In addition, I would argue that research in 
this area would benefit from a closer analysis of the relationship between national 
and local government (Aiden 2011).  
1.3 Research approach 
The extent to which the national government, local governments and civil society 
actors are involved in determining the balance of equality between migrants and 
Japanese ethnonationals through the Japanese welfare regime is a compelling 
research agenda with implications beyond the Japanese context. It is therefore timely 
to examine the Japanese case in more detail, using a framework capable of capturing 
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the dynamic relationships between the actors and institutions involved in migration 
policy-making processes. 
This study has adopted a relational approach for understanding integration policies 
and policy-making in Japan, which I believe has the potential to shed new light on 
these phenomena, while incorporating elements of governance and citizenship-based 
frameworks. 
1.3.1 Introducing a relational approach to investigate integration 
policies and policy-making 
The aim of this study has been to investigate integration policies and policy-making 
processes related to the settlement and integration of foreign residents in Japan, using 
concepts drawn from governance and citizenship-based studies. The ‘conventional’ 
focus of citizenship is the relationship between individuals and the state. 
Governance, meanwhile, focuses our attention on the configuration of actors 
(including the national government, local governments and civil society actors) 
involved in the policy-making process, and their roles, interrelationships and various 
strategies of policy-making, including the participation and agency of migrants 
themselves. Moreover, the decisions made by these actors are made in different 
spaces—the transnational, the national, the regional and the local—where different 
aspects of governance and citizenship are enacted and contested. 
While scholars have often used concepts from citizenship and governance 
concurrently, I propose going a step further. In this study, I have focused on the 
relational dimensions of governance and citizenship-based frameworks—the aspects 
of these frameworks that focus on the relationships between the actors involved in 
the production of integration policies in the Japanese context. In fact, part of the 
purpose of this project has been to understand how integration policy-making 
processes may be studied using a relational approach. By this I mean an approach 
that focuses on the relationships between certain policy-making actors and 
institutions, not just on the entities themselves. 
I argue that field analysis provides a germane way of combining citizenship and 
governance-based approaches by viewing them through a single relational 
framework. Field analysis was developed by Pierre Bourdieu as part of his relational 
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approach to sociology (for an overview, see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
According to Bourdieu, modern society is characterised by the existence of multiple 
independent arenas, which he described as ‘fields’ or simply as ‘spaces’, that 
although empirically interrelated and mutually determinative, nonetheless obey their 
own internal laws and principles to some extent (Emirbayer and Williams 2005). 
Thinking systematically in terms of fields involves viewing all aspects of society 
relationally: beginning with national society itself (which Bourdieu described as the 
social space as a whole) down to microcosmic fields, such as individual families, and 
everything in between. 
While some of Bourdieu’s concepts have been used in migration studies before—in 
particular, ‘cultural capital’ and ‘habitus’ à la Bourdieu—they are seldom used as 
part of field analysis in the way that Bourdieu intended. Using the concepts of capital 
or habitus without situating them within a field does not make conceptual sense from 
a Bourdieuian perspective. This study therefore uses an analytical framework based 
on a ‘fuller’ understanding of field theory, rather than a selective appropriation of 
Bourdieu’s analytical toolkit. 
The purpose of this study is not to suggest that a relational approach is necessarily 
better than other approaches, but to demonstrate the utility of a relational approach 
through an empirical investigation of the research questions outlined below. 
1.3.2 Research questions 
Using a relational approach, this study has sought to address the following question: 
how does the configuration of actors and institutions in Japan help shape the policies 
affecting migrants in Japanese cities? More specifically: 
 Who are the key actors involved in the development of integration policies 
and why? 
 What institutional structures have developed to take formal responsibility for 
these policies? 
 How have integration policies and policy-making processes been influenced 
by critical events or ‘junctures’? 
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 How are the subjects of integration policies constructed within policy-making 
processes? What does this reveal about the nature of these policies and the 
relationships between the actors and institutions involved? 
Given that the majority of foreign residents in Japan are located in urban 
environments, these processes have been explored in the two cities with the highest 
numbers of (registered) foreign residents, namely the cities of Osaka and Yokohama. 
1.3.3 The study sites: Osaka and Yokohama 
The communities of Osaka and Yokohama provide pertinent sites for exploring the 
production and experiencing of integration policies within the Japanese context. 
Figure 1.2 shows the number of ‘registered foreign residents’ (gaikokujin tōrokusha) 
in Japan’s largest cities, where ‘foreignness’ is defined by ‘nationality’.
4
  
While Tokyo is home to a much larger number of foreign residents than Osaka, 
Tokyo’s administrative arrangements are such that it cannot be classified as a single 
city. Hence the city of Osaka has the highest number of (registered) foreign residents 
of any ‘designated city’ (municipalities with a population of greater than 500,000 and 
designated as cities by government ordinance) in Japan. Between them, the top ten 
designated cities accounted for almost a quarter of all foreign residents in Japan in 
2016. Consequently, Osaka represents an important case in which to understand how 
Japanese cities conceptualise and approach the issues related to the integration 
process. 
While Osaka is host to about 126,000 foreign residents, the majority of Osaka’s 
foreign resident population is made up of residents of Korean origin, many of whom 
are Zainichi (Koreans who settled in Japan as imperial subjects, along with their 
descendants). Bearing this in mind, a slightly different picture emerges if we focus 
on those migrant groups of non-Korean origin (see Figure 1.3). Yokohama has the 
highest number of non-Korean foreign residents, followed by Osaka, Nagoya, 
                                                 
4
 Here, the Japanese term kokuseki has been translated as ‘nationality’. For the majority of Japanese 
ethnonationals this is a non-issue: one’s ‘nation-ness’ and ‘state-ness’ are identical (McCrone and 
Kiely 2000). However, it is important to maintain the analytical distinction between nationality 
and citizenship in the light of an increasing immigrant population and growing articulations of 
intra-Japanese difference (e.g. Okinawan-ness) as forms of political and cultural resistance. The 
relationship between citizenship, ethnicity and identity in the Japanese context is explored more 
fully by other scholars, such as Tai (2004) in the case of Zainichi Koreans. 
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Kawasaki (located near Yokohama) and Kobe (located near Osaka). Consequently, 
Yokohama represents a second important case study site. 
Figure 1.2 Cities with highest numbers of registered foreign residents by 
nationality, as at December 2016 
 
Source: Shikuchōson-betsu kokuseki/chiiki-betsu zairyū gaikokujin (‘foreign residents by municipality 
and by nationality/region’). Available at http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001177523 
Figure 1.3 Cities with highest numbers of registered foreign residents by 
nationality (excluding residents of Korean origin) as at December 2016 
 
Source: Shikuchōson-betsu kokuseki/chiiki-betsu zairyū gaikokujin (‘foreign residents by municipality 
and by nationality/region’). Available at http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001177523 
The map below (Figure 1.4) shows the location of the key study sites, as well as the 
locations of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (the site of central government in Japan) 





































its role as part of the Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi (or GSTK, discussed in more 
detail later in the text). 




Osaka and Yokohama are located in two of the most heavily populated and 
economically productive metropolitan areas in the world. The city of Osaka lies in 
Osaka prefecture, itself located in the wider Kansai region. Kansai comprises seven 
prefectures: Osaka, Mie, Nara, Wakayama, Kyoto, Hyōgo and Shiga. Owing to its 
proximity to Kobe and Kyoto, Osaka is sometimes grouped with these cities in a 
region called the Keihanshin metropolitan area—home to roughly 20 million people. 
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Like Kansai, the Kantō region encompasses seven prefectures: Gunma, Tochigi, 
Ibaraki, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo and Kanagawa, which is home to the city of 
Yokohama as well as the city of Kawasaki. With an estimated one third of the total 
Japanese population living within its administrative borders, Kantō is the most 
heavily populated region in Japan. 
1.4 Chapter outline 
Chapter two sets out the historical context of immigration and immigrant policies in 
Japan, with due attention to the political, social and economic circumstances under 
which these policies arose, and the contemporaneous patterns of migration. Specific 
attention is given to the configuration of these factors as they coalesced in the urban 
spaces of Osaka and Yokohama during the course of the twentieth century. The 
discussion then turns to the way in which integration policies have been framed and 
the ways in which migrants and migrants’ rights have been constructed within these 
policies. 
Expanding on the themes presented in the next chapter, chapters three and four 
sketch out a relational framework for conceptualising and analysing the issues, actors 
and institutions involved in integration policy-making within the Japanese context. 
The conceptual framework sketched out in the third chapter draws on concepts 
developed in governance and citizenship studies, while the fourth chapter 
demonstrates how integration policies and policy-making may be viewed through the 
relational perspective of field analysis—an analytical approach developed by Pierre 
Bourdieu.  
The theory and practice are integrated in the fifth chapter through a discussion of the 
qualitative research methods used to explore the research questions, namely 
documentary review, interviews with integration policy stakeholders and focus 
groups carried out with foreign residents with a connection to Yokohama or Osaka. 
The findings from the study sites are presented in chapter six—which focuses on the 
data gathered through the policy stakeholder interviews—and chapter seven, which 
draws primarily on the focus group data. Taken together, the qualitative research 
findings highlight the relations between the actors and institutions involved in the 
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production of integration policies at a national and local scale, and how these policies 
are experienced by migrants and other foreign residents in Japan. 
The findings are discussed critically in the penultimate chapter. By engaging with the 
data from the study sites, this chapter attempts to refine our understanding of the 
issues at stake in the development of integration policies in Japan using a field 
analytical approach. The strengths and limitations of this study, and implications for 
wider migration research, are discussed in the concluding chapter.  
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2 Migration policies and policy research in Japan 
2.1 Introduction 
We cannot discuss Japan’s integration policies without reference to the way in which 
Japan’s immigration regime is managed. While immigration policies are concerned 
with the admission, entrance and exit of people who used to live outside the territory 
in question, immigrant or integration policies relate to immigrants and their position 
in the new society of settlement (Borkert and Penninx 2011, 14–15). However, it is 
worth emphasising that the parameters of immigrant policies may well be affected by 
the outcomes of immigration policies and the latter may, in turn, be revised in the 
light of the former. 
Thus, while the focus of this study is on integration policies and policy-making in 
Japan, it is also necessary to look at how migrants are stratified before they even step 
foot on Japanese territory. As Kraler observes, ‘contemporary migration management 
largely operates through allocating differential rights to different categories of 
migrants and thus through legally discriminating against (certain categories of) 
foreign nationals’ (Kraler 2010, 13). Viewed in this way, it could be argued that the 
Japanese immigration system demarcates immigrants in terms of statuses and 
associated packages of rights, which may shape their subsequent settlement 
experiences. 
Hence, this chapter presents an overview of the immigration regime and the 
integration policies that have been developed in Japan, with a particular focus on the 
development of integration policies in the two study sites—Osaka and Yokohama. 
This is followed by a review of the literature on the policy paradigms that have 
characterised Japanese integration policies, with a view to unpicking some of the 
ways in which issues have been framed and migrants have been constructed within 
these paradigms. 
2.2 The problem of/with integration 
The issue of ‘integrating’ migrants into host societies poses multiple challenges for 
all concerned. The term itself is highly contested despite its popularity over other 
terms such as inclusion, incorporation and cohesion (Favell 2001). Indeed, Schierup 
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and others have used the term ‘incorporation’ in preference to integration which they 
regard as politically loaded by dint of its connection to particular national policy 
regimes (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006, 40). 
But what exactly is (social) integration?
5
 Loosely defined, integration involves a 
process through which migrants adapt to a host society, but this definition raises 
several issues. Geddes, for example, makes the following three observations 
regarding integration: 
First, we usually recognise integration only in its absence as social exclusion or 
disintegration rather than being able to specify what is meant by an integrated 
society. […] Second, the integration of immigrants is often linked to discussion 
of immigrants as though these militate against inclusion or are vehicles for 
creation of a more progressive multicultural society. […] Third, citizens tend to 
look to the state to guarantee the expectation of integration, i.e., not that this will 
necessarily be attained given that it’s difficult to say what it would mean, but that 
governments are at least expected to show that they care. (Geddes 2003, 23–24) 
As Geddes rightly observes, the absence of integration in the form of ‘disintegration’ 
is more easily understood than integration per se. The ‘polar opposite [of integration] 
is so obviously bad as to almost force us to accept integration as a necessity’ (Favell 
2001, 353).  
In a less direct way of defining integration, we can also identify a range of policies 
that could broadly be termed integration or immigrant policies. While immigration 
policies are concerned with border controls and admission, integration policies focus 
on the consequences of immigration and issues associated with (permanent) 
settlement. Such issues may include the need for legal and social protection, 
naturalisation and citizenship rights, housing provision, multicultural education 
policies and host-society language courses. (For a comprehensive list, see Favell 
2001). 
This is problematic for several reasons. First, the collection of policies, provisions 
and interventions that might constitute a broad integration policy does not tell us 
what the expected outcome is. At the very least they may stave off ‘disintegration’, 
but other than that it is not obvious what the results will be. Second, cross-national 
                                                 
5
 Japanese scholarship makes frequent reference to immigrant policies as ‘social integration policies’ 
(shakai tōgō seisaku), as opposed to just ‘integration policies’, but neither term is widely used in 
non-academic discourses. 
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studies on integration invariably assume that immigrants are integrating into one 
homogeneous society within one nation-state. Third, there is a tendency in the wider 
literature on migrant integration to associate the set of policies and initiatives that 
could be termed integration policies with the national government. Yet any number 
of actors may be the originators and implementers of these policies, as Favell notes. 
What should be asked first is how and why this disparate range of state policies, 
laws, local initiatives and societal dispositions—which could be implemented by 
many agencies at many levels—comes to be thought of as a single nation-state’s 
overall strategy or policy of integration. Who or what is integrating whom and 
with what? (Favell 2001, 351) 
In polities, such as Japan, where local governments also have the ability to develop 
local-level policies or programmes, it would seem reasonable to consider these 
instruments as part of local processes of integration. It is inadequate to discuss ‘local’ 
integration in terms of national policies toward foreign residents or immigrants, 
without due regard for what is happening at the local scale. As Ireland notes, ‘in 
order to gain a complete understanding of the political aspects of immigration, one 
has to examine local-level developments’ (Ireland 1994, 19). On the other hand, 
there is also a need to be critical towards recent research into local government 
initiatives that ignores the role of the state and its effect on other actors (Aiden 2011). 
2.3 Migration policies and policy-making in Japan 
2.3.1 Immigration to Japan: an overview 
Despite being frequently described as a recent country of immigration (Tsuda 2006a), 
Japan has had a long history of migration. In times before the nation-state was born, 
it was particularly cities and local authorities that had fulfilled the need to ‘regulate’ 
some aspects of admission and residence, for example by providing people a ‘pass’ 
through the territory and permission to exert a profession (Borkert and Penninx 2011, 
8). Even during Japan’s period of ‘seclusion’ (sakoku) between the early 1600s and 
the mid-1800s, considerable trading activity occurred between Japan and other parts 
of Asia via Japan’s coastal cities, and these trade networks subsequently formed the 
basis of important migration routes (Hamashita 2009). This is evident in the 
historical activities of cities such as Yokohama and Nagasaki, where thriving 
Chinatowns saw little interference from the Tokugawa shogunate (c. 1600–1868). 
After Japan reopened its doors to regular global trade in the 1850s and 1860s, 
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Chinese and Western merchants began to form foreign settlements in Japan’s major 
port cities at the end of the nineteenth century (Yamawaki 2000). While the direct 
influence of local governments on Japanese immigration policy seems to have waned, 
indirect forms of influence also receive scant attention from scholars of 
contemporary migration, which may be an oversight. 
With Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, ‘internal’ migration flows between the 
Korean Peninsula and Japan were soon established, and hundreds of thousands of 
Korean ‘subjects’ were later conscripted into labour service during the Second World 
War (Ryang 2000). Over half a million Koreans and smaller numbers of Taiwanese 
and mainland Chinese people remained in Japan after the war and came to be 
described as Zainichi, literally meaning ‘in Japan’. 
Against this backdrop, the first major piece of postwar immigration legislation was 
passed in 1951. The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act 
(shutsunyūkoku kanri oyobi nanmin nintei hō) was designed ‘to provide for equitable 
control over the entry into or departure from Japan of all persons and to consolidate 
the procedures for recognition of refugee status’. With the Allied occupation of Japan 
drawing to an end, Zainichi Koreans and Chinese were formally declared to be 
‘aliens’ or ‘foreigners’ (gaikokujin) from April 1952 onwards (Chung 2010). 
However, following the normalisation of diplomatic ties between Japan and South 
Korea that culminated in the 1965 Treaty, Zainichi Koreans and Taiwanese were 
granted the right to ‘special permanent resident’ (tokubetsu eijūsha) status—now 
viewed as a form of ‘denizenship’ (see below). 
Japan experienced fairly low levels of immigration throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
but Sellek (2001, 15–54) identifies three major stages of migration of foreign 
workers to Japan in the postwar era. The first began in the late 1970s, marked by an 
influx of predominantly female migrants concentrated in the sex and entertainment 
industries and, to a lesser extent, the admission of refugees from the Indochinese 
Peninsula. The second stage was marked by a shift towards an increasing number of 
male migrant workers into low-wage jobs from the mid-1980s onward, which, like 
the first stage, was primarily irregular migration.  
The most recent stage, beginning with the 1990 revision of the Immigration Control 
Act, has been characterised by Japan’s deep economic recession. The Act was 
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revised to rationalise the status-of-residence system by introducing 27 up-to-date 
residence permit categories. As Takao notes: 
Foreigners residing in Japan may engage in the scope of activity that is specified 
by their status of residence. Period of stay is determined by the status of 
foreigners. All foreigners residing in Japan are obliged to register as foreign 
residents within 90 days of entering Japan. They must complete Foreign Resident 
Registration at their local ward or municipal office and receive a foreign resident 
registration card. This is the key procedure for foreigners to be eligible for social 
services. (Takao 2003, 528) 
At the same time, the Act also reinforced measures against ‘illegal foreign workers’ 
or ‘visa overstayers’ (fuhō taizaisha), making the situations of many foreign workers 
precarious. As Sellek observes, ‘immigration policy in Japan has been adopted so 
that the so-called “unskilled foreign workers” are forbidden from entering the 
country’ (Sellek 2001, 91). In reality, however, foreign workers continued to work as 
‘unskilled’ labour through various types of status of residence, especially as ‘foreign 
trainees’ (gaikokujin kenshūsei) and as euphemistic ‘entertainers’, while receiving no 
formal recognition as workers by the authorities. 
These developments have gradually changed the composition of foreign residents in 
Japan in terms of the (ethno)nationalities of those residents (see Figure 2.1). Of those 
that benefitted from the ‘side door’ policies introduced by the revision, the Nikkeijin 
(foreign-born descendants of Japanese emigrants) were perhaps the biggest winners. 
Shortly before the amended Immigration Control Act came into effect on 1 June 
1990, the Ministry of Justice issued a circular specifying new criteria for obtaining 
the long-term resident (teijūsha) visa which had been newly introduced in the revised 
Act (Sellek 2001; Kondō 2009; Akashi 2010). Hence, a legal migration channel was 
opened up for third generation Nikkeijin, as well as their spouses and dependants, 
through an administrative mechanism; as opposed to a legislative one, which would 
have been subject to greater scrutiny. Since their admission was not treated as 
economic migration, those entering with the visa could take up any occupational 
activities, thus becoming de facto migrant workers. 
Competing explanations have been put forward for this expansionary move. One 
explanation is that the special provision was intended to rebalance the legal status of 
the descendants of earlier Japanese emigrants—not just those in South America but 
those living elsewhere too—with the status of third and fourth generation Zainichi 
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Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan (Kondō 2009; Akashi 2010). Another is that the 
admission of Nikkeijin was expanded as part of a labour market strategy to secure 
unskilled workers without threatening Japan’s ethnonational homogeneity. The fact 
that most South American Nikkeijin who arrived after the 1990 amendment 
subsequently found employment as unskilled labour seems to lend weight to this 
assessment (Akashi 2010).  
Figure 2.1 Number of foreign residents in Japan by nationality, 1980–2016 
 
Sources: Kokuseki, nenrei (5-nen kaikyū) betsu gaikokujin-suu (‘number of foreigners by nationality, 
5-year age bands’), Statistics Bureau of Japan. Available at https://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/02.html 
Zairyū gaikokujin tōkei (kyū-tōroku gaikokujin tōkei) tōkei-hyō (‘statistics on foreign residents’), 
Ministry of Justice. Available at http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html 
In reality, both accounts may be correct to a certain degree, but Anglophone 
scholarship has largely privileged the latter explanation (for a thoughtful discussion, 
see Akashi 2010). Yamanaka, for instance, describes the admission of Nikkeijin as a 
‘political compromise’ enabling employers to meet their labour needs while 
attempting to ‘maintain racial, ethnic and social homogeneity in the face of 
progressive transnationalization’ (Yamanaka 1996, 78). Viewed in this light, the 
Government’s rationale that the new provision would enable Nikkeijin to visit their 
ancestral homeland seems to be a thin cover for the actual policy logic (Tsuda 1999; 
Chung 2010). However, conceding this publicly would certainly have paved the way 




















Figure 2.2 Number of foreign residents in Japan by residence status, 2006–2016  
 
Note: Fourteen key categories are presented here (including SHIS, which stands for specialist in 
humanities/international services) but there are several categories which are not shown  
Source: Zairyū gaikokujin tōkei (kyū-tōroku gaikokujin tōkei) tōkei-hyō (‘statistics on foreign 
residents’), Ministry of Justice. Available at 
http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html 
The growth in Nikkeijin migration over the next two decades began to reverse 
following the global financial crisis and the temporary introduction of a repatriation 
programme which barred re-entry for three years. Figure 2.2 shows that there were 
almost 270,000 people in Japan on long-term resident visas in 2006. Among the visa 
holders, approximately 153,000 were Brazilian nationals and 21,000 were Peruvian 
nationals, with Chinese nationals and Philippine nationals making up a further 
60,000. By 2012, the number of Brazilian nationals with long-term resident visas had 



































the spouse (or other family member) of a Japanese national decreased from over 
74,000 in 2006 to just under 20,000 in 2016. 
Over the decade to 2016, there was an 84% increase in the number of permanent 
residents in Japan. As Figure 2.2 shows, the number of permanent residents increased 
from approximately 394,000 in 2006 to 727,000 in 2016. This growth was 
predominantly due to an increase in the number of nationals from other Asian 
countries registering as permanent residents. Between 2006 and 2016, the number of 
Chinese nationals registered as permanent residents doubled from about 117,000 to 
238,000, the number of Philippine nationals registered as permanent residents also 
doubled from approximately 60,000 to 124,000, and the number of Korean nationals 
registered as permanent residents increased from 48,000 to 68,000. Similarly, the 
number of Brazilian nationals registered as permanent residents increased from 
approximately 79,000 to about 115,000. 
In contrast to ‘unskilled migrants’, ‘highly-skilled migrants’ (kōdō jinzai) and 
international students have gained under more recent changes to the immigration 
system. These groups are now able to take advantage of a much easier route to 
settlement in comparison to other migrant groups, as a result of their perceived 
ability to contribute more, economically speaking, to Japanese society. The number 
of non-Japanese nationals with student visas doubled from 132,000 in 2006 to 
277,000 in 2016, while the number of non-Japanese nationals registered as engineers 
or specialists in humanities/international services (SHIS) increased from 92,000 to 
161,000 over the same period. 
We can classify non-Japanese ethnonationals into broad categories, which I describe 
as foreign residents and migrants. Excluding refugees and asylum seekers and so-
called ‘illegal migrants’, we are left with migrants who emigrated to Japan from 
various countries and foreign residents who were born in Japan but lack Japanese 
nationality—a key group being Zainichi Koreans from the second generation 
onwards.  
As mentioned above, many Zainichi Koreans are treated as denizens through their 
status as special permanent residents. However, it is also clear from Figure 2.2 that 
the number of special permanent residents has decreased considerably. There were 
443,000 special permanent residents in 2006, of which 99% were Korean nationals, 
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compared with 339,000 in 2016. This is partly due to mortality, but also due to 
increasing naturalisation rates, particularly among younger Zainichi Korean cohorts 
who identify as ‘Korean Japanese’ rather than ‘Korean’ only (Tai 2004; Hester 2010). 
While many Zainichi Koreans maintain their non-Japanese nationality as a form of 
resistance against assimilation, the ‘Korean Japanese’ identity expresses a definition 
of ethnicity as separate from nationality. However, the difficulty of obtaining 
accurate statistics on the number of naturalised Koreans or Chinese in Japan is 
indicative of the view that ethnicity and nationality are inextricably linked, at least as 
far as the Japanese authorities are concerned. 
Looking beyond Japan’s territorial borders, the establishment of the Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum in the 1980s provided two new forums for the potential discussion of 
labour migration issues. Although the impact of these bodies on Japanese policy-
making is debateable, the results of transnational activities are certainly discernible. 
Negotiations for, and the conclusions of, bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
with the rapidly developing ASEAN countries
6
 signalled the Japanese Government’s 
intention to open the front door (as opposed to the side door; cf. Sellek 2001) to 
labour migrants.  
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) have, in recent years, called for the government to depart from its 
restrictive immigration policy and for the expansion of labour migration. Since 2003, 
the negotiations for agreements with ASEAN countries (and also India) has been 
promoted by both ministries and supported and encouraged by the Prime Minister’s 
Office (Kuboyama 2008). Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and India have 
pressed the Japanese government for the liberalisation and deregulation of the 
movement of people, and this has certainly had an impact. Specifically, the Japanese 
Government passed legislation that extended the technical intern training programme 
to care work and revised Japanese immigration law in late 2016 by establishing a 
new visa category for nurses and care workers (kaigo). 
                                                 
6
 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has ten member countries including Thailand, 
the Philippines and Vietnam. The term is used here in a similar fashion to the term ‘OECD 
countries’, namely to denote a particular group of countries. 
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2.3.2 Integration policy-making processes at the national scale 
Postwar Japan was famously described as a ‘developmental state’ by Chalmers 
Johnson (1982) in recognition of the role of central government in driving the 
country’s development strategies and economic growth. This approach was 
institutionalised during the Meiji era (1868-1912) and its trajectory remained largely 
unchecked until the economic bubble burst in the late 1980s, plunging Japan into its 
severest recession since the Pacific War. Since then, decentralisation, deregulation 
and administrative reforms have gained momentum. 
The work of Deborah Milly is one of the few comprehensive studies of governance 
and immigrant policies in Japan. Milly’s (2014) comparative study of Japan looks at 
a range of policy areas—including welfare, housing, education, healthcare and 
family support—and how central and local government and non-governmental actors 
interact to shape and influence these policies. 
Milly’s study adopts a multilevel governance framework for understanding the 
development of immigrant policies in Japan ‘in terms of prior institutions, prior 
political strength of humanitarian civil society groups, the proximate sources of 
devolution, and subsequent immigrant policy changes’ (Milly 2014, 19). While this 
approach has been frequently used in European studies (for instance, Zincone, 
Penninx, and Borkert 2011), multilevel governance approaches may also be viewed 
as problematic (as discussed in the next chapter). 
Milly analyses how local governments devised new policies by coordinating among 
themselves, especially through the Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi (GSTK), which 
Milly translates as the ‘Conference of Cities with Large Foreign Populations’. She 
also considers how they have gained influence via the Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni 
kansuru Kenkyūkai (TKSK), a central government committee which she translates as 
the ‘Council to Promote Multicultural Society’. 
The GSTK was established as a ‘political force’ (Komine 2014, 207) by mayors from 
13 municipalities that had been particularly affected by the increase in Nikkeijin 
migrants following the 1990 amendment to the Immigration Control Act. As the 
largest city in the group, Hamamatsu City hosted the first conference of the GSTK 
and released a declaration which called for chiiki kyōsei or ‘local integration’ 
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(Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi 2001). Immediately after its launch, the mayors 
representing the municipal members of the GSTK took the declaration to key central 
ministries and continued to lobby central government for national action on 
education, social security and a new system for maintaining information on foreign 
residents (Komine 2014, 207–8). 
Non-governmental actors also had pre-existing proposals or quickly developed 
proposals to bring to central government. This included Ijūren (which did not in fact 
become a specified NPO until 2015), which presented a comprehensive proposal for 
policy reforms to government officials in 2002. Around the same time, a group of 
academics—Yamawaki Keizō, Kondō Atsushi and Kashiwazaki Chikako—
published their vision of Japan as a multi-ethnic state in order to stimulate public 
debate on the issues concerned (Yamawaki, Kondō, and Kashiwazaki 2001). Their 
proposals included the creation of a ‘basic law’ (kihon-hō) for foreigners and a 
separate agency to oversee the rights of foreign residents. By 2004, Keidanren (the 
influential Japan Business Federation) had also developed a policy position, which 
echoed that of the GSTK. At that time, the organisation was led by the Chairman of 
the Toyota Motor Corporation, Okuda Hiroshi—chair of a company that has 
employed hundreds of Nikkeijin immigrants at its site in Aichi prefecture since the 
1990s (Milly 2014, 73). 
Crucially, in 2005 the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) 
established the aforementioned TKSK, a study group concerned with the promotion 
of tabunka kyōsei. In 2006, the MIC circulated the report produced by the TKSK and 
its plan for the promotion of tabunka kyōsei in local communities (chiiki ni okeru 
tabunka kyōsei suishin puran) to local governments throughout Japan (Tabunka 
Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). The TKSK report is notable as the 
first central government output to address integration in a comprehensive fashion 
(Aiden 2011). 
The TKSK is just one example of the plethora of advisory committees that have, at 
various times, been involved in policy-making at the national scale. As Harari 
explains: 
In modern democracies, governments appoint public advisory bodies (variously 
called commissions, councils, committees, hereafter PABs) whose membership is 
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partly or wholly composed of persons from outside government. Ideally, these 
bodies should, by facilitating the participation of special interest groups, scholars, 
etc., in public policy making, help government to make responsive, innovative, 
and practical policies. (Harari 1997, 18) 
Enacted under the auspices of the US occupation authorities, Article 8 of the 
National Government Organisation Act (kokka gyōsei soshiki-hō) stipulated that the 
formation and certain features of advisory bodies would be statutory. These statutory 
advisory bodies are generally referred to as shingikai. In due course, however, non-
statutory bodies—referred to as kondankai or shiteki shimon kikan (‘private advisory 
bodies’), even though they are appointed by public figures for public purposes—have 
mushroomed alongside the shingikai. 
Membership of a given shingikai does not convey the full extent of participation in 
the operations of that shingikai. There are cases where individuals are appointed as 
‘advisers’ (komon, sankō), but do not appear in the membership lists. Moreover, 
shingikai vary considerably in size from a handful of individuals to over 100 
members. The larger shingikai tend to operate through subcommittees or study 
groups, whose membership is not always limited to shingikai members. 
Unfortunately, as in the case of the non-statutory advisory bodies, neither the 
existence nor the full membership of such subcommittees and study groups is 
regularly published. 
Formally, shingikai members are appointed by the prime minister, by other cabinet 
ministers or by heads of government agencies, but in practice appointment decisions 
are almost invariably made by high-ranking bureaucrats, often in consultation with 
the groups concerned. Government organisations (ministries, agencies) vary in the 
number of shingikai they form and for which they provide administrative and 
sometimes research staff support. 
While the TKSK report was an important stepping stone, the plan gained political 
traction when the influential Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi (‘Council on Economic and 
Fiscal Policy’, hereafter the CEFP) took its ideas on board. At the time, the CEFP 
was an influential ‘supra-ministerial’ agency directly accountable to Prime Minister 
Koizumi (Yamawaki 2007). Its adoption of the ideas developed by the TKSK led to 
the creation of a ‘liaison conference’ (renraku kaigi) on issues related to foreign 
workers. The liaison conference produced the first cross-ministerial integration 
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policy in December 2006—a comprehensive policy concerning foreigners as 
seikatsusha or ‘members of society’ (Gaikokujin Rōdōsha Mondai Kankei Shōchō 
Renraku Kaigi 2006). 
In 2007, the ‘Council for Regulatory Reform’ (CRR), located within the Cabinet 
Office, urged the government to implement the social integration measures desired 
by the GSTK. Unlike the GSTK proposal, however, the CRR three-year plan 
explicitly linked these measures to visa renewal, including rules on checking the 
applicant’s taxation history, social security registration, employment conditions, 
Japanese language proficiency and, where appropriate, children’s school enrolment. 
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) incorporated some of the suggestions made by the 
CRR in its March 2008 guidelines and again in its March 2009 guidelines, but not in 
their entirety (for a fuller discussion, see Kondō 2009). 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Cabinet Office hastily created the 
Office for the Promotion of Measures for Foreign Residents (Teijū Gaikokujin 
Shisaku Suishin Shitsu). The OPMFR took charge of a repatriation scheme targeting 
Nikkeijin migrants, many of whom had become unemployed following the crisis. 
Aside from the repatriation scheme, which was heavily criticised by domestic and 
international commentators, the OPMFR also announced emergency measures 
covering education, re-employment, housing, crime and disaster management, and 
multilingual administrative services (Teijū Gaikokujin Shisaku Suishin Kaigi 2009). 
Combined with previous developments, these measures have led to the emergence of 
what may be regarded as Japan’s first integration policies at the national scale. 
After decades of taking a back seat in terms of integration policies, the Japanese 
state—or, more precisely, central government—has taken a more prominent role in 
this regard since the early 2000s (Komine 2014; Milly 2014). One of the key 
questions that remains unsatisfactorily answered, however, is why central 
government has become more involved in the development of policies. 
Adopting institutionalist accounts, both Komine (2014) and Milly (2014) suggest that 
political pressure from local government and various governmental agencies led to 
the gradual introduction of various integration policies at the national scale. What is 
unclear, however, is why these institutions were able to effect change after a 
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considerable period of relative stability in terms of central government non-
involvement. 
2.3.3 Migration-related challenges at the local scale 
While the Japanese government has transformed the immigration system in recent 
years, there has never been a clear overarching approach to tackle the integration of 
migrants and other foreign residents already living in Japan. Local governments have 
attempted to fill this gap over several decades with a series of pragmatic local policy 
measures. To some extent these policies were designed to prevent conflict between 
Japanese and non-Japanese ethnonationals and how to incorporate the latter into the 
Japanese social welfare systems, with consequences for the meaning of community 
membership. 
According to Milly (2014), local policies could only develop in areas where 
devolution had occurred and funding was possible, such as informational materials 
for foreign residents, Japanese-language classes for foreign adults and consultative 
mechanisms to promote inclusiveness. Providing foreign residents with access to 
national healthcare and the social insurance system, however, has been more difficult, 
and local officials together with civil society actors have tried to assist to some 
degree. Local governments have had more tools at hand to address housing issues, 
through publicly managed housing projects, for example. They have also played a 
role in the provision of education at the local level, which takes account of the 
particular needs of migrant children.  
Innovation at the local level in these social policy areas is driven by either local 
government officials and/or civil society groups, both impacting on national policy 
changes. Milly illustrates the processes of these local initiatives and innovations with 
examples from several cities and prefectures, which gives an idea of the diversity of 
actors and approaches existing in response to different local conditions. 
At the same time, local governments also carry out functions delegated to them by 
central government. Under the Alien Registration Act (gaikokujin tōroku-hō), for 
example, local governments collected basic personal information, such as names and 
home addresses, from foreign residents on behalf of the Ministry of Justice whose 
primary concern was, and still is, immigration control. This information was then 
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used by local governments to provide social services and collect taxes. However, the 
system was not designed for the purpose of local governance and created inefficiency 
(Komine 2014). For instance, a municipal government could not legally close down 
the file of a foreign resident who was known to have moved out of the municipality 
until the individual had registered with another local government. Without accurate 
information on foreign residents, some local governments struggled to undertake 
routine administrative tasks. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that many 
Nikkeijin were employed as casual workers (or ‘despatch workers’) and frequently 
changed jobs and locations of residence. 
Although many of the migration-related challenges that local governments face may 
be similar, it is important to stress that the contexts in which local governments 
operate are shaped by a unique combination of social, political, economic and 
historical factors. Hence, it is essential to consider some of these factors as they 
relate to the study sites—Yokohama and Osaka. 
Osaka is one of the key commercial centres of Japan, with a long history as a 
strategic trading port in the Kansai region. Osaka’s ‘identity’ is often conceived in 
opposition to that of Tokyo and there are marked sociocultural differences between 
the two conurbations. This is particularly apparent in the distinctiveness of the Osaka 
dialect (ōsaka-ben) vis-à-vis ‘standard Japanese’ (hyōjungo), which was based on the 
Tokyo dialect. It has even been suggested that this opposition has been appropriated 
by Zainichi Koreans in Osaka as a symbolic form of resistance to the Japanese state, 
in the guise of ‘ethnolinguistic solidarity’ between the Korean language and Osaka 
dialect (Maher and Kawanishi 1995). 
Osaka can be regarded as somewhat progressive in terms of addressing the needs of 
foreign residents. During the 1920s and 1930s the city carried out a series of labour 
surveys, which sought to investigate general labour conditions and living standards 
(Mizuuchi 2003, 18–19). The reports also addressed the high percentage of poor 
quality housing and the high proportion of foreign residents in the inner city areas—
trends which have persisted into the postwar period (Mizuuchi 2003). More recently, 
the Osaka City education board was the first to create its own policy for the 
education of foreign children in government schools (Okano 2008, 108), and it is one 
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of the few cities that allows foreign residents to hold public sector positions despite 
central government opposition. 
Cities are also sites where central government agencies act at the local scale. This 
includes the Commission for the Protection of Human Rights (Jinken Yōgo Iinkai) 
which is part of the MOJ. The commission delegates it powers to regional Legal 
Affairs Bureaux to provide human rights advice to residents, including children, 
women and foreign residents. Osaka also has a Human Rights Counselling Office for 
Foreigners, located within the Osaka Legal Affairs Bureau. 
While cities can act as creative hubs for policy innovation, they can also act as arenas 
where struggles at a national or transnational scale play out. This was the case in 
1995, when the Supreme Court upheld an Osaka High Court ruling that the 
Constitutional definition of ‘Japanese citizens’ and ‘residents’ only applies to 
Japanese nationals, thereby denying foreign residents the right to vote in local and 
national elections. The ruling was issued following a 1990 lawsuit in which nine 
Zainichi Korean filed a complaint against the Osaka Election Committee for not 
registering them in the electoral roll based on Article 24 of the Public Offices 
Election Act (kōshoku senkyo-hō). An obiter dictum included in the ruling did 
concede the basic constitutionality of granting local voting rights to non-Japanese 
nationals, but such a change may only be brought about by legislation. 
While Osaka is home to a high proportion of the Zainichi Koreans living in Japan, 
who have helped shape the city’s history as well as its policies towards foreign 
residents, Yokohama is often regarded as one of the most cosmopolitan cities in 
Japan. Yokohama played a significant role in modern Japanese history following the 
arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry’s famous black ships just south of its shores in 
1853–54. Not only did this mark the gradual end of two centuries of national 
seclusion (sakoku), but also the emergence of a new urban space through which 
modernity and ‘otherness’ would seep into Japan. Thereafter, Yokohama grew 
rapidly to become one of Japan’s largest ports and migrant workers played a 
significant role in this development, especially in the immediate postwar period.  
Osaka is well-known for having the largest Koreatown in Japan, while Yokohama is 
known for having a vibrant Chinatown—the largest in Japan and an important site 
for Japanese-oriented tourism (Yamashita 2003). Chinese immigrants in Yokohama, 
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as Han (2014) argues, were happy to identify as ‘citizens’ (shimin) of Yokohama, 
with the dual aims of challenging Japan’s official refusal to recognise them as 
Japanese nationals, while eschewing exploitation by the imperial state to promote 
favourable Sino-Japanese relations during the Second World War. 
Industrial decline since the 1980s has seen many of those erstwhile employed around 
the docks pushed into unemployment, but the growth of other sectors has attracted a 
new generation of migrant labour with skills in areas such as IT and engineering. 
These structural and economic changes and their impact on the socioeconomic 
trajectories of migrant workers are reflected in the spatial distribution of foreign 
residents in Yokohama (Yamamoto 2000). The location of a US navy base in the 
south of Kanagawa has also contributed to a relatively high number of Americans 
living in Yokohama: almost 2,500 compared with about 1,500 US nationals in the 
city of Osaka. 
2.4 Integration policy paradigms and policy frames 
2.4.1 Changing policy paradigms, changing constructions of migrants 
The ideational turn in policy studies has ensured that the importance of ideas is not 
lost in understandings of policy development and policy change, to the point where 
there is now an extensive body of literature in this space (for a list of key works, see 
Béland 2009, 704). In this frequently-cited definition, Peter Hall describes what he 
means by the term ‘policy paradigm’: 
[…] policy makers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards 
that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be 
used to attain them but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded through the very 
terminology through which policymakers communicate about their work, and is 
influential because so much is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a 
whole. I am going to call this interpretive framework a policy paradigm. (Hall 
1993, 279) 
Hall (1993, 293) distinguished between three modes of policy change First and 
second order change are associated with incremental policy-making—in other words, 
change within the parameters of a particular policy paradigm. While first order 
change involves relatively small changes in the levels or settings at which policy 
instruments are used to achieve particular goals, new policy instruments may be 
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employed in second order change. By contrast, ‘Third order change […] is likely to 
reflect a very different process, marked by radical changes in the overall terms of 
policy discourse associated with a “paradigm shift”’ (Hall 1993, 279). It is also 
characterised by a shift in policy goals, as well as an alteration in the type of policy 
instruments used and their settings. Daigneault describes the three orders of change 
as being ‘lexically ordered’, implying that ‘each mode builds upon and extends the 
characteristics of the preceding mode’ (Daigneault 2014, 455). 
While policy paradigms have not always been carefully defined in the studies 
employing the concept (for a fuller discussion, see Daigneault 2014), an appreciation 
of the importance of different norms and worldviews can give us a better handle of 
how and why policies come into being. In particular, Daigneault (2014) points to the 
need to distinguish between policy paradigms proper and the ideational components 
of policies. In addition, ideas take effect through the ways in which political actors 
and institutional forces interact with them (Béland 2009, 707–8). They take shape 
through the variety of rhetorical and action frames that ‘underlie the persuasive use 
of story and argument in policy debate’ and ‘inform policy practice’ (Schön and Rein 
1994, 32). 
With respect to the Japanese context, it may be argued that the body of discourse 
collectively referred to as nihonjinron helped define the paradigm in which 
immigration policies were developed at the national scale, while reinforcing 
opposition to the development of national integration policies. 
Discussions on migration often focus on the ‘other’, but it is important to remember 
that migration challenges notions of ‘self’ too. The nihonjinron literature came to 
prominence in the 1970s and 1980s, seeking to explain the presumed cultural 
uniqueness of Japan and the Japanese, at a time when Japan’s economic success was 
fast commanding worldwide attention. Since then, the methodological, empirical and 
epistemological flaws of nihonjinron discourse have been exposed by several critics, 
leaving it ‘thoroughly castrated’(Ryang 2004, 8) according to some scholars. 
However, it would be wrong to discount its current importance:  
As an overarching worldview of Japan, nihonjinron has no rival. No other 
worldview of the Japanese society, culture, and nation has a wide enough 
acceptance to compete successfully with nihonjinron. Thus nihonjinron prevails 
by default. (Befu 2001, 118) 
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Mouer and Sugimoto believe that support for the ideology represented by 
nihonjinron by different institutions acted as an invisible but effective ‘psychological 
barrier’ against migration, especially during the 1970s (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986, 
403). Despite the fact that the nihonjinron discourse of ethnic homogeneity (tan’itsu 
minzoku) is inconsistent with Japan’s ethnocultural diversity (Weiner 1997; Lie 
2001), policymakers consistently appealed to nihonjinron narratives to explain or 
justify their policy decisions. Prime Minister Nakasone celebrated Japan’s ethnic 
homogeneity in the 1980s as a factor in its economic success, and the national 
identity defined by the nihonjinron literature served to ‘legitimate’ such claims (Befu 
2001, 100–101). In particular, Nakasone attributed the Japanese postwar miracle to 
the harmony that derives from a homogenous society. In so doing, he was contrasting 
Japanese homogeneity and harmony to alleged heterogeneity and divisiveness in the 
US, implying that America’s economic problems during the eighties, as well as 
Japan’s economic successes during that time, stemmed precisely from the 
ethnocultural differences between the countries. As Yoshino points out, these aspects 
of nihonjinron are based on a racialised sense of self:  
A Japanese expresses the ‘immutable’ or ‘natural’ aspect of Japanese identity 
through the imagined concept of ‘Japanese blood’. Since a scientifically founded 
‘racial’ classification of the Japanese and non-Japanese is meaningless, ‘Japanese 
blood’ is, first and foremost, a case of social construction of difference. (Yoshino 
1992, 24) 
Several scholars have observed that support for the ideal of ethnonational 
homogeneity has led to a paradoxical situation, where Japan defines itself as a zero-
immigration country in spite of reality (Morris-Suzuki 1998; Burgess 2014). In much 
the same way as the German state described its postwar migrant workers as 
Gastarbeiter (‘guest workers’), the Japanese state has consistently avoided the use of 
the term imin (‘immigrant’) in public discourse. As Burgess explains: 
The no-immigration principle is an institutionalization of the homogeneous-
people discourse. The principle basically states that Japan does not accept 
migrants. Indeed, the M-word (imin in Japanese) is markedly absent in legal, 
media and popular discourse, where it is replaced by euphemisms such as 
“entrants” and “foreign workers.” On the policy side, this means that it is 
necessary to do as much as possible to prevent foreigners in general from staying 
long or settling down. Tessa Morris-Suzuki argues that this principle has 
remained relatively unchanged since the first Nationality Law of 1899, which 
aimed to a) prevent an influx of unskilled labor, and b) restrict access to Japanese 
nationality. (Burgess 2014) 
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Against this backdrop, the discourse of ‘internationalisation’ (kokusaika) took centre 
stage in the 1980s and has dominated discussions on foreign residents for the last 
three decades. Internationalisation came to prominence as an encapsulation of the 
spirit and ambitions of the country at a time when its economic growth was attracting 
worldwide attention, yet it has not been without its critics. Mouer and Sugimoto 
identified two goal-incongruous usages of the word internationalisation: the first 
implying ‘the smooth promotion of Japan’s national interests, an application 
associated primarily with the establishment’; the second, concerning idealistic 
worldviews ‘either referring vaguely to international brotherhood and goodwill 
among nations or outlining the way in which some form of world government might 
be encouraged’ (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986, 381–83). Other commentators have 
observed that internationalisation has ushered in a new era in Japanese politics. 
Gurowitz, for instance, believes that ‘Debates over internationalization […] have 
changed the context in which immigrants are discussed (from a perspective of 
domestic isolation to a more global and regional context)’ (Gurowitz 1999, 443). 
Officials in local governments have challenged the national rhetoric of homogeneity 
(tan’itsu minzoku) with a rhetoric of ‘local internationalisation’ (uchinaru kokusaika) 
and more recently tabunka kyōsei.  
From the mid-1990s, a potential alternative to internationalisation appeared in the 
guise of tabunka kyōsei (variously translated as ‘multicultural coexistence’, 
‘multicultural symbiosis’ or ‘intercultural living’) and seems to be gaining popularity 
in both national and local government discourse. According to Takezawa, tabunka 
kyōsei emerged in the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake (known as the Hanshin-
Awaji earthquake in Japanese) in 1995—a disaster he describes as ‘a significant 
turning point in terms of the relationships between the Japanese and the ethnic 
minorities in the city’ (Takezawa 2008, 32–33).  
Tabunka kyōsei has been fostered by civil society organisations and local 
governments with an understanding that temporary migrants have become permanent 
residents and that foreign residents should be able to participate in Japanese society. 
If Japanese nationality is a precursor to citizenship, then citizens’ rights are also tied 
to this notion. However, denying a range of rights to foreign residents at a time when 
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immigration looks set to increase is surely unsustainable. As Morris-Suzuki points 
out: 
In the present global system […] it is necessary to understand the rights of 
individuals, in terms of their status not only as ‘citizens’ or ‘nationals’ (kokumin) 
but also as ‘residents’ or ‘denizens’ (jūmin): people whose long-term residence in 
a particular community gives them a right to share in the social and political life 
of that community, whatever their official nationality. (Morris-Suzuki 1998, 191–
92) 
In this respect, tabunka kyōsei is often presented as a far cry from the discourse of 
cultural and ethnic homogeneity featured in nihonjinron literature. However, the fact 
remains that these residents are not citizens and do not have the same rights as 
citizens. This has implications for how these immigrants are perceived by Japanese 
citizens and the rights that they possess. 
Japan is often described as a centralised state but, as Jacobs (2000) points out, the 
role of prefectures and larger cities has been greatly undervalued. While foreign 
residents have been denied the rights associated with state citizenship on the basis of 
their nationality (Komai 1993; Tegtmeyer Pak 2000), some cities have sidestepped 
the issue of nationality by treating foreign residents as ‘local citizens’. 
According to Tegtmeyer Pak (2000), some local governments have gone even further, 
committing themselves to treating foreigners as ‘local citizens’ (which is her 
translation of the term gaikokujin shimin). Under this approach, local government 
officials found political space for addressing immigrant issues by redefining the 
‘amorphous’ national government project for local internationalisation. The specific 
catalysts for this process differ from city to city, but overall, the redefinition of local 
internationalisation to include integration plans and programmes allows local 
officials to expand the scope and importance of their programmes. 
2.4.2 Migrants’ rights as non-citizens, denizens or local citizens 
Many of the rights now available to migrants in Japan have resulted from the path-
breaking activities spearheaded by Zainichi Koreans keen to tackle the social and 
legal discrimination they faced as ‘foreigners’ living in Japan. As Chung (2010) 
observes, much of the welfare and social protection now available to foreign 
residents—such as a secure residential status, access to social security, protection 
from certain forms of discrimination and employment freedom—were gradually 
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achieved through years of struggle. Many of these struggles were channelled through 
civil society organisations and coethnic networks, which engaged in both lobbying 
activities and service provision—a model subsequently adopted by countless other 
migrant-supporting organisations. 
In addition, many of the ideas and slogans associated with Zainichi activism, such as 
tomo ni ikiru (‘living together’), senshin shimin shakai (‘advanced citizen society’) 
and gaikokujin shimin (‘foreign citizen’ or ‘foreign city resident’) have now entered 
mainstream discourses on integration. In particular, the idea of ‘living together’ 
seems to have been appropriated under the guise of kyōsei or ‘coexistence’. Likewise, 
policymakers seem to have replaced the idea of the senshin shimin shakai with the 
kyōsei shakai (‘coexistence society’). 
However, the adoption of these ideas warrants greater scrutiny. In particular, it is not 
clear where the package of rights and opportunities afforded to migrants in Japan lies 
on the spectrum between assimilationism, at one extreme, and pluralism or 
multiculturalism at the other. While there are elements of multiculturalism in 
tabunka kyōsei, I propose that several concepts that would be associated with 
multiculturalism have not been incorporated into the Japanese term. 
To begin with, it is worth reiterating the views of critics who believe that ‘a potent 
source of confusion is the use of terms such as pluralism and multiculturalism to 
refer simultaneously to a state of affairs and a political programme’ (Barry 2000, 22). 
It is therefore important to distinguish between multiculturalism as a state of affairs 
and multiculturalism as a political programme. The former is an undeniable feature 
of Japan, if we take account of national minorities, immigrants and lifestyle groups. 
For instance, Japan is multinational in the sense that there are indigenous groups 
such as the Ainu and Okinawan communities, which may even be regarded as 
nations in their own right; but it is also home to multiple immigrant groups with 
plural ethnic identities, as well as various lifestyle groups (Weiner 1997). 
Multiculturalism as an official policy programme traces its roots to political 
developments in Canada and Australia in the 1970s. These ideas were soon taken up 
by liberal thinkers, culminating in the development of ‘liberal multiculturalism’. For 
Loobuyck, this is intended to signify ‘a policy within the scope of liberal philosophy 
that seeks maximum accommodation of differences in religious, cultural or ethnic 
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origin in a stable and morally defensible way, in private as well as in public spheres’ 
(Loobuyck 2005, 110). Multiculturalism is often regarded as a positive alternative to 
policies of assimilation, based on a politics of recognition of the citizenship rights 
and cultural identities of ethnic minority groups.  
For Castles, assimilation means ‘encouraging immigrants to learn the national 
language and to take on the social and cultural practices of the receiving community’ 
(Castles 2003, 10). However, Japanese policies of assimilation in the post-war era 
served to restrict the expression of non-Japanese cultural identities; not just those of 
immigrants such as the Zainichi Koreans and Taiwanese who became ‘invisible 
minorities’ (Tai 2009), but also those of indigenous groups such as the Ainu  and 
Okinawans (Kōhei 1996). Until recently, Zainichi communities were required to 
register as aliens and to have their fingerprints recorded as part of their non-
citizenship and those wishing to naturalise were compelled to adopt Japanese-style 
names, further contributing to the disappearance of their ethnic markers (Asakawa 
2003; Tai 2009). 
One issue to note here is the duration of residence. Many migrants might have come 
to Japan as temporary migrants, but have ended up staying for several years. In the 
case of more established immigrant groups, such as the special permanent residents, 
residence has been for several decades or whole lifetimes. What is not always 
explicitly discussed, however, is whether migrants should be treated differently for 
being ‘permanent residents’ and whether the rights of temporary migrants may differ 
in relation to the length of their stay. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that 
individuals’ rights to social claims on the state are determined by their residence 
status rather than their national citizenship (Therborn 1995, 85–99). Thus we need to 
distinguish between the rights accorded to citizens and non-citizens, and the 
gradation of formal and substantive rights available to different groups of foreign 
residents (Morris 2002). 
Japanese citizenship is based on the principle of jus sanguinus: citizenship is 
awarded to those who have blood ties to Japan so that individuals born on Japanese 
soil are not necessarily entitled to Japanese citizenship. Before the 1985 revision of 
the nationality law, this situation was further complicated by the need for the father 
to possess Japanese nationality (Murphy-Shigematsu 2000, 204–5). Thus, 
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generations of individuals born in Japan—particularly resident Koreans and 
Taiwanese who are considered to be foreign nationals and are unable to acquire dual 
citizenship—have been able to apply for Japanese citizenship only through the 
naturalisation process. 
Although many of Japan’s immigrants do not possess citizenship, in some respects 
they are treated as pseudo-citizens. Hammar (1990) first used the term ‘denizen’ to 
describe migrant workers who immigrated to parts of Europe, remaining in their 
destination countries for much longer than intended—or permanently—without 
acquiring citizenship. Later it came to be applied to people ‘who are foreign citizens 
with a legal and permanent resident status’ (Hammar 1990, 15). ‘Special permanent 
residents’, who make up a large proportion of Zainichi Koreans and Taiwanese, 
therefore qualify as denizens under this definition. 
Policy approaches towards denizens can be expected to differ to those aligned to 
citizens, but where do denizens sit with respect to other non-citizens such as 
Nikkeijin or marriage migrants? Mackie, following Ghassan Hage, argues that 
‘citizenship is not a simple matter of a binary distinction between citizens and non-
citizens, but rather a constellation of features which determine one’s position on a 
spectrum of citizenship’ (Mackie 2002, 201). She demonstrates that while lack of 
citizenship rights may lead to absence from the voting franchise, ‘marked features’ 
that are perceived to distinguish foreign residents from Japanese citizens may also 
influence the assumptions underpinning various policies.  
The differences between archetypal ‘Japanese citizens’ and the non-Japanese 
ethnonationals who are of particular interest to this study may be perceived rather 
than real, but that does not diminish their effect in framing the discussions on 
immigration and integration. As Table 2.1 indicates, Japanese nationality is not 
regarded as an attribute of non-Japanese ethnonationals. For example, as mentioned 
in the previous section, an increasing number of Zainichi Koreans are exploring their 
identity as ‘Korean Japanese’ by acquiring Japanese nationality but maintaining an 
ethnicity that draws on their Korean ethnocultural roots. However, Japanese 
discourse at large does not seem to accept the idea of ‘ethnic minorities’ as Japanese 
nationals.  
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Table 2.1 Attributes associated with, or perceived to be associated with, 













+ – – – – 
Japanese 
fluency 
+ + +/– – +/– 
Japanese 
‘blood’ 
+ – + – – 
Japanese 
‘appearance’ 




+ + +/– +/– +/– 
Note: + denotes the presence (or perceived presence) of the attribute in question, – denotes its absence 
(or perceived absence) and +/– denotes high variability in the (perceived) presence of the attribute 
Source: Adapted from Mackie (2002, 204) 
Fluency in the Japanese language—to wit, proficiency in the Japanese language to 
the extent that an observer is given the impression that the observed individual is an 
archetypal Japanese citizen—varies among different groups of foreign residents. 
After migrating to Japan, many Brazilian Nikkeijin were perceived to have Japanese 
language fluency owing to their Japanese ‘appearance’ (Tsuda 2008). In the case of 
highly skilled migrants, there may be disconnect between the perception of fluency 
and the reality. Many highly skilled migrants might have studied Japanese as 
international students in Japan or as a result of having taken Japanese language 
classes. However, without having the appearance of archetypal citizens, highly 
skilled migrants are unlikely to be considered ‘native level’ speakers. 
Whereas highly skilled migrants are often expected to be male, there are more female 
Filipino migrants in Japan than male Filipino migrants. Filipino migrants are likely to 
lack, or be perceived as lacking, many of the attributes associated with archetypal 
Japanese citizens and gender is likely to influence these perceptions. However, this 
does not preclude the possibility that Filipino migrants have the cultural literacy or 
‘cultural capital’ (see chapter four) needed to enable them to negotiate various social 
situations. 
2.5 Summary 
Despite the fact that Japan has a long history of immigration, migrant numbers have 
remained relatively low in comparison to other economically developed countries. 
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The 1990 revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act 
rationalised the status of residence system and was accompanied by ‘side door’ 
policies, which allowed Nikkeijin to emigrate to Japan in greater numbers with no 
restrictions on their ability to work. Since then there has been a gradual increase in 
the stock of foreign residents living in Japan, but Japan’s immigration regime 
continues to be restrictive towards all but the ‘highly skilled’. This clearly has 
implications for the long-term composition of Japan’s migrant population and, by 
extension, the way in which its integration regime is likely to be managed. 
In contrast to Japan’s immigration regime, Japan’s integration regime remained 
undeveloped at the national scale for much of the postwar period. The reluctance of 
the Japanese government to develop integration policies can at least partly be 
attributed to an insistence on preserving a myth of Japanese ethnonational 
homogeneity and the characterisation of Japan as a country of zero immigration 
(Burgess 2014).  
Instead it has fallen to local governments, such as Osaka City and Yokohama City, to 
develop their own policies to support migrants and other foreign residents living 
within their areas of jurisdiction. Many of these policies were designed to address 
issues such as education and housing, and were shaped by the local contexts in which 
they were produced (Milly 2014). Despite an official rhetoric that refuses to 
recognise immigrants, local governments appear to have treated non-Japanese 
ethnonationals as denizens or ‘local citizens’ and afforded them civil and social 
rights in this capacity (Tegtmeyer Pak 2006). 
For this study, what is crucial is to understand to what extent these characterisations 
still hold. That is to say, we need to explore whether the portrayal of national 
government as disinterested in integration policies and local governments as 
integration pioneers still holds. It is also important to understand the ideas which 
permeate the integration policies developed by governmental actors and how these 
have been influenced by non-governmental actors. 
Hence, in the next chapter, I discuss the actors involved in the integration policy-
making process in more detail, focusing on the relations that characterise the 
governance of integration policy-making processes and migrants’ relationships with 
‘the state’ and other institutions.  
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3 Understanding integration policy-making in Japan: 
a relational approach 
3.1 Introduction 
Within migration studies, the specific analysis of migration policy-making has been 
described as an emerging field of research (Penninx, Berger, and Kraal 2006; 
Zincone, Penninx, and Borkert 2011). In what Zincone and Caponio (2006) describe 
as the ‘fourth generation’ of migration research, investigations pose the question of 
how immigration and integration policies are created, operationalised and 
implemented. This research does not focus on the content of these policies per se, but 
on the political processes through which such policies come into existence and how 
their implementation is steered.  
A growing body of research in this field is being produced by scholars from 
IMISCOE, particularly by the Standing Committee on the The Multilevel 
Governance of Immigrant and Immigration Policies, which has sought to theorise the 
relationships between local, regional, national and supranational policies from a 
multilevel governance perspective. More recently, the group has been focusing on 
the strategies used by cities to deal with the challenges of increasing diversity, by 
looking at their links with other governmental and non-governmental actors and the 
approaches that emerge from these relations. 
A separate but related research agenda is being developed by the MIGPROSP project 
on the prospects for international migration governance. Based primarily at the 
University of Sheffield, the research team has been exploring how actors within 
governance systems understand international migration and what these 
understandings mean for the future governance of international migration at national, 
subnational and transnational scales. 
Looking towards Japan, the number of studies concerned with migration and migrant 
integration in urban contexts is growing (for example, Tegtmeyer Pak 2000; Tsuda 
2006b; Shipper 2008; Yamawaki 2007; Chung 2010). Yet, within the Japanese 
context and more widely, more investigation is required into the actors involved in 
the integration process within and across cities, to understand the roles played by the 
45 
state and non-state actors and their relative positions within these policy-making 
spaces.  
Taken together, the concepts of citizenship and governance provide a pertinent 
framework with which to understand and explore the institutional and agential 
dimensions of migration policy-making. Governance focuses our attention on the 
networks of actors involved in the integration process, their roles and inter-
relationships and various strategies of policy-making, including the participation and 
agency of the migrants themselves. In addition, ideas from citizenship enable us to 
explore the dynamics between institutions and migrants, and the expression of these 
complex connections in the way that policies towards migrants are negotiated. 
Some scholars refer to citizenship and governance as multidimensional or multi-
layered processes (Swyngedouw 2005; Dean 2013). This is an important 
development, as it reminds us that citizenship and governance are highly complex 
processes. Here, I conceptualise these processes as having multiple, interconnected 
dimensions, the analysis of which necessitate a clear articulation of which 
dimensions are being explored. Accordingly, this study focuses on the relational 
dimension of governance and citizenship: namely the relations between the actors 
and institutions involved in the integration policy-making process. 
3.2 The relational dimensions of governance 
3.2.1 Governance in a Japanese context 
The concept of governance has received increasing attention within social policy and 
related disciplines since the 1990s (Rhodes 1996; Rhodes 1997; Pierre and Peters 
2000; Swyngedouw 2005; Chhotray and Stoker 2009). Now widely used, governance 
emerged in the 1990s from ‘virtual obscurity’ (Daly 2003, 115) to take an important 
place in the social sciences. Analyses of governance focus on the formal and 
informal actors involved in making and implementing decisions, and the formal and 
informal structures that shape these decisions.  
While government refers to a particular agent of collective power in society, or to a 
particular mode of societal control (hierarchy), governance is connected to the 
process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented. 
Recognising that governance is ‘notoriously slippery’ to conceptualise (Pierre and 
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Peters 2000, 7), and building on the definition offered by Chhotray and Stoker (2009, 
3), I suggest that governance is about the process of collective decision-making in 
settings where there is a plurality of actors or organisations whose relations are 
controlled through both formal and informal institutions and mechanisms. 
First and foremost, therefore, governance focuses our attention on the collective 
decisions required to produce integration policies and the way in which those 
decisions are made by the actors involved. Moreover, it reminds us that central 
government is not the only actor involved in integration policy-making decisions, but 
that the nation-state has been challenged by the complexity of social problems, the 
strength of organised interests, and the growing internationalisation of 
interdependencies (Benz and Papadopoulos 2006). Hence, it allows us to transcend 
the somewhat artificial divide between society and politics by including institutions 
in both spheres that govern and regulate society, either alone or in combination. As 
Sørenson (2006) argues, the ‘dividing line between state and society is blurred 
because of the fact that governance is often produced by networks involving both 
public and private actors’. 
Thus, the governance of integration policies can be thought of as a multi-actor 
process with interlocking, evolving roles and relationships involving foreign 
residents and influencing the integration of foreign residents within Japanese society. 
With reference to Europe, Zincone and Caponio (2006) note that research on migrant 
integration and governance has developed unevenly both in terms of the timing of its 
genesis and of the kinds of themes that have become the focus of researchers’ 
interest. However, this kind of study already represents quite a relevant research field 
in ‘new’ immigration countries, such as Italy (Zincone and Caponio 2005) and Spain 
(Agrela and Dietz 2006; Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). Although Japan is often 
grouped with other new immigration countries (Tsuda 2006a)—despite a long 
history of immigration as noted in the previous chapter—it remains under-researched 
in a field dominated by studies of European and Anglophone countries and contexts. 
Can we, therefore, apply a governance framework to Japan bearing in mind that it 
may not ‘fit’ the Japanese context, or do we disregard the model as Western-centric? 
As Merleau-Ponty so eloquently stated, ‘how can we understand the other without 
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sacrificing him to our logic or without sacrificing [our logic] to him?’ (Merleau-
Ponty 1965, 146). 
We cannot know what is being sacrificed, or negotiated, without appreciating how 
governance is already understood and applied within the Japanese context. The 
English term ‘governance’ was originally incorporated into the Japanese language in 
the form of ‘corporate governance’ (kōporēto gabanansu) and there is a host of 
academic and grey literature in this area. More recently, the term ‘multilevel 
governance’ (marutireberu gabanansu) has also been discussed by Japanese scholars 
in relation to the European Union. Within academic circles, the term ‘gabanansu’ 
has also been used in connection with government structures, since the 1990s.  
Not only has the term been ‘Japanised’, but it has also catalysed new discussions on 
pre-existing Japanese terms. Looking towards the political sphere, Prime Minister 
Obuchi’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21
st
 Century coined the term 
‘collaborative governance’ (kyōchi) in 2000 to conceptualise a ‘new’ approach for 
dealing with contemporary global and social risks: 
This new governance is not adequately expressed by the Japanese word 
traditionally used, tōchi. While we do not repudiate everything about the old 
governance, we suggest calling the new governance kyōchi, a word that 
emphasises cooperation (kyō) rather than governing, rule, or control (tō). (Prime 
Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century 2000, 16). 
It is worth noting that the report was published after a decade or more of Japanese 
economic stagnation and within this context the term was connected with other 
neoliberal ideas introduced at the time. The commission coined the term kyōchi in an 
attempt to encourage the public to change its mind-set on the relationship between 
individuals and society. The inclusion of the new term caused some controversy 
among commissioners, who considered it to have no place in the Japanese language 
(Kawashima and Suzuki 2000). Controversies notwithstanding, the report’s call for 
individuals to take greater responsibility for governance issues demonstrated a 
normative understanding of governance as involving greater responsibilisation. 
While kyōchi never really caught on, the neoliberal ideas underpinning this 
normative form of governance seem to have remained popular with the Koizumi 
administration and beyond (Hook 2010). 
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3.2.2 From multi-level to multi-scalar governance 
Speaking in the mid-2000s, Zincone and Caponio described the emerging research 
on the processes of policy-making for immigration and immigrant integration as a 
‘sort of fourth generation research topic’ (Zincone and Caponio 2006, 2), which 
tackles the problem of understanding how migration policies are decided upon and 
carried out. Like other IMISCOE scholars, they approach this field from the 
perspective of ‘multilevel governance’, a concept that rose to prominence in the 
1990s, especially through studies of the European Union (Marks 1993; Marks, 
Hooghe, and Blank 1996). 
With respect to Japan, Deborah Milly (2014) has used a multilevel governance 
perspective to explore the development of immigration and integration policies at a 
national and subnational scale. Her work seeks to show how new forms of 
governance, involving governmental and non-governmental actors, are characterised 
by processes that affect both national and local approaches to immigrant integration. 
In particular, Milly adopts multilevel governance to refer to ‘the trend of dispersing 
power away from central states and the increasing role of collaborative networks in 
governance, regardless of the role of supranational organizations’ (Milly 2014, 4). It 
is clear that Milly is particularly interested in multilevel governance as characterised 
by intentional devolution and the growth of cross-sector networks—networks that 
span the public, private and non-profit sectors. This resonates with Dingwerth’s 
(2004) definition of governance as the horizontal associational networks of private 
(market), civil society (usually NGOs) and state actors. 
Despite its popularity, however, the concept of multilevel governance is also 
problematic. Several scholars have commented on the need to refine multilevel 
governance, both conceptually and taxonomically (see, for instance, Alcantara, 
Broschek, and Nelles 2016; Jessop 2016). Studies based on multilevel governance 
have also been criticised for concentrating on the complex web of relationships that 
characterise specific areas of policy-making, rather than developing explanatory 
accounts of policy-making processes (Jessop 2016, 19). 
At the heart of multilevel governance is the idea of different levels of governance. As 
Jessop notes, however, it is not clear whether the ‘level’ in multilevel governance 
‘refers to territorial jurisdictions, core-periphery relations among places, the scalar 
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division of labour (with its potentially tangled hierarchies), the nodal character of 
networks’ (Jessop 2016, 19) or some other construct. Furthermore, the multiple 
levels in multilevel governance also imply the existence of a priori hierarchical 
relationships (Stubbs 2005). Within the European context in which the concept of 
multilevel governance was originally developed, Gary Marks defined it as ‘a system 
of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers’, in 
which ‘supranational, national, regional, and local governments are enmeshed in 
territorially overarching policy networks’ (Marks 1993, 402–3). Thus, although the 
EU plays host to a number of actors and institutions with markedly different levels of 
power and resources, this formulation of multilevel governance implies that power 
and resources are vertically distributed. Dingwerth’s (2004) characterisation of these 
relationships as ‘horizontal’ is an improvement, in this sense. 
Several scholars have commented on the need to explore policy-making as a 
multidimensional process in which various actors have a role (for example, Dror 
1983), but ‘multidimensional’ need not necessarily be equated with ‘multilevel’. 
Rather than ‘levels’, some observers refer to different ‘scales’. For example, 
Brenner’s suggestion that ‘scales evolve relationally within tangled hierarchies and 
dispersed interscalar networks’ so that ‘scalar hierarchies constitute mosaics not 
pyramids’ (Brenner 2001, 605–6) appears to be an improvement on the treatment of 
hierarchy within the multilevel governance literature. Jones and others have built on 
Brenner’s idea of interscalar networks through the concept of ‘multi-scalar networks’ 
which ‘link local and trans-local processes, producing and consolidating social 
constructions of place’ (Jones, Jones, and Woods 2004, 104). 
Despite the emergence of new forms of governance, we should not be too hasty in 
dismissing or discounting the continuing importance of the state. In fact, many of the 
‘networked organisations’ that are part of the governance process are ‘both set up by, 
and directly or indirectly controlled by, the state and, regardless of their origins, 
necessarily articulate with the state’ (Swyngedouw 2005, 2002). Regardless of the 
spaces (transnational, national, regional or local) that we may be considering, 
institutions and actors are unlikely to act outside of parameters set by the state or 
without reference to the state. 
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Since the 1990s, neoliberal policies have seen powers ‘up-scaled’ to transnational 
actors and ‘down-scaled’ to local government and civil society in many OECD 
countries. However, even with the rescaling of power, the role of the state is still 
crucial. While power is seemingly devolved away from the state, the state may still 
maintain a degree of control through its relationships with local government or 
through ‘governmentality’: the strategies or ‘technologies’ of governance (Lemke 
2002; Foucault 2010). 
Without ignoring the role of central government, a multi-scalar governance 
framework pushes us to look ‘beyond the state’ (Swyngedouw 2005), enabling us to 
view organisational structures and relationships in addition to the state–migrant 
nexus. What is of interest is not the actors, per se, but the ‘matrix of governance’ 
(Lieberthal 1995) or, better, the ‘choreographies of governance’ (Swyngedouw 2005) 
and the arrangement of responsibilities and control among the actors involved. 
Considering configurations of governance focuses our attention on the forms of 
power (such as control and influence) and linkages (such as networks), which make 
up the mechanisms that drive governance. While actors operating in larger territories 
may have greater access to resources or spatially more expansive networks than 
those operating in smaller territories, this should not necessarily be equated with 
greater influence over integration policy-making processes. Rather than making 
assumptions about the links between scale and influence, this study exploits the 
explanatory potential of governance frameworks to understand how integration 
policies are influenced.  
3.2.3 Central–local government relations 
Most governance scholars emphasise the continuing importance of the nation-state 
within governance arrangements. However, if we are exploring integration as a 
primarily urban phenomenon, which affects some cities more than others, then it is 
also important to unpick the relations between central and local government in Japan.  
There are three main tiers of government in Japan: national or central, prefectural 
and municipal (cities, towns and villages), with larger cities such as Osaka and 
Yokohama having a further tier in the form of local ward offices. Previous theories 
of central–local government relations in Japan have drawn on key works by Tsuji 
Kiyoaki and Muramatsu Michio to understand the relationships between these bodies.  
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In an influential work on the topic, Tsuji (1969) drew on ideas presented by John 
Stuart Mills in his lesser known essays on Representative Government to develop a 
theory of central government as possessing a functional form of control over local 
government, as illustrated by the following excerpt. 
The principal business of the central authority should be to give instruction, of 
the local authority to apply it. Power may be localised, but knowledge, to be most 
useful, must be centralised; there must be somewhere a focus at which all its 
scattered rays are collected, that the broken and coloured lights which exist 
elsewhere may find there what is necessary to complete and purify them. (Mill 
1977, 544) 
Tsuji believed that central–local government relations should be maintained by 
functional (legislative, administrative and financial) control from the centre, using 
the British system as an exemplar. This system is evident in organisations such as 
CLAIR (Council of Local Authorities for International Relations), which is 
administered by staff seconded from both central and local government, helping 
encourage local implementation to national standards. According to Tsuji’s model, 
local governments operate as executive branches of central government, but his 
approach does not adequately account for issues such as local opposition to central 
government policies. With respect to integration policies, the previous chapter 
highlighted the fact that a number of local governments in Japan have developed 
integration policies at the local scale—affording social rights to foreign residents 
living under their jurisdiction despite the lack of integration policies at the national 
scale. While these activities do not necessarily undermine Tsuji’s ideas, they do not 
seem to support the model either. 
Muramatsu (1997; 2001), on the other hand, has proposed a model of 
interdependency, where local governments exhibit some level of autonomy within 
the legislative constraints described by Tsuji. This constrained independence is 
evident in, for example, local government acceptance of subsidised projects such as 
the ‘rainbow bridge’ (niji no kakehashi) project. While the rainbow bridge project 
was designed to enable state schools to support migrant children with Japanese 
language needs, local governments had some control over how these funds were used 
during the implementation phase. Muramatsu (1997) attributes changes to central–
local government relations to ‘bottom-up’ competition between local governments, 
with prefectural governors playing an important role in encouraging local autonomy. 
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With regards to integration, Tegtmeyer Pak (2006) notes that local governments in 
Japan have a history of innovative policy-making going back to the 1960s and 1970s 
and that policies concerning foreign residents fit into this trend. This policy-making 
role has arguably been strengthened since the 1990s with decentralisation (chihō 
bunken) featuring firmly on the political agenda. The path to administrative 
decentralisation and local government reform was initiated in the early 1990s, when 
Japanese Diet cooperation with local government led to the enactment of a law for 
the promotion of decentralisation (chihō bunken suishin-hō) and the creation of an 
associated committee (chihō bunken suishin iinkai) in 1995. Recommendations by 
the Decentralisation Promotion Committee to change central–local government 
relations from hierarchical to cooperative set the direction of subsequent 
decentralisation reform (Yagi 2004, 11). The Diet later put forward an omnibus bill 




While decentralisation has undoubtedly affected central–local government relations 
in Japan, it is not clear what impact this has had on integration policies at either the 
national or the local scale. Scholars such as Reed (1986) have suggested that central 
government may influence local government policies through constraints, guidance 
and advice, but ultimately allow local governments to make their own decisions. The 
influence exerted by central government may, therefore, lead to some level of 
similarity between local government policies. 
However, decision-making at the local level requires the support and cooperation of 
central government. For instance, Aldrich suggests that unless the goals of local 
governments ‘mesh’ with central government objectives, implementing these goals 
may be heavily constrained by ‘financial, administrative and legal ties to the centre’ 
(Aldrich 1999, 70). A simple reading of this argument could be taken to be that 
central government can shape the development of integration policies at the local 
scale through its ties with local governments. However, the argument rests on the 
potential for conflict with central government objectives in terms of integration, or 
related policy areas, if indeed such objectives exist in the first place. 
On the other hand, some commentators argue that the state has been weakened by the 
fiscal crises that have swept across more economically developed parts of the world 
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at various points during the past few decades, most recently in 2007–08. These crises 
have impacted differently on different levels of government and on the relationship 
between these levels (Peters and Pierre 2001). A case in point is Japan where the 
state previously used financial resources as carrots, or sticks, to steer local 
governments. Given that public spending in Japan has reduced over time (Brady and 
Lee 2014), the state’s capacity to use financial incentives is also likely to have 
reduced. However, we also need to consider whether central government would use 
its financial ties to influence local government integration measures, given the 
government’s reluctance to recognise immigrants in the first place. 
Political and administrative actors at different levels of government perceive 
reality—and hence the policy problems associated with it—differently, as they are 
confronted with variation in the contextual factors, actors and aspects of the policy 
problem at hand (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008). The fact that policy does not 
always trickle down to the local level is not always the result of an implementation 
gap or administrative misfit. More fundamentally, different levels of government can 
induce different ways of problem framing. In Japan, since local government officials 
are directly responsible for registering foreigners and dealing with the majority of 
complaints from Japanese residents about migrants in a particular place, they have a 
different perspective to national officials who are only tracking the demographic 
changes from a distance (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000).  
As Milly notes, ‘subnational governments do not just implement national policies, 
they create independent measures, may stretch national policy rules, and advocate 
national policy changes to standards for immigrant inclusion’ (Milly 2014, 22). 
Hence, we may expect integration policies to be developed and framed differently at 
the local scale than at a national scale—and this study has been undertaken to detect 
such variations. 
3.2.4 Local governance, networks and participation 
By viewing ‘local governance’ (or governance at the local scale) as a process which 
establishes the definition and consequences of community membership, one is 
emphasising local government’s qualities as a government and reflecting the 
arguments often made by local elected politicians for greater respect and greater 
autonomy from higher levels of government (Andrew and Goldsmith 1998). On the 
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other hand, there is also a need to be critical towards recent research into local 
government initiatives that ignores the role of central government and its effect on 
other actors (Aiden 2011). Neither central government nor local governments operate 
in a bubble and citizenship issues require interventions at both tiers (García 2006, 
753). While local governments have been active in determining local policies and 
plans, it is necessary to take a broader view of policies adopted by local governments 
within a larger context that includes central government. 
Governance takes account of the autonomous nature of local governments and civil 
society organisations as policy innovators. For instance, Shipper contends that local 
governments have acknowledged the work performed by NGOs and have developed 
innovative policy initiatives with the expertise of these foreigner support groups 
(Shipper 2008, 128–29). This position is backed up by Takezawa’s (2008) research 
into the Kobe earthquake (known as the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Japan), where 
volunteers from the affected areas and beyond subsequently provided various forms 
of support to foreigners, including non-registered foreigners. Ostensibly temporary 
services such as those provided in the aftermath of the earthquake can become 
permanent sources of support, helping to fill vital gaps in the absence of national 
schemes. 
Following the period of proactive local governance in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
pursuit of independent policy-making at the local level has been normalised. Activist 
groups—especially academics—impatient with the national government’s neglect of 
non-entry control aspects of international migration see local governments as a viable 
alternative site for action. 
There are a range of governmental and non-governmental actors that may be 
involved in the governance of integration policies involving and affecting 
immigrants and other foreign residents in Japan. Aside from the governmental actors 
mentioned above, there are various potential actors which may be loosely termed 
‘civil society actors’, including NGOs, trade unions, migrant or coethnic associations, 
social movements, academic experts, and the media.  
Figure 3.1 highlights the different types of actors involved in integration policy-
making at the local scale that are considered to be pertinent to this study. 
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Figure 3.1 Key actors involved in integration policy-making at the local scale 
 
While we have already discussed local governments as key actors in the field, a 
number of organisations exist within civil society with the aim of supporting specific 
causes or groups of people. At the same time, a number of organisations exist to 
support migrants, including informal and formal networks of ethnic associations. For 
the purposes of this study, non-governmental organisations that support migrants are 
of particular interest.  
Lying at the boundary between local governments and migrant-supporting 
organisations are international exchange associations or foundations (kokusai kōryū 
kyōkai/zaidan). These were developed in the 1980s as part of Japan’s 
internationalisation agenda to foster cultural exchange, including cultural exchange 
between Japanese cities and cities in other countries through the sister city movement 
(Ertl 2008). This movement later expanded to include what became known as 
uchinaru kokusaika, or ‘inward internationalisation’. While the internationalisation 
movement was criticised for essentially ignoring Japan’s domestic ethnocultural 
diversity, uchinaru kokusaika drew attention to this oversight. Hence, the remit of 
international exchange associations slowly expanded to include support services 
(generally advice and information services, and language classes) aimed at migrants 
living in local communities. 
While civil society organisations (including NGOs, advocacy groups and non-state 
foundations and associations) have been active in Japan for decades, it was not until 
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1998 that civil society organisations were able to register as non-profit organisations 
under the ‘Law to Promote Specified Non-Profit Activities’ (tokutei hieiri katsudō 
sokushin-hō). With the enactment of the NPO Law, as it commonly called, thousands 
of civil society organisations registered to become specified non-profit organisations 
(see Figure 3.2).  
A specified NPO (hereafter, just NPO) is under the jurisdiction of either the 
prefecture or city where its main office is located (but only if the city is a designated 
city). Once an organisation has completed the necessary procedures and turned in the 
necessary documents to the jurisdiction office, the jurisdiction office ‘authenticates’ 
that organisation as a NPO as long as it fulfils its legal requirements. NPOs that have 
cleared the standard conditions and received authorisation from the director of the 
National Tax Administration Agency become authorised/certified NPOs. According 
to the Cabinet Office, there were 51,518 nintei (‘authenticated’) NPOs and 1,021 
ninshō (‘authorised’) NPOs in Japan in 2016. The key difference between the two 
categories is that donors to ninshō NPOs are able to benefit from income tax 
deductions, unlike donors to nintei NPOs, but this privilege comes with stronger 
government oversight. 
Figure 3.2 Number of specified NPOs in Japan, 1998–2016 
 
Source: NPO Homepage, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. Available at https://www.npo-
homepage.go.jp/ 
For Milly, ‘the combination of dispersed policy responsibilities and increased roles 























































































policy advocacy at local and national levels by changing citizens’ understanding of 
and investment in foreign residents’ (Milly 2014, 6). Local government or NPOs 
may choose to advocate or lobby central government for policy change, or they may 
be able to influence central government indirectly by participating in local 
governance, albeit that their role in local governance may not have been intended to 
be used for advocacy purposes (Milly 2014, 23). 
Immigrant-advocacy NGOs in Japan have worked with local government officials to 
target influential actors, especially the national bureaucracy and the Supreme Court, 
to influence policy outcomes on immigration (Shipper 2008). Local government 
officials, dedicated to fostering a distinct collective identity for their community, 
make good partners in such endeavours. 
Moreover, many migrant-supporting NPOs and NGOs are part of regional or national 
alliances. Of particular relevance is the Kansai NPO Alliance—a network of NPOs in 
the Kansai region which covers the prefectures of Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Nara, Shiga, 
and Wakayama. At a national scale, many migrant-supporting organisations are 
members of Ijūren—also known as the Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan—
which is a Tokyo-based organisation that advocates on behalf of migrant-supporting 
organisations in Japan. 
For scholars such as Rhodes (1996), governance involves cooperation and 
coordination through formal and informal networks of actors. He goes on to argue 
that these networks are driven by ‘the need to exchange resources and negotiate 
shared purposes’ and that they are subject to a complex dynamic and are not directly 
accountable to the state but that the state may be able to steer networks ‘indirectly 
and imperfectly’ (Rhodes 1996, 660).  
In addition to these networks, Rhodes (1997) also believes that policy networks 
matter. Policy networks, involving committees, civil servants, professions, interest 
groups, provide the crucial framework for including some interests, while excluding 
others. All governments confront a variety of interests, and so aggregating those 
interests is a functional necessity. As discussed in chapter two, committees have 
played an important role in developing migrant policies in Japan, as in the case of the 
TKSK and the development of its report on the promotion of tabunka kyōsei in local 
communities (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). 
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Speaking about strategies for managing policy networks, Klijn and others have 
highlighted the importance of managing relations within an existing network, as well 
as strategies to change the structure of a network or the actors participating in it 
(Klijn, Koppenjan, and Termeer 1995). However, the network concept and how best 
it should be analysed, remains somewhat problematic and unclear. As Marsh and 
Smith (2000) argue in terms of policy outcomes, it is unclear how much explanation 
is down to the existence of a particular network, and what it is about that network 
that delivers certain outcomes. 
3.2.5 Transnational actors and institutions 
The discussion so far has been limited to actors and institutions that are physically 
located within Japan and which operate primarily at a national, regional or local scale. 
However, there is also a need to consider the actors and institutions operating chiefly 
at a transnational scale, which may be involved in the governance of integration 
policies in Japan. 
Looking towards the transnational space, many scholars still see limited significance 
of ‘postnational’ or international organs outside of the EU context (for example, 
Joppke 1999). While transnational institutions may be able to encourage change, they 
do not necessarily challenge the sovereignty of the state, whereas the rights and 
services conferred by local governments and NGOs are actually enforced (Tsuda 
2006b, 10). Moreover, if we look beyond the European Union, there are no global 
institutions that have the ‘teeth’ to enforce postnational or supranational forms of 
citizenship.  
Addressing claims that advocates of international human rights standards have not 
adequately demonstrated their importance in domestic policy-making, Gurowitz 
(1999) argues that international norms have helped bring about significant changes to 
discriminatory policies in Japan. While Japan may have adopted international norms 
as part of its role as an international player, many quarters ‘have attributed the 
various improvements in policy toward Korean-Japanese (as well as toward Buraku 
and Ainu) in large part to ratification of these agreements’ (Gurowitz 1999, 429).  
Both Gurowitz’s work and the previous example highlight the role of the Japanese 
state in absorbing international ideas and in working with other nation-states to agree 
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domestic and regional policies. This is not to say that transnational actors have no 
part to play in Japanese governance arrangements, but that much of what we consider 
to be transnational activities are conducted between states and subnational actors, 
rather than via supranational agencies. 
As Milly (2014, 15–16) notes, although East Asia and other regions lack 
transnational institutions analogous to the EU, other international and transnational 
mechanisms have been used to influence the treatment of migrants and other foreign 
residents in Japan. As discussed previously, international norms have been used to 
bring about domestic changes in Japan (Gurowitz 1999) and some transnational 
institutions have effectively brought about policy change through extra-
parliamentary tactics (Chung 2010). For example, pressure applied through the US 
Department of State’s ranking of individual countries’ human trafficking conditions 
in the 2000s, combined with ongoing pressures from domestic actors, led to changes 
in the legal status of foreign trainees (Milly 2014). 
In Japan, although the proportion of foreign residents among the total population is 
small in comparison to other industrialised countries, hundreds of support groups 
exist to offer a variety of services to foreign workers and advocate for their rights and 
welfare (Piper and Ball 2001). Among these, women’s groups in particular often 
promote and appeal for strong transnational linkages against human trafficking and 
the violation of human rights. Most have established local ‘networks’ within their 
own country and some have begun to establish transnational links, particularly with 
an Asia-Pacific focus (Piper and Ball 2001). There are also a few NGOs which do 
lobbying work at an international organisational level, including Ijūren (the 
Solidarity with Migrants Network Japan). 
3.3 The relational dimensions of citizenship 
While governance focuses our attention on the actors involved in integration policy-
making decisions, migrants are often only discussed to the extent that they are 
involved in participatory forms of governance. However, as the subjects of 
integration policies, and given their stake in the outcomes of those policies, more 
focus is needed on migrants themselves. Hence, in this section I draw on the 
citizenship literature to look at the relationships between migrants and central 
government, and between migrants and local government, in more detail. 
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3.3.1 Citizenship and the state–migrant nexus 
Since the 1980s, closely allied to discussions of migrant integration has been the 
concept of citizenship (Schmitter Heisler 1992). Migration studies have tended to 
adopt a particular view of citizenship as being liberal-democratic and ‘national’ 
(Soysal 1994; Sassen 2002). In other words, citizens are regarded as ‘loyal’ to 
territorially-bounded nation-states, as represented somewhat stylistically in Figure 
3.3a. Bauböck comments that the link between citizenship and the nation-state was 
reified by the American and French Revolutions (Bauböck 2003, 140), but this 
connection was not always the status quo. In the Greek conception of citizenship, 
citizens participated in the government of the polis, with Athens being the prime 
example. Works by Jean Bodin and Johannes Althusius in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries marked a shift in understanding, in which the citizen was 
regarded as falling under the sovereign influence of a larger territorial state (Bauböck 
2003, 140). This system is often referred to as the Westphalian model, but whether or 
not the Treaties of Westphalia actually provided the blueprint for this system is 
highly debateable (Osiander 2001). 
Within this schema, issues such as possible ‘leaks’ in territorial boundaries (Ferrera 
2005, 13), the existence of political communities other than the nation-state and the 
loyalty of individuals to more than one such community have, to a large extent, been 
downplayed (Bauböck 2003). These assumptions are present in Marshall’s casting of 
social citizenship as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a 
community’ (Marshall 1950, 28), characterised by its triumvirate of civil, political 
and social rights. 
Figure 3.3 (a) The state–migrant nexus (left) and (b) an expanded view of the 
state–migrant nexus (right) 
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Rather than treat social citizenship as a hierarchy of civil, political and social rights, 
Dean (2013) reconceptualises social citizenship in terms of ‘sociality’ (the competing 
meanings that attach to social interdependency) and ‘negotiation’ (the dynamics of 
the claims process through which needs may be acknowledged or recognised). As a 
‘post-Marshallian’ concept, social citizenship involves multiple sites of 
interdependency and multiple sites of dialogue for the negotiation of social rights. 
Thus, while integration policies and policy-making are often analysed in terms of the 
actions of the Japanese state (Figure 3.3a), a less ‘rigid’ view of citizenship permits 
non-national spaces of negotiation to be taken into account involving local 
government actors as well as central government actors (Figure 3.3b).  
In the past these sites of negotiation may have been limited to physical spaces such 
as forums, but ‘we now live in a world where the capacity to communicate across 
time and space not only dissolves the significance of territorial boundaries, but also 
makes virtual communities with shared needs and interdependencies possible’ (Dean 
2013, 12). While I would argue that the significance of territorial boundaries has not 
been completely ‘dissolved’, Ellison and Hardey (2013) believe that new forms of 
communication made possible by Web 2.0 based technology (especially social media 
platforms, whose reach and accessibility are augmented by Wi-Fi penetration) have 
enabled open-ended conversations and forms of virtual participation that can and do 
lead to new forms of ‘solid’ engagement and protest. 
Within the expanded state–migrant nexus, desirable behaviour is not necessarily 
enforced by the state, but a web of incentives and disincentives may be spun around 
society to extract voluntary obedience and to ‘mould conduct’ (Rose 2000: 323). 
Seen from a political or Foucauldian perspective, new welfare governance implies a 
form of working upon ‘the ways in which individuals regulate their own behaviour to 
ensure this is consonant with the interests of the state’ (C. Pierson 2004, 75). Hence, 
any exploration of migrant-related policies and policy-making processes would be 
incomplete without an attempt to understand the implications of particular policies 
on the rights, responsibilities and expectations placed upon immigrants and other 
foreign residents. 
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3.3.2 Citizenship as a multidimensional construct 
Dean’s idea of claims and counterclaims, or the politics of need, is also present in 
Tilly’s view of citizenship as ‘a continuing series of transactions between persons 
and agents of a given state in which each has enforceable rights and obligations 
uniquely by virtue of the person's membership in an exclusive category’ (Tilly 1996, 
230). Yet, Tilly’s formulation is problematic insofar as it assumes that these 
transactions necessarily take place between individuals and the state. Dean’s analysis 
proceeds through a complicated layering of heuristics, too detailed to explore here, 
but its significance lies in its multidimensional conceptualisation of social citizenship 
that ‘loosens its bonds with the nation state, so that citizenship is defined over a 
spectrum that extends from the global, through to the local’ (Lister 2003, 196). 
The increasing impact of globalisation and the emergence of non-governmental 
actors are giving rise to new understandings of citizenship that question the link 
between nationality and citizenship (Sassen 2002). Beginning with Soysal’s (1994) 
seminal work on Gastarbeiter (‘guest workers’) and ‘postnational citizenship’, the 
debate has been extended to encompass both transnational and ‘local’ (subnational) 
institutions, and membership based not only on nationality but also on personhood.  
While the territorial and exclusionary nature of Japanese citizenship is certainly 
important, this study does not view citizenship simply in relation to the Japanese 
nation state. Nor is this study concerned with social citizenship or postnational 
citizenship, per se. Rather, this study is concerned with citizenship as a multi-
institutional and multi-actor process with multiple sites for the negotiation of needs 
and rights between migrants, the national government, local governments and other 
actors. 
There are several reasons for looking at subnational institutions, including local 
governments, NGOs and, potentially, businesses/employers. To begin with, although 
migrants and other foreign residents are not guaranteed the same access to social 
services as ordinary citizens under national policy, many local authorities and NGOs 
are tackling discriminatory practices at a ‘local’ level, treating foreigners as ‘local 
citizens’ (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000; Tegtmeyer Pak 2006; Yamanaka and Akiba 2014).  
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According to Andrew and Goldsmith, ‘local citizenship conveys the potential for 
local government structures to represent and/or reinforce the interrelationship of 
individual and collective identities’ and ‘captures the idea of the city and the locality 
as the appropriate levels for an arena of debate’ (Andrew and Goldsmith 1998, 110–
11). As local citizens,
7
 foreign residents are afforded the same rights as ordinary 
citizens in terms of access to services (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000). Local governments are 
thus forging a form of immigrant policy that accepts foreigners in an inclusive way. 
According to García: 
‘Urban and regional forms of citizenship’ develop when: policy instruments are 
introduced locally and regionally in order to maintain and/or create social 
entitlements as a result of citizens’ demands or as a result of local institutions’ 
innovative practices; and when the mechanisms for political integration provide 
an open sphere for participation and contestation not only for established citizens, 
but also for denizens. These are forms of citizenship because they ‘result in 
diverse forms of appropriation of national laws as citizens’ rights’. (García 2006, 
754) 
As ‘local citizens’, migrants’ nationality may not prevent them from accessing 
services that are available to them as residents, but other practical issues such as 
Japanese language illiteracy or unfamiliarity with local procedures could pose a 
problem. It may therefore be expected that policy approaches towards foreign 
residents would aim to resolve such problems. Local governments and civil society 
organisations are in a good position to transform the informal/formal rights that 
foreign residents possess into substantive rights. 
As well as social rights, local governments have also been active in trying to secure 
more political rights for migrants as local citizens in terms of local suffrage. 
The upward trend of pro-local suffrage among voters coincides neatly with 
growth in local government calls to grant foreigners’ voting rights—and in 
related newspaper articles. In 1993, for the first time in Japan, 16 local 
governments passed resolutions calling for foreigners to be allowed to vote in 
local elections, and in the next year, another 172 local governments passed 
similar resolutions. By 2001, 1,439 local governments had passed such 
resolutions, representing 73% of Japan’s total population. The number of articles 
devoted to foreigners’ local suffrage in two major national newspapers, the Asahi 
                                                 
7
 Tegtmeyer Pak’s (2000) translation of gaikokujin jūmin as ‘local citizen’ should be qualified, as 
‘foreign resident’ offers a more objective approximation to the original. Defining foreign residents 
as local citizens strengthens Pak’s argument, but it could also be viewed as a misleading 
interchange of terms. 
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Shimbun and the Nikkei Shimbun, dramatically increased from only nine articles 
in 1987-93 to 104 articles in 1994-2000. Takao (2003, 534) 
Hitherto we have focused on the rights that citizens, or residents, may be entitled to 
within the democratic state of Japan, or within Japanese cities, but we cannot look at 
this relationship under the naïve assumption of ‘something for nothing’. In affording 
rights to foreign residents, Japanese institutions are also signalling the expectations 
that they are placing upon foreign residents in terms of obligations (cf. Milly 2014). 
Marshall proposed that ‘the normal method of establishing social rights is by the 
exercise of political power, for social rights imply an absolute right to a certain 
standard of civilization which is conditional only on the discharge of the general 
duties of citizenship’ (Marshall 1950, 43). 
For Philp (1999) these ‘duties of citizenship’ can be categorised as two forms of 
demands: procedural and participatory. Whereas procedural duties involve behaving 
in a way commensurate with the acceptance of the procedures of the political process 
that one may wish to influence, participatory duties concern the activities which link 
citizens to their political representatives within a common political culture (Philp 
1999, 25).  
While Philp’s categorisation is useful, it is only through empirical investigation that 
the real implications of these demands can be deciphered. The contextually-specific 
conditions that are enmeshed in these duties (or obligations) are crucial for 
understanding the material and symbolic effects of these demands on the 
involvement of foreign residents in the policy-making process. 
Another issue to consider in relation to local citizenship is the extent to which it is a 
substantive form of citizenship. Tsuda (2006c, 278–83) contends that substantive 
(local) citizenship is predicated not only on the implementation and enforcement of a 
particular set of rights, but also on the ‘active civic participation’ of migrants as 
members of their ‘residential communities’. This involves recognition of their civic 
belonging and commitment to actively claim and exercise the rights to which they 
are entitled. 
Tsuda argues that migrants do not actively engage in civic participation for three key 
reasons: the instrumental economic motives of migrants, a sojourner mentality and 
ethnic segregation. According to Tsuda, the majority of migrants in Japan are 
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interested in amassing as much money as possible for the duration of their time in 
Japan. This means that many migrants’ lives revolve around work, leaving much less 
time for civic activities. At the same time, migrants may frequently relocate in order 
to take advantage of new employment opportunities, or as a result of losing 
employment, which is not conducive to developing a sense of belonging. This may 
be compounded by the cultural and linguistic barriers that migrants face, inhibiting 
their sense of civic community and engagement as ‘local citizens’. 
3.4 Towards a relational framework 
The model in Figure 3.4 below summarises some of the key ideas from the 
discussion so far. Unlike previous research which focuses on the state–migrant nexus 
(including Cornelius, Tsuda, and Valdez 2003), and more recent research which 
scrutinises relationships between local government and migrants (inclduing Tsuda 
2006a), this model identifies several actors whose roles and interrelationships could 
be fruitfully investigated to understand how policies affecting foreign residents are 
made and governed. These roles and relationships are shaped by the particular 
sociocultural, political, economic and historic factors that coalesce to form the 
‘Japanese context’. 
While the ‘conventional’ focus of citizenship is the relationship between individuals 
and the state, governance focuses our attention on the wider assemblies of 
governmental and non-governmental actors involved in the policy-making process, 
and their roles, inter-relationships and various strategies of policy-making, including 
the participation and agency of immigrants/foreign residents themselves. Moreover, 
the decisions made by these actors are enacted in different spaces—the transnational, 
the national, the regional and the local scales of cities and municipalities—and the 
roles of these spaces and their interconnectedness are therefore an integral part of this 
conceptual framework. 
A key feature of the model is that foreign residents are positioned at the centre and 
relationships with other actors stem from here. While ‘bottom-up’ approaches are an 
improvement on ‘top-down’ perspectives—insofar as they identify key institutional 
relationships with reference to foreign residents first and foremost, and then between 
institutions—both approaches imply that these relationships are vertically structured. 
Instead, the model here presents the relationships between the various actors as 
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dynamic and non-hierarchical. Of course, the distribution of power and resources 
among various actors and across relationships may vary considerably, but this 
distribution is a matter for empirical investigation. 
Figure 3.4 Key relationships in the governance of integration 
 
The model focuses on the actors that are ‘physically’ located in Japan, as well as 
those actors who may be physically located elsewhere, but whose transnational 
activities may have an impact on Japanese policy-making. The Japanese context 
would be inappropriate for contextualising all the activities of transnational actors. In 
the case of bilateral and multilateral agreements, we would need to reproduce the 
model for all the countries involved and identify linkages between these countries 
and the contextual layers in which they operate. Such a framework may be useful for 
comparative research, but falls outside of the scope of the present study.  
The influence of transnational activities on the political, sociocultural and economic 
conditions in Japan should also be noted, in terms of their impact on, and 
involvement of, the other actors in the model. Japan’s historical and geographical 
position in East Asia or the Asia Pacific, and as a member of international 
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organisations, also influences its domestic policies. Betts (2011) suggests that what 
makes governance ‘global’ is not the ‘level’ at which it is identified—whether 
bilateral, regional, transnational, or supranational—but rather the fact that it is 
constraining or constitutive of the behaviour of states and transnational actors. 
However, this definition is rather narrow, suggesting that global governance must 
have an effect on actors’ behaviours for it to be recognised and implying that this 
influence is top-down. 
Nor should we assume that the Japanese state must operate at the national scale. 
States are simultaneously involved in transnational and multilateral processes that 
ultimately have implications for national and local policies. At the same time, 
ministries such as the MOJ have local branch offices, especially in larger cities. 
These branch offices bypass the local government structure and enable the state to 
deal directly with local residents. 
Given the multi-scalar and multi-spatial nature of governance, even ‘local’ actors 
may engage in activities that could be considered to have a transnational flavour, 
such as the ‘sister city’ programme. Moreover, the governance structures that apply 
within one prefecture or municipality may vary from one prefecture to the next. For 
example, Osaka City Government performs many of the duties that prefectural 
governments would conduct in other localities. In addition, the city of Osaka is 
subdivided into 24 wards, each with its own ward office and varying numbers of 
foreign residents with different demographic makeups. 
The relationship between the state and ‘civil society’ in Japan is also noteworthy. 
The blurring of the state/civil society boundary in Japan is of more than theoretical 
interest. In most policies we can see how the institutions of the Japanese state work 
with non-governmental actors in ways that would be considered unusual, perhaps 
impossible, in many Western states (Neary 2003). 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has drawn together key concepts from governance and citizenship-based 
approaches to migration studies in order to create a combined framework for 
exploring integration policies and policy-making processes within a Japanese context. 
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The previous chapter demonstrated that the development of integration policies (and 
indeed immigration policies) within Japan may be viewed as a multi-actor process. 
The purpose of this chapter was to expand upon this by showing that citizenship and 
the governance of integration policies may also be viewed as multidimensional 
processes, involving multiple actors and multiple scales. Moreover, focusing our 
attention on the relations between the actors and institutions involved in the 
production of integration policies allows insights from governance and citizenship 
based approaches to be combined in one framework, while offering a relational 
perspective on the issues at stake. 
It is important to bear in mind that the concept of governance was not developed in a 
Japanese context, but has subsequently entered Japanese academic and political 
discourses. In particular, the term kyōchi, while short-lived, indicated a form of 
governance centred on collaboration with civil society actors in the delivery of public 
services. The role of migrant-supporting organisations, particularly specified NPOs, 
is of particular concern to this study. 
Much of the literature exploring migration policies through a governance lens has 
done so through the lens of multilevel governance—a conceptual framework 
developed primarily through studies of the European Union. While multilevel 
governance has been particularly useful in urging scholars to look at the role of 
transnational institutions in policy-making alongside national governments, this 
study is particularly interested in the role of subnational or local governments in the 
development of integration policies. For the purposes of this study, power and scale 
are regarded as more useful stratifying concepts than territorial ‘levels’ alone. 
However, it is easy to lose sight of the centrality of migrants in the integration 
policy-making process. While migrants are often constructed as passive policy 
subjects, there is also a need to consider migrants as key actors in the governance of 
integration policies—for example, as individuals who may make claims on the state 
as residents or local citizens within particular cities. Alongside the civil and social 
rights that migrants may be entitled to—either at a national or local scale—we also 
need to be aware of the expectations and obligations that are placed on migrants. 
Given that this is still an emerging research area, the governance–citizenship 
framework developed in this chapter must be tested and validated in the field. The 
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next chapter outlines an analytical framework for understanding how integration 
policies are being developed in Japan, and experienced by migrants, based on a 
Bourdieu-inspired field analysis.  
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4 Analysing integration policy-making: a field 
analytical approach 
4.1 Introduction 
Although governance can be viewed as a collaborative process rather than an 
adversarial one (Ansell and Gash 2007), there is a need for scholars to view all forms 
of governance with a critical eye—to scrutinise, for instance, whether collective 
decision-making is truly collective or whether policy-making practices are as 
democratic as they profess to be. Yet, we also need to understand why particular 
forms of governance occur, why certain actors are involved in decision-making 
processes, or not involved as the case may be, and why particular policies are 
pursued or implemented. 
In their review of contemporary debates in policy studies, Ayres and Marsh (2013) 
note that the theorisation of policy-making within policy studies has been dominated 
by approaches developed within American branches of political science. In particular, 
analysis of policy-making as a sequence or cycle of interrelated activities or stages 
has tended to dominate discussions of policy-making ‘processes’, with its focus on 
problem identification, agenda setting, deliberation and development of potential 
actions, implementation of agreed actions and evaluation. According to John (2003), 
the 1990s were dominated by three explanatory approaches to the theorisation of 
policy-making, based on the concepts of policy streams (Kingdon 1995), punctuated 
equilibria (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993). Although very different, all three approaches share similarities 
in their appreciation of the importance of ideas, as well as (rational) actors, 
institutions, groups and networks, and exogenous factors (John 2003).  
Public policy analysis is, however, now rich in concepts and methods devised to 
understand the social contexts in which policies are produced, or constructed (e.g. 
Gusfield 1994), and which problematise the concept of policy itself (Shore and 
Wright 1997). One such approach articulated by Dubois (2014b) involves the 
application of field analysis. A Bourdieu-inspired field analysis of integration policy-
making encourages the researcher to view the governance and state-migrant 
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relationships at the heart of policy-making more critically, while also providing a 
distinct explanatory logic for policy change.  
This chapter begins by identifying and discussing examples of how field analysis has 
been used in migration studies to date. It then goes on to describe how the production 
of integration policies may be viewed from a field perspective, before discussing 
what this study is contributing to the literature. I argue that it offers a fresh 
perspective on existing concepts—one which highlights the dynamics of the power 
relations between actors and institutions involved in the struggle for developing 
integration policies, while challenging the behavioural assumptions underpinning 
certain governance approaches. 
4.2 Field analysis in migration studies 
As mentioned in chapter one, a field is essentially a space of relations—not simply 
between actors, but between the characteristic resources, practices and other 
attributes of those actors. Thinking systematically in terms of fields involves viewing 
all aspects of society in terms of fields. 
There have been some attempts to develop field-based or relational approaches in 
migration/integration studies already. Of particular note are the works of the Dutch 
scholars Peter Scholten and Justus Uitermark. While both these approaches apply 
Bourdieu’s ‘tools’ for very specific purposes, both have merits worth discussing in 
their own right. 
Scholten’s (2011) work draws on the relational approach developed by Bourdieu and 
his structuralist-constructivist perspective, combined with Rein and Schön’s (1996) 
work on problem framing and frame reflection, to explore the dialogue between 
migration (and migration research) and migration policy-making in a Dutch context. 
However, it should be stressed that the ideas and insights developed by this work 
have implications and applications beyond the Dutch context. 
According to Scholten, framing a problem requires ‘naming specific facets from 
problem situations and an inherently normative way of framing them into cognitive 
stories about what is going on, who is involved, why it is going on and what could or 
should be done to provide a solution’ (Scholten 2011, 33). His work builds on Schön 
and Rein’s (1994) approach to problem framing, which recognises the influence of 
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the structural setting in which framing takes place. According to Scholten, they ‘refer 
to frames as being connected to particular institutional forums that induce actors to 
name and frame a problem situation in a specific way’ (Scholten 2011, 33). And 
sometimes the structures of those forums induce actors to reflect on those frames or 
possible alternatives. 
Scholten criticises Rein and Schön’s approach for its ‘loose’ conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of institutional forums and thence goes a step further by viewing 
science and policy as fields of structured relations. The problem Scholten addresses 
is the very specific nature of the relations between policymakers and researchers (the 
‘research–policy nexus’) and how changes in this nexus are connected to changes in 
the way that immigrant integration is framed in policy and research. The analytical 
insights drawn from the field perspective, and in particular the intersection of 
different fields, helps explain changes in the relationships between those fields in the 
Netherlands at different periods of time and their connection to the framing of 
immigrant integration.  
For Uitermark (2012), while European countries have exhibited increasing 
convergence in terms of integration policies, integration politics (i.e. the struggles 
through which differences and inequalities are constructed between individuals and 
groups that share the same nationality, namely the Dutch one) has become more 
contentious (Uitermark 2012, 22).  
According to Uitermark, integration politics are contested in the ‘civil sphere’—
those institutions and communicative channels where actors negotiate the conditions 
and nature of civil belonging (Alexander 2006). He draws on the work of Bourdieu 
to develop a political sociology of integration politics, by recasting Alexander’s civil 
sphere as a field. In fact, Uitermark (incorrectly) identifies the civil sphere as the 
Bourdieuian ‘public sphere situated at the intersection of the political field and the 
bureaucratic state’ (Wacquant 2013, 276). Civil politics is a discursive struggle, 
where discourse is defined as a ‘coherent ensemble of framing and feeling rules 
through which meaning and emotion are ascribed to material and social realities’ 
(Uitermark 2012, 29).  
Uitermark is seemingly more critical of Bourdieu than Scholten, and sees Bourdieu’s 
understanding of the concept of ‘symbolic power’ (the power to recognise or 
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legitimise forms of capital) as one that not only absolutizes discourse, but also 
absolutizes power. This, for Uitermark, is demonstrated in Bourdieu’s ‘principled 
unwillingness to examine [actors’] interactions’ which ‘reduces his capacity to 
understand the dynamics of collective action’ (Uitermark 2012, 29). Uitermark 
therefore complements his field analysis with network analysis and discourse 
analysis to better grasp the dynamics and ambivalence of power relations and hence 
understand changing immigrant integration approaches in the Netherlands 
(specifically, Amsterdam and Rotterdam). 
While Bourdieu’s work should not be accepted uncritically, Uitermark’s criticism of 
Bourdieu’s work ignores key elements in Bourdieu’s extensive body of work, 
especially the notion of habitus which he scarcely touches upon. Although less 
prominent, there are elements in Bourdieu’s oeuvre which indicate an interest in 
change and strategies for change (discussed later in this chapter) albeit through a 
field-analytical perspective rather than an interactionist one. Introducing network or 
discourse analysis into the mix could therefore be regarded as excessive.  
Furthermore, Bourdieu rarely, if ever, spoke in a sustained and systematic way about 
the civil sphere. Rather, he spoke of coalitions or movements in which ‘the 
dominated’ among the dominant actors would align themselves with actors from 
outside the field of power in attempts to gain greater shares of resources and 
influence (Emirbayer 2010, 403). This makes the recasting of the Bourdieuian field 
of power as the civil sphere somewhat problematic. In fact, he was fiercely critical of 
Alexander’s cultural sociology (see, for instance, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
Overall, however, both Scholten’s study and Uitermark’s demonstrate the versatility 
and explanatory power that Bourdieu’s analytical toolkit offers. While some 
governance-based arguments have been criticised for being too descriptive, such as 
the networks approach (Heard-Lauréote 2005, 43), field analysis can offer deep and 
distinct insights into individuals’ behaviours and practices within the governance of 
immigrant integration. 
Rather than try to mesh field analysis with other frameworks, this study seeks to 
demonstrate how governance and state-migrant relations can be viewed through a 
field analytical perspective. Following Scholten and Uitermark, the intention of this 
study is not to use Bourdieu’s work as an off-the-shelf theoretical framework, but as 
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an insightful framework through which to explore the design and delivery of 
integration policies in Japan. 
4.3 The field of integration policy-making 
4.3.1 The structure of the field of integration policy-making 
In developing this analytical framework, I draw on the work of Vincent Dubois 
(2014b), who has outlined a field-based framework for introducing Bourdieu’s 
political sociology into policy analysis. Dubois is specifically interested in what he 
terms the ‘space of production of a policy’ (Dubois 2014a). As Dubois points out, 
‘the notion of the field was conceived as a transposable tool capable of explaining 
the logics specific to each differentiated space of relationships and practices’ (Dubois 
2014b, 199). In other words, field-based approaches are designed to be flexible and 
to be used in different modes of study. 
According to Paulle et al. (2012) there are three key concepts in a Bourdieu-inspired 
field analysis: the field/space, capital/power and habitus. An appreciation of all three 
concepts is essential for rethinking integration policy-making in terms of fields. 
For the purposes of this study, I am interested specifically in what may be termed the 
field of integration policy-making (or using Dubois’ terminology, the ‘field of 
production of integration policies’). Within this space, integration policies can be 
regarded as: 
[…] the product of the practices and representations of the agents involved in it, 
these practices and representations being determined by the social characteristics, 
interests and objective positions of the agents, and therefore the structure of the 
relationships among them. (Dubois 2014b, 204) 
As discussed previously, the ensemble of actors and institutions involved in the 
governance of policy are often described as a ‘matrix of governance’ (Lieberthal 
1995) or in terms of the ‘choreographies of governance’ (Swyngedouw 2005). 
Uitermark (2012) defines these relationships as ‘figurations of governance’, in an 
apparent nod to Norbert Elias’s (2012) concept of figurations—essentially 
homologous with the Bourdieuian concept of field or space (for a comparison, see 
Paulle, van Heerikhuizen, and Emirbayer 2012). In order to avoid confusion, 
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however, I describe these relationships as ‘configurations of governance’ (within the 
integration policy-making field). 
Bourdieu regarded the field as a ‘configuration of objective relations between 
positions’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). More precisely, the field of 
integration policy-making can be conceptualised as a structure of relations not 
between the actors themselves (e.g. specific NPOs or the migrants supported by 
those organisations) but, rather, between the ‘nodes’ that those actors happen to 
occupy (Emirbayer and Williams 2005, 691). In other words, the units of analysis are 
not concrete or empirical entities but constructed or ‘epistemic objects’—objects of 
investigation employed in the research process (Knorr-Cetina 1999). 
Epistemic objects are defined in terms of where they are situated within a relational 
system. Bourdieu indicates that the nodes or positions within a field are: 
[…] objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose 
upon their occupants, agents, or institutions, by their present and potential 
situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) 
whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the 
field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, 
subordination, homology, etc.) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97) 
Put simply, the nodes or positions within the integration policy-making field must be 
analysed in terms of the distinctive profiles of capital associated with them. In fact, 
the concepts of field and capital are intrinsically interlinked: just as ‘a capital does 
not exist and function except in relation to a field’, so too, conversely, the 
distribution of types of capital ‘constitutes the very structure of the field’ (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992, 101). Or as Elias (2012) contends, power is an emergent 
property of relations that emanates from, and structures, social interactions.  
Exactly what sort of power or capital is at stake depends on the field. Within the field 
of integration policy-making, the central stake is the power or authority to determine 
legitimate integration policies. This includes the power to decide who should 
legitimately benefit from those policies. For Bourdieu, the state has a monopoly on 
the legitimate use of symbolic violence, within a given territory, and so the state is 
often a dominant actor (if not the dominant actor) within a given field. 
Different actors within the integration policy-making field will have different forms 
of capital which are relevant to the field. For example, some local governments or 
76 
NPOs may have more extensive or more close-knit networks of relationships than 
others. This social capital can be used to gain new forms of capital, such as 
informational capital (for an interesting discussion on informational capital, see 
Bourdieu 1994) as described below. However, we cannot determine the forms or 
volumes of capital that actors possess without empirical investigation. 
As discussed previously, all governance approaches recognise that different actors 
are involved in the integration policy-making process beyond ‘the state’. However, 
by viewing these actors through the lens of the field, we can determine which actors 
have relatively more or less control in determining integration policies and whether 
particular actors are using their existing power or capital to gain more control.  
For Bourdieu, capitals function both as weapons and as stakes in the struggle to gain 
ascendancy within fields: a struggle for successful monopolisation of the specific 
authority which is characteristic of the field in question (Emirbayer and Williams 
2005). This means that the competing stances and choices vying to define and 
implement policies in a particular way (e.g. assimilationism) can be related to the 
positions and interests of those who advocate them. Put another way, there may also 
be some form of correspondence between the content of a particular integration 
policy (its orientation, its style) and the relational structure of the configuration of 
governance actors involved in its production (Dubois 2014b, 205). 
Hence, what Bourdieu’s perspective highlights is the structural tension between 
occupants of ‘dominant’ and ‘dominated’ positions within any social microcosm. 
Indeed, Bourdieu conceives of the field along the lines of an electromagnetic field, 
with dominant and dominated poles that actors (or agents, as Bourdieu would say) 
seem to gravitate towards. In Bourdieu’s work, these poles are often identified as the 
temporal/economic pole and the spiritual/cultural pole respectively (see Figure 4.1). 
Especially significant in all such struggles (again, as both a stake and a tool) is what 
Bourdieu terms ‘symbolic capital’: capital in any of its forms insofar as it is accorded 
legitimacy (positive recognition, esteem, honour, and so forth) by relevant actors 
within the field. Contestations over symbolic authority are a crucial feature of field 
dynamics and those actors who succeed in amassing it gain considerably in their 
efforts to assume a dominant position within the field as a whole (Emirbayer and 
Williams 2005).  
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Figure 4.1 Basic structure of a Bourdieuian field 
 
 
In Bourdieu’s early writings, he focused on three particular forms of capital—
economic, cultural and social capital—as highlighted in the following excerpt. 
[…] capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, 
which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be 
institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is 
convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be 
institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, 
made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is convertible, in certain 
conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a 
title of nobility. (Bourdieu 1986, 242) 
Previous migration studies have fixated on social capital (e.g. Cornelius, Tsuda, and 
Valdez 2003). The terms ‘social capital’ and ‘social networks’ have at times been 
used interchangeably (Ryan, Erel, and D’Angelo 2015), but here it is taken to mean 
the means by which actors within the field of integration policy-making, including 
migrants, are able to mobilise their social networks and ties.  
Bourdieu identifies various kinds of capital within a field that can be accumulated 
and strategically deployed by actors within a field, including political capital and 
informational capital. Political capital allows its holders to define what is at stake 
within the field of integration policy-making and, ultimately, to define integration 
policies. Informational capital (of which cultural capital is one dimension) endows its 
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holders with a seemingly ‘authentic’ understanding of the integration issues affecting 
‘foreigners’ in Japan. 
In any field analysis, it is crucial to inquire into the tacitly shared interests, concerns, 
and ultimate beliefs that constitute the ‘cost of admission’ into those fields. These 
attachments also guarantee that the ‘dynamism and processuality constitutive of 
fields do not involve perpetual upheaval’ (Emirbayer 1997). Bourdieu (2000) points 
out that unspoken agreements are often lodged at the level of what he terms the 
‘habitus’.
8
 By this, he means the system of dispositions that become like second 
nature to actors either through childhood socialisation within the family (‘primary 
habitus’) or more specific mechanisms of socialisation in later life (‘specific 
habitus’). Such dispositions include deeply ingrained modes of perception, emotional 
response and action within the world, but also manners and bearing, ways of 
speaking, forms of dress, and so on, as discussed in more detail below. 
Before continuing, however, it is worth reiterating that the field of integration policy-
making is a configuration of objective relations between positions or nodes 
determined by the kinds of capital possessed by the actors within the field. How 
these actors are positioned in physical space is only relevant insofar as it influences, 
or is influenced by, the kinds of capital that those actors are able to accumulate and 
use. So, for example, this could mean that actors who are positioned in different 
geographical territories, or who act at different scales, may occupy nodes which are 
relatively closer in the field of integration policy-making than actors who are 
colocated. Viewed from a geographical perspective, this relationship may appear as 
‘scale jumping’, but from a field-analytical perspective what is of importance is the 
nature of the relationship between those actors—how it came to be and what it 
enables those actors to do. 
It is also worth pointing out that integration policy-making is likely to intersect with 
other policy areas, particularly immigration policy-making. By extension, the fields 
in which these policies are produced are also likely to intersect. While immigration 
policies are not the focus of this study, they are still considered to be important for 
understanding the integration regime in Japan. What happens in immigration policies, 
                                                 
8
 While the concept of habitus was already in use before Bourdieu appropriated it (Bourdieu 1985), 
his formulation of habitus has been considerably influential. 
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and other relevant policy areas, may have a bearing on integration policy-making 
processes. 
4.3.2 Governmental and non-governmental actors from a field 
perspective 
In the previous chapter, I proposed that the state should not be viewed as a 
monolithic whole but split between central government—including the Diet and 
government ministries—and local government, which can be further divided between 
prefectural governments, municipal (city) governments and local ward offices. 
There is some precedent for this in Bourdieu’s writing. In Bourdieu’s later works, he 
construes the ‘state’ not as a monolithic, coordinated ensemble, but as a splintered 
space of forces, which he calls the ‘bureaucratic field’, vying over the definition and 
distribution of public goods (Bourdieu 1994). 
According to Wacquant’s interpretation of the bureaucratic field: 
The bureaucratic field is traversed by two internecine struggles. The first pits the 
‘higher State nobility’ of policy makers intent on promoting market-oriented 
reforms against the ‘lower State nobility’ of executants attached to the traditional 
missions of government. The second opposes what Bourdieu calls the ‘left hand’ 
and the ‘right hand’ of the State. The left hand, the feminine side of Leviathan, is 
materialized by the ‘spendthrift’ ministries in charge of ‘social functions’—
public education, health, housing, welfare and labour law—which offer 
protection and succour to the social categories shorn of economic and cultural 
capital. The right hand, the masculine side, is charged with enforcing the new 
economic discipline via budget cuts, fiscal incentives and economic deregulation. 
(Wacquant 2015, 239–40) 
Bourdieu’s perspective on the state is instructive insofar as it reminds us not to 
objectify the state and to be aware of the tensions that characterise intragovernmental 
relations, namely relations between different central government departments or 
ministries.  
This study attempts to fill a gap in Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the state, by 
examining the role of local government in integration policy-making processes in 
more detail. One way to do so is to analyse the relationship between central 
government and local government as a form of struggle by developing Bourdieu’s 
treatment of local government as part of the so-called ‘lower State nobility’ 
(Bourdieu 1994). Another is to treat the structure of local government as homologous 
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with that of the bureaucratic field, with local governments characterised by the same 
‘tensions’ that characterise the bureaucratic field in general.  
Following Medvetz’s (2015) analysis of think tanks, there are at least three different 
ways to conceive of the role of migrant-supporting organisations: as part of the field 
of integration policy-making, as a separate field within their own right or as 
‘boundary organisations’ operating at the intersections between the field of 
integration policy-making and other fields. For the purpose of this study, I will not be 
looking at local governments or at migrant-supporting organisations as part of 
separate fields but as part of the field of integration policy-making. However, the 
theme of intersections—which has also been taken up by Scholten (2011)—is 
revelant to this study. Of particular pertinence is the intersection between the field of 
immigration policy-making and the field of integration policy-making. 
4.3.3 Field-specific strategies 
Since habitus—or dispositions acquired through experience—serve as a generative 
principle for strategies of action, differences at the level of habitus help to explain the 
different strategies of control and resistance that actors find themselves inclined to 
pursue in a ‘context of indeterminacy’ (Peillon 1998, 222). Habitus, or the ‘feel for 
the game’ as Bourdieu often describes it, ‘is what enables an infinite number of 
“moves” to be made, adapted to the infinite number of possible situations which no 
rule, however complex, can foresee’ (Bourdieu 1990a, 9). 
Those actors who occupy the weakest positions in the field of integration policy-
making, in terms of control over integration policies, are likely to be those with 
habitus least well-suited for the struggles specific to that field. However, 
commonalities at the level of habitus also serve to bind all actors within the field 
together, despite the structural tensions that may separate them. As Bourdieu puts it, 
a ‘fight presupposes agreement between the antagonists about what it is that is worth 
fighting about; those points of agreement are held at the level of what “goes without 
saying”’ (Bourdieu 1993, 73).  
For Bourdieu, there are three core forms of field strategy: strategies of conservation, 
succession and subversion. Understanding these strategies can help inform our 
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understanding of changes in configurations of governance within the field of 
integration policy-making. 
If the habitus (which informs practice) is aligned with the objective structure of the 
field of integration policy-making, we can expect the field to be defined by a 
relatively stable social order and a collective memory that favours constancy and is 
resistant to change (Bourdieu 1990b). The legitimacy of capital or other entities 
within the field would then be based on cognitive and moral judgments about the 
‘consistency’ of those entities with the taken-for-granted norms, or doxa, associated 
with the field. If there is alignment between the habitus and the field, or a strong 
hierarchical structure within the field, the ‘space of possibles’—a phrase often used 
by Bourdieu (see, for instance, Bourdieu 1996)—may be limited and therefore the 
habitus would incline toward orthodoxy rather than policy transformation.  
Dominant actors in the field of integration policy-making may use conservation 
strategies aimed at defending their position and sustaining the doxic social relations 
of the field (Swartz 1997). The collective memory structures of habitus also structure 
cognition, leading to phenomena such as path dependence or the closing down of the 
space of possibles (Bourdieu 2014). New actors may pursue strategies of succession 
aimed at gaining access to dominant positions in the field, consistent with ‘fitting in’: 
adopting existing cognitive norms and patterns of behaviour (Stringfellow and 
Maclean 2014). By contrast, activists in the field of integration policy-making are 
likely to lack institutional legitimacy. It is therefore less likely that transformative 
integration policies will be espoused if the field of integration policy-making is 
relatively stable. 
The need to achieve or maintain institutional or policy legitimacy in the field of 
integration policy-making may limit the potential for creativity and transformative 
policy-making practices, unless the relationship of actors to the field changes in such 
a way that the field itself is transformed. Such a transformation could be described as 
a ‘break in equilibrium’ (following Bourdieu) or ‘critical juncture’ (P. Pierson 2003). 
Pierson argues that once path-dependent processes have been put into motion, 
‘specific patterns of political mobilization, the institutional “rules of the game”, and 
even citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world will often generate 
self-reinforcing dynamics’ (P. Pierson 2003, 196). 
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If the field of integration policy-making is less stable or undergoing a period of flux, 
actors may be able to establish new patterns of legitimate behaviour during a critical 
juncture. Taken-for-granted structures and doctrines that were previously invisible, 
and subconsciously accepted, may then be identified and challenged. Competing 
narratives or discourses, such as those associated with policy transformation, may 
therefore emerge. These discourses would still relate to the past and present 
dynamics of the field, but would position actors in accordance with anticipation of 
institutional or policy change. Actors could use these ‘windows of opportunity’ (cf. 
Kingdon 1995) to generate strategies of succession aimed at achieving dominance, 
while balancing the dual requirements of ‘fitting in’ and ‘standing out’. Hence, the 
stability or instability of the field of integration policy-making could be a key factor 
in explaining policy change or transformation. 
By contrast, activists may pursue strategies of subversion—more radical attempts to 
break free from dominant policymakers and other actors by challenging and 
delegitimising the logic and practices associated with the status quo (Stringfellow 
and Maclean 2014, 178). These strategies are more likely to be used by less 
dominant actors in the integration policy-making field, who have less to lose by 
disrupting the field. However, by adopting strategies that run counter to the taken-
for-granted rules and behaviours of the field, these actors are essentially trying to 
swim against the tide, making it more difficult to destabilise the authority of 
dominant actors in the field. 
4.3.4 Governance and social praxeology 
The way in which theories in policy studies are brought into dialogue is problematic. 
Theory inevitably entails ontological and epistemological commitments, but these 
are explicitly examined less frequently than would be desirable (Cairney 2013). 
Hence, this section draws out some of the ontological and epistemological 
underpinnings of field analysis more explicitly. 
Bourdieu was ‘not a governance theorist’, according to David Swartz, nor did he ‘use 
the language of governance’ (Swartz 2003, 141). This is primarily because Bourdieu 
did not cast his work in terms of disciplinary boundaries, whereas concepts such as 
governance are heavily associated with disciplines such as political science and 
political sociology. At the same time, Bourdieu disagreed with much of the literature 
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associated with governance, especially where it made normative claims about the 
implementation of public policy. Nonetheless, many of the concerns reflected in 
Bourdieu’s work (e.g. the crisis facing the modern welfare state) and in his personal 
views (e.g. the wish to make public services more democratic) are shared by many 
‘governance theorists’.  
In identifying the overlap between Bourdieu’s field analytical framework and the 
concerns expressed by governance theorists, Swartz goes on to say that: 
Field analysis brings Bourdieu close to the analytical level and strategy 
recommended by Rod Rhodes (1997, 29) for a governance perspective; namely, a 
‘meso-level’ approach that links micro expressions of particular interests with 
macro power concerns. Thus Bourdieu’s field analytical approach to politics, like 
the new governance perspective, brings into play a broader range of power 
centres contributing to political life than do approaches focused on the central 
organism of government. (Swartz 2003, 151) 
Despite the overlap, it should also be noted that the tone of Bourdieu’s work is also 
very different to the approach taken by many governance theorists. Bourdieu does 
not talk about collaborative or cooperative forms of governance, but instead focuses 
on domination and the struggle for power.  
This is particularly evident in Bourdieu’s writing on the delegation of political 
authority, which he viewed as a form of political alienation. Delegates obtain their 
power from the group and the group in turn is shaped by delegates. However, by 
handing over some authority to a delegate, people in dominated positions (such as 
migrants) are at risk of ‘dispossession’, i.e. migrants become more constrained to 
rely on delegates for their political voice. According to Swartz, Bourdieu’s analysis 
of delegation is a wake-up call for governance theorists who believe that acts of 
delegation such as decentralisation may lead to more democratic forms of 
representation and policy implementation (Swartz 2003, 107–11). As a result, 
migrants, for instance, may not find increased representation in these configurations 
of governance. 
While governance based theories that adopt rational choice as a starting point believe 
that individuals behave in ways designed to maximise their ability to choose 
particular options based on their preferences (whether purely rational or based on 
self-interest), embedded within the field are assumptions about the behaviours people 
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engage in. Bourdieu’s ‘social praxeology’ contends that individuals behave in ways 
consistent with the ‘rules of the game’ (the taken for granted assumptions inherent 
within a particular field). In other words, their behaviours are either part of their 
habitus—their ‘natural’ dispositions within the field—or else designed to disrupt the 
taken for granted principles (doxa) within the field. 
For our purposes, this means that actors are not developing integration policies based 
purely on what is rational or what they themselves may desire. Instead, the agency of 
policymakers and other actors within the field of integration policy-making is 
structured by the structures and institutions within the field. Likewise, those 
structures themselves are constructed and reconstructed by actors whose actions are 
based on principles consistent with the field in which they are positioned. 
There may appear to be some similarities between the field-based understanding of 
people’s behaviours and that of the bounded rationality approach to governance 
(Chhotray and Stoker 2009). Based on the work of Herbert Simon, the bounded 
rationality approach has recently gained traction as it provides a counter to the 
rational choice assumptions that underpin the delegation approach to governance. 
While rational choice suggests that individuals behave in ways that maximise their 
preferences, given the constraints presented by an external environment, bounded 
rationality suggests that individuals also have to deal with their inner world. It 
suggests that rationality is ‘bounded’ by the framing role of the human mind 
(Chhotray and Stoker 2009). However, the fundamental difference between the 
approaches is that the social praxeological approach regards individuals as having 
cognitive instruments which are structured by the world (socially bounded), while 
Simon’s focus is on the biological limitations of human reason. 
In this sense, the social praxeological assumptions underpinning the field-based 
approach have more in common with cultural institutional theory, which posits that 
people’s interests are the product of social relations. People’s preferences and their 
management strategies to realise these preferences are shaped by their ways of life. 
Cultural institutional theory regards decision-making processes not as purely 
cognitive but also as socially influenced: ‘mental activity is embedded in and 
justifies social relations’ (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 58). 
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Terms such as ‘strategy’ thus take on a different meaning within field analytical 
frameworks, as they are closely connected with the habitus characteristic of 
particular fields. As Bourdieu explains: 
This word, strategies, evidently has to be stripped of its naively teleological 
connotations: types of behaviour can be directed towards certain ends without 
being consciously directed to these ends, or determined by them. The notion of 
habitus was invented, if I may say so, in order to account for this paradox. 
(Bourdieu 1990a, 9–10) 
Hence, actors within the field of integration policy-making will follow courses of 
action that are consistent with their habitus, rather than actions that are based on 
rational calculations or utility maximisation. 
4.4 Interactions at the frontline 
4.4.1 The position of migrants in the field 
The position of migrants within the field of integration policy-making can be viewed 
in different ways. One possibility is to view their relationship with other actors as an 
uchi-soto (‘insider-outsider’) relationship. Migrants and other foreign residents may 
play a key role in integration policy-making processes as ‘insiders’ (uchi). This could 
be as community leaders or as members or employees of key organisations. On the 
other hand, migrants are also ‘consumers’ of policies and services designed to 
support their settlement and integration. As consumers (soto), they are less likely to 
play a direct role in the formulation of integration policies. 
The concept of habitus becomes particularly relevant at the interface between social 
policy ‘providers’ and foreign residents who consume integration and social policy 
services. For Bourdieu, this relationship is marked by ‘misrecognition’—where acts 
of control are often (mis)recognised as benign or benevolent (see, for instance, 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). By contrast, migrants who recognise these acts as 
forms of discipline or coercion may pursue different ‘strategies’ of resistance to 
counter strategies of control, as discussed above.  
Strategies of control and resistance should not necessarily be perceived as intentional, 
for they may be enacted through routine practices which are generated by a habitus 
(Peillon 1998). Two sets of practices are particularly pertinent: practices generated 
by the habitus of those who produce and deliver integration and social policies, and 
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practices engendered by the habitus of those who consume or are targeted by those 
policies. In fact, diverse habitus are probably involved in each category, as both 
‘producers/providers’ and ‘consumers/recipients’ do not constitute uniform 
categories. 
Following Emirbayer and Williams (2005), Figure 4.2 presents a template for 
viewing the position of migrants within the field of integration policy-making. The 
field is polarised between forms of capital which are most valued by service 
providers (‘provider-sanctioned capital’) and those forms which are most valued by 
migrants as service users (‘client-sanctioned capital’). Immigrants and other foreign 
residents who are rich in provider-sanctioned capital may be looked upon more 
favourably by service providers than those who lack such capital. In other words, 
foreign residents (in their positions as denizens, clients or consumers) who do not 
rock the boat, so to speak, may garner more support from ‘street-level bureaucrats’ 
than those who do. 
Figure 4.2 Basic structure for viewing the position of migrants vis-à-vis service 
providers within the field of integration policy-making 
 
 
While some migrants may be relatively rich in either of these forms of capital, others 
may be rich in neither. This is not to say that those migrants would have no influence 
in the field, but that they may have to rely on other strategies in order to secure the 
services and support they need or desire. 
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4.4.2 Migrant capital as substantive citizenship 
In addition to configurations of governance, Bourdieu’s ideas on capital suggest that 
citizenship constitutes a key mechanism of distinction between migrants and 
Japanese ethnonationals. From this perspective, citizenship is a strategically 
produced form of capital (or capitals), which manifests itself (or manifest 
themselves) in formal (legal and institutional) as well as informal (practised and 
cultural) aspects (Bauder 2008). Both aspects of citizenship can render migrants 
more vulnerable than Japanese ethnonationals, for example by channelling migrants 
into the secondary labour market or the informal economy. This view of citizenship 
corresponds to the treatment of citizenship as a strategic concept not only in 
association with constructions of identity and belonging, struggles over recognition, 
and the politics of participation and contribution, but also in relation to regulating 
access to scarce resources and institutionalising difference (Bauder 2008, 316). 
Formal citizenship, arguably, functions as a form of capital in the sense intended by 
Bourdieu: it is a strategically deployed category that can be exchanged with other 
forms of capital and serves the aim of accumulation and reproduction (Bauder 2008, 
321). In the sense that formal citizenship permits the denial of economic rights, 
formal citizenship (or lack thereof) is a legal mechanism of inclusion/exclusion. 
When migrants, qua denizens or non-citizens, can only enjoy a limited bundle of 
rights (e.g. conditional labour-market access), the lack of formal citizenship can be 
said to function as a ‘mechanism of subordination’ (Bauder 2008, 322). 
Informal citizenship is a dimension of membership in a national community related 
to practices of identity and belonging. This substantive dimension of citizenship 
complements formal citizenship as a mechanism of distinction and applies to 
migrants who ‘are not considered “to belong” to the nation state community’ (Bauder 
2008, 323) regardless of any formal entitlement they may or may not have. 
In this sense, Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital is particularly relevant. Cultural 
capital, according to Bourdieu (1986), appears in three states: embodied, 
institutionalised and objectified. Thinking about the first two categories, embodied 
cultural is perhaps best expressed in the concept of habitus, which includes bodily 
comportment and speaking as markers of distinction; while institutionalised cultural 
capital includes formal education qualifications and certifications (Erel 2010).  
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Bourdieu’s articulation of cultural capital could be used to reconsider ideas 
associated with informal citizenship. For example, informal citizenship cannot 
entirely be separated from ‘race’, as ‘racial markers’ often signify cultural non-
belonging. These markers can be considered to be an embodied form of cultural 
capital. However, the notion of informal citizenship as a category of distinction and 
exclusion can be applied in a more territorial manner than the category of race: a 
person’s belonging may not be defined so much by racial markers as by having 
access to ‘territorially defined cultural codes and conventions and by being able to 
enact place-particular habitual performances’ (Bauder 2008, 324). In other words, 
informal citizenship is dependent on the space or field in which it is enacted. 
Informal citizenship distinctions associated with belonging and entitlement also 
shape migrants’ situations in a more direct manner. For example, migrants are often 
unable to give the cultural performances expected from the members of an ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson 2016). They may be unable to speak Japanese fluently, 
especially the more formal Japanese required in administrative environments 
(linguistic capital), or they project embodied images or institutionalised symbols of 
non-belonging which limit their access to employment, education or other 
opportunities. This process of exclusion or discrimination also extends to policy-
making processes, which tend to privilege certain forms of cultural and political 
capital at the expense of others. 
Formal and informal aspects of citizenship can further be translated into economic 
and other forms of capital. For example, particular categories of migrants (such as 
highly skilled migrants) may be able to afforded privileges and opportunities that are 
not available to migrant groups. In this context, of course, citizenship is not 
independent from class, race, gender or other categories of distinction (Bauder 2008, 
326). 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has considered how concepts associated with governance and 
citizenship may be analysed through a relational framework—more specifically, the 
field analytical framework developed by Bourdieu, based on the conceptual 
triumvirate of fields, capital and habitus. 
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By viewing the production of integration policies through the lens of the field of 
integration policy-making, actors involved in these policy-making processes become 
reconfigured in terms of their relative positions within the field. Actors in the field 
are characterised by the capital they are able to accumulate and wield in their 
struggle to formulate integration policies at different scales and to decide who may 
benefit from those policies.  
While actors’ behaviours may be shaped by the specific habitus associated with the 
field of integration policy-making, they are also likely to use different strategies to 
try to maintain or conserve the status quo or to try to subvert it. Again, these 
strategies will depend on their relative dominance within the field and the kinds of 
capital they have at their disposal. 
As actors in their own right, migrants’ actions in the field are also characterised by 
the specific forms of capital that they are able to leverage to access particular 
services and forms of integration support. However, it is important to consider how 
migrants’ cultural capital (in particular their embodied and institutionalised cultural 
capital) may promote or hinder their ability to achieve particular outcomes in terms 
of their own or their families’ settlement and integration. 
As Peillon observes in his use of Bourdieu’s analytical toolkit, ‘the usefulness of this 
framework will be decided by the empirical work it performs: by the way it makes 
sense of practices and institutions observed in concrete welfare situations’ (Peillon 




As discussed in the previous chapters, this study has explored integration policies 
and policy-making in Japan through a relational framework. This framework has 
drawn on the concepts of governance and citizenship, but the relational dimensions 
of these concepts have been viewed through the lens of field analysis. Hence, 
appropriate research methods were needed in order to be able to investigate these 
phenomena with due appreciation for their complexity.  
As part of this approach, the policy-making processes in question were explored 
through detailed case studies of the policies and practices involving actors and 
institutions operating within and across two particular cities, namely Osaka and 
Yokohama. A review of the particular, historically-endowed sociocultural, political 
and economic contexts that have combined to form these urban contexts has helped 
construct ‘the objective structures […] that define the external constraints bearing on 
interactions and representations’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 11). 
Data were gathered from multiple sources for this case study research in order to 
triangulate and validate the findings. One aspect of the research focused on 
identifying and gathering integration policy documents: central government 
legislation and reports and local government reports and policy documents, 
supplemented with reports produced by NGOs and trade associations. These 
documents were reviewed in order to assess their relevance in terms of the research 
questions. Relevant documents were analysed thematically to better understand how 
and why certain integration policies have come into existence, and how their 
implementation was steered, while ‘deconstructing’ the categories embodied in these 
texts with reference to the contexts in which they were produced. 
Building on the data gathered through the document review, the main apsect of the 
research involved interviews and focus groups with integration policy stakeholders. 
Interviews were conducted with ‘policymakers’ (government advisors, civil servants 
and local government officials) and representatives from migrant-supporting 
organisations, while focus groups were carried out with migrants and other foreign 
residents in order to understand the positions they occupy in the field of integration 
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policy-making. The fieldwork was carried out over three time periods: December 
2014 to March 2015, September 2015 to October 2015 and March 2016 to April 
2016. 
These qualitative research methods were used to explore the ‘immediate, lived 
experience of agents in order to explicate the categories of perception and 
appreciation (dispositions) that structure their action from inside’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, 11). Allowing policymakers to put forward their accounts of the 
processes and relationships involved was a crucial step towards piecing together the 
patterns of integration policy-making processes. Moreover, the assumptions and 
perceptions that underpin policies toward migrants—as well as the expectations that 
are placed on migrants in the design of particular services, initiatives or measures—
were also investigated.  
5.2 Exploring integration policies and practices relationally 
5.2.1 The case study approach 
There was a strong rationale for choosing a comparative case study strategy to 
address the research questions in this study. Case studies usually focus on a small 
number of instances of a particular phenomenon with the aim of exploring various 
aspects of it in detail. While more than one instance may be investigated, case studies 
are used to extract in-depth information that cannot be gained from mass studies such 
as surveys. In other words, the ‘aim is to illuminate the general by looking at the 
particular’ (Denscombe 2007, 36). 
Case studies are appropriate where phenomena cannot be generated artificially, or 
controlled by the researcher, but must be investigated in their natural settings. The 
complexity of the policy-making processes in question meant that there was a need to 
carry out fieldwork in situ, namely in the cities of Osaka and Yokohama. While a 
comparison of two case studies has its limitations, using embedded units or subunits 
(such as wards within the cities) can lead to a richer analysis (Ragin 1994). Data can 
be analysed within each subunit separately (within case analysis), between the 
different subunits (between case analysis) and across all of the subunits (cross-case 
analysis).  
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Case studies focus on relationships and processes rather than outcomes; or in Yin’s 
(2009) terms, a focus on how and why questions. For this study, I was interested in 
the ways in which actors and institutions based in Osaka and Yokohama—and to 
some extent, the prefectures of which they are part—have created and implemented 
policies towards foreign residents under their aegis, with reference to other actors 
and institutions. This called for a meticulous understanding of the relationships 
between the various actors and foreign residents themselves, as well as an 
appreciation of the ways in which policies are shaped and produced at different 
scales. Indeed, this is where Bourdieu’s approach was particularly instructive, as it is 
intended to explore ‘bundles of relations’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 16). 
What separates case studies from other social research is that information is gathered 
from a variety of sources using a variety of methods. One advantage of this approach 
is the greater potential for validation through triangulation of methods (Denzin 2009, 
297–313). For example, the views of central and local government officials and 
NGO representatives were compared with the accounts of foreign residents. However, 
care was taken to ensure that there was continuity of purpose in the collection of the 
data. This required coherence between the methods used to collect the various data 
and the objectives that these data contributed towards (as discussed below). 
According to Yin (2009), one of the major problems in single-case and few-case 
research is a failure to make the transition from analysis at the subunit level to 
analysis at a level where the research questions can actually be addressed. In other 
words, researchers can become so engrossed in the details of the case that they 
neglect the goals of the project. While coding reorganises the data, it is the task of a 
connecting strategy to understand the data in context and to draw connections 
between the various utterances and events into a ‘coherent whole’ (Maxwell 2009, 
238). In a case study design, the holistic case study is used to connect the various 
strands of the research. 
Categorising and connecting strategies should not be viewed as mutually exclusive 
and it is important that both are used to make sense of the data. As Maxwell explains, 
both ‘categorizing and connecting strategies are legitimate and valuable tools in 
qualitative analysis, and a study that relies on only one of these runs the risk of 
missing important insights’ (Maxwell 2009, 238). These considerations were taken 
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into account when analysing the data obtained through the different collection 
methods (see below). 
5.2.2 Osaka and Yokohama: key sites of immigrant integration 
There were several reasons for selecting Yokohama and Osaka as the case cities for 
this study. As mentioned in chapter one, Osaka and Yokohama are the two 
‘designated cities’ (municipalities with over 500,000 residents and designated as 
cities by government ordinance) with the highest numbers of foreign residents. Both 
cities are home to migrants and other foreign residents from the most prevalent 
groups of non-Japanese ethnonationals in Japan. Moreover, the policies and practices 
in these two cities alone have the potential to affect a considerable number of foreign 
residents.  
With a combined population of over six million people, including 200,000 registered 
foreign residents, Yokohama and Osaka are not just populous cities but places with a 
significant history of migration that have become important sites for interactions 
between Japanese and non-Japanese ethnonationals (see chapter two). This was an 
important factor in the selection of Osaka and Yokohama as the study sites, as it 
increased the likelihood of being able to secure an ethnonationally diverse sample of 
participants. 
Table 5.1 Number and percentage of registered foreign residents by nationality 
in Osaka and Yokohama, as at December 2016 
Nationality 
Osaka Yokohama 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
China 30,072 23.7% 36,444  40.8% 
Korea 66,530  52.5% 12,986  14.5% 
Philippines 3,431  2.7% 7,420  8.3% 
Vietnam 7,432  5.9% 4,964  5.6% 
Brazil 962  0.8% 2,589  2.9% 
Nepal 1,140  0.9% 2,789  3.1% 
USA 1,485  1.2% 2,407  2.7% 
Taiwan 4,287  3.4% 2,672  3.0% 
Other 11,471  9.0% 17,127  19.2% 
Total 126,810 100.0% 89,398 100.0% 
Note: The nationality column is ordered by prevalence of those nationalities among the registered 
foreign resident population of Japan as a whole. 
Source: Shikuchōson-betsu kokuseki/chiiki-betsu zairyū gaikokujin (foreign residents by municipality 
and by nationality/region). Available at http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001177523 
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In the case of Osaka, the Zainichi Korean community is particularly well established, 
with Korean nationals making up over half of the registered foreign resident 
population, while Chinese nationals accounted for a further quarter in 2016 (see 
Table 5.1). In Yokohama, Chinese nationals represented approximately 40% of the 
registered foreign resident population. The ethnonational diversity of the local 
populations was treated as one potential explanatory factor for any observed 
differences in integration policy-making processes between the two cities. 
Another consideration in the selection process was the wider impact of the 
integration policies being investigated. While innovation has played an important 
role in the development of local government policies toward foreign residents, 
Tegtmeyer Pak (2000, 70–71) believes the diffusion of these policies to other local 
governments is as likely to happen through the adoption of ‘best practices’ as it is 
through other means. The designated cities have gre influence in this respect, as their 
privileged positions have afforded them greater fiscal capacities and budget 
flexibility (Kitayama 2001). Hence, Yokohama and Osaka were selected with the 
expectation that the policies and programmes in these cities may represent some of 
the most forward-looking initiatives of their type and may be typical of current best 
practices. 
Within each city, the integration policy-making processes at ward level were treated 
as subunits for a potentially richer analysis. The distribution of the approximate 
126,000 foreign residents in Osaka was found to be far from even across its 24 wards, 
but the proportion of foreign residents in every ward exceeded the national average 
(see Table 5.2).  
Nearly 28,000 foreign residents were based in one particular ward, Ikuno, 
representing 22% of the ward population and roughly a quarter of all foreign 
residents in Osaka. Of these, close to 93% had a Korean background and the ward is 
home to several generations of Korean families as well as Japan’s largest 
‘Koreatown’. Ikuno was also identified as one of the few wards to explicitly address 
the needs of foreign residents in the design of its ‘local welfare action plan’ (Ikuno-
ku Chiiki Fukushi Akushon Puran Sakutei Iinkai 2006; Ikuno-ku Chiiki Fukushi 
Akushon Puran Suishin Iinkai 2011). Hence no investigation of integration policy-
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making processes in Osaka would have been complete without reference to policies 
and practices in Ikuno ward. 
Table 5.2 Number of registered foreign residents in the city of Osaka, by ward 
and as a percentage of the total ward population, as at 31 March 2017 
Ward Number Percentage Ward Number Percentage 
Ikuno 27,516 21.6 Minato 2,523 3.1 
Naniwa 7,672 11.6 Jōtō 5,147 3.0 
Higashinari 6,915 8.5 Miyakojima 2,909 2.8 
Chūō 7,611 7.8 Suminoe 3,286 2.7 
Nishinari 7,931 7.4 Konohana 1,756 2.6 
Tennōji 4,235 5.6 Higashisumiyoshi 3,293 2.5 
Nishi 3,915 4.1 Abeno 2,714 2.5 
Hirano 7,888 4.0 Sumiyoshi 3,812 2.5 
Kita 4,782 3.9 Asahi 2,099 2.3 
Higashiyodogawa 6,293 3.7 Taishō 1,335 2.0 
Nishiyodogawa 3,372 3.5 Fukushima 1,325 1.8 
Yodogawa 5,885 3.4 Tsurumi 1,940 1.7 
   City total 126,154 4.7 
Source: Jūmin kihon daichō jinkō / gaikokujin tōroku jinkō (registered resident and foreigner 
population), Osaka City. Available at http://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/shimin/page/0000006893.html 
Table 5.3 Number of registered foreign residents in Yokohama city, by ward 
and as a percentage of the total ward population, as at 31 August 2017 
Ward Number Percentage Ward Number Percentage 
Naka 16,278 10.9 Izumi 2,517 1.6 
Minami 9,390 4.8 Tsuzuki 3,037 1.4 
Tsurumi 11,971 4.1 Kanazawa 2,838 1.4 
Nishi 4,140 4.1 Totsuka 3,727 1.3 
Kanagawa 6,326 2.6 Seya 1,603 1.3 
Isogo 4,151 2.5 Aoba 3,723 1.2 
Hodogaya 4,952 2.4 Kōnan 2,290 1.1 
Midori 3,294 1.8 Asahi 2,635 1.1 
Kōhoku 5,741 1.6 Sakae 959 0.8 
   City total 89,572 2.4 
Source: Yokohama-shi tōkei pōtaru saito—Yokohama no jinkō (Yokohama City statistics portal site—
Yokohama’s population). Available at http://www.city.yokohama.lg.jp/ex/stat/ 
Like Osaka, the 18 wards of Yokohama are home to a diverse number of foreign 
residents in varying proportions. As Table 5.3 indicates, the number and proportion 
of foreign residents in each ward vary widely. While it was important to get a city-
wide view, the wards of Naka and Tsurumi were used as key sites for investigation at 
the subunit level. Naka has the highest number of foreign residents of any ward in 
Yokohama, followed by Tsurumi. A review of documents produced by the Tsurumi 
Ward Office  revealed that it had developed a tabunka kyösei ‘action plan’ outlining 
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its approach to local integration issues, updated in 2011 and translated into several 
languages (Tsurumi Kuyakusho 2008; Tsurumi Kuyakusho 2011). 
To summarise, the integration policy-making processes in the cities of Osaka and 
Yokohama are the units of analysis of this study and the findings from the study sites 
have been analysed in terms of the context shaped by national policies and the 
prefectural governments of Osaka and Kanagawa. At the subunit level, specific 
wards were explored as key sites: Ikuno in Osaka, and Tsurumi and Naka in 
Yokohama. Although it was not possible to conduct focus groups with foreign 
residents in each of these sites, at least one interview was carried out with policy 
stakeholders in all three sites. Research undertaken in these sites was used to better 
understand whether different configurations of local-scale policies and institutions 
may lead to different subnational modes of integration. 
5.3 Reviewing policy documents: a window into integration 
policy-making in Japan 
Collecting and analysing policy documents was an important aspect of the three-
prong approach adopted in this study, alongside interviews with policy stakeholders 
and focus groups with foreign residents. Bowen describes documents as ‘non-
reactive’ sources of data (Bowen 2009, 31), highlighting the fact that they can be 
‘reused’ in the research process without the data being affected by the researcher’s 
interrogation of it.  
The documents analysed for this study include documents produced by the Diet and 
central government, namely government legislation and reports published by relevant 
ministries and departments. Relevant statutes included the Immigration Control and 
Refugee Recognition Act and the Alien Registration Act; other relevant documents 
included the Basic Plan for Immigration Control (shutsunyūkoku kanri kihon 
keikaku) and integration-related reports produced by the TKSK (Tabunka Kyōsei no 
Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006) and other government agencies. These policies 
and reports were scrutinised to determine the rationale behind the enactment of 
particular immigration and integration policies. As noted in the next section, the 
interviews were carried out predominantly with stakeholders engaged with 
integration policy-making at a local scale and so the documents provided useful 
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information on developments at the national scale that could not be obtained through 
other sources. 
While national policies are legislated centrally, the influences on these policies and 
the ways in which these policies are enacted depend, crucially, on other actors such 
as local governments, NGOs and business organisations. Hence, another source of 
primary data was local government documents (including tabunka kyōsei promotion 
plans) and other reports produced by subnational actors. This involved the collection 
of documents from specific ward offices within Osaka and Yokohama, as well as 
from local government websites. 
Substantial preliminary research was concluded through a review of existing 
literature, especially scholarly articles and research papers. This literature was found 
through a combination of key search terms using search engines (including Google 
Scholar), databases (including CiNii) and relevant journals (such as the Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies).  
The fieldwork phase was used as an opportunity to access and critically engage with 
the extensive Japanese literature relevant to this study, as well as acting as a check on 
potential methodological Eurocentrism or, conversely, Japanese relativism (Hijiya-
Kirschnereit 1988). The CiNii search engine was used to locate relevant library 
holdings at national and local institutions in Japan, some of which I was able to use 
for this study. New documents of relevance were located on local government 
websites, especially those of Osaka Prefecture, Kanagawa Prefecture, Osaka City and 
Yokohama City. These documents were also used to identify key search terms and 
further sources of information were then located through citation tracing. Many of 
the interview participants also provided further documents at interviews or during 
follow-up correspondence, some of which were relevant to this study. It was unclear 
whether or not these documents were furnished by the participants because they had 
been requested as part of the interview arrangement process, but their provision was 
welcomed. 
While these documents provided a rich and accessible window into Japan’s political 
institutions over a period of time, it was borne in mind that they were not written for 
research purposes (Mangen 2004, 313–14). While some contained useful information, 
others yielded little information of value, and some might have contained inaccurate 
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or inconsistent data. For this study, the documents reviewed were not treated as 
purely objective reflections of the actors or institutions that produced them, nor of 
the policies, processes or decisions that they professed to describe. As Bowen (2009) 
suggests, researchers should be vigilant about potential biases in documents, as well 
as the researcher’s own potential biases. Hence, documentary research was just one 
aspect of the overall research strategy, with methodological and data triangulation 
achieved using the other data collection methods described below. 
5.4 Interviews and focus groups with integration policy 
stakeholders  
Interviews with key stakeholders—especially policymakers, representatives from 
NPOs and international exchange foundations (with and without migrant 
backgrounds), and Japanese academics—were carried out in order to better 
appreciate integration policies and policy-making from the actors’ perspectives. 
These semi-structured interviews were designed to gather information about the 
relationships between actors, in terms of how integration policies have been 
formulated and implemented at different scales, and to understand the issues that 
those policies were designed to address. 
Focus groups were carried out with the aim of understanding foreign residents’ 
experiences of the integration process, with reference to the actors and institutions 
that are involved in integration policy-making and the responsibilities and 
expectations that have been placed upon foreign residents. In addition, unpicking the 
sociopolitical frameworks in the study sites and the wider Japanese context and 
examining how they shape the way in which migrants settle in those cities is a key 
feature of this study that was investigated through the focus groups. 
To some extent the focus groups were used to understand how the experiences of 
newcomer groups compare to those of more established Zainichi, who have more 
extensive rights (bar the right to participate in national elections) owing to their 
status as predominantly ‘special permanent residents’. As there is a rich body of 
research concerning Zainichi people in Japan, the majority of the focus groups were 
carried out with non-Zainichi people. 
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5.4.1 Ontological, epistemological and methodological considerations 
Just as the conceptual framework for this study rejects simple binaries, so too were 
they rejected in the collection and analysis of the data. To begin with, many 
researchers suggest that working ‘in an elite field poses major difficulties which stem 
from the challenges of researching up, which are quite different to those encountered 
in studying down’ (emphasis added; Desmond 2004, 262). As Woods points out, the 
term elite ‘remains remarkably unproblematised, employed largely as a short-hand 
term for those agents who are in some way perceived to be more powerful or more 
privileged than some unidentified group, but without any substantive conceptual 
depth’ (Woods 1998, 2101).  
The changing dynamics between the researcher and the participant in an interview 
situation is well-documented, but notions of ‘studying up’ and ‘studying down’ 
imply that there is a definite hierarchy in a given interview situation; the former 
applying to interviews with ‘elites’, the latter to interviews with ‘non-elites’. Yet, 
there is no reason to assume that contextually-specific patterns or distributions of 
power, and the contextually-specific sources from which individuals derive their 
relative authority or ‘legitimacy’, will carry forth into the interview space. Indeed, 
Smith’s (2006) experience suggests that the special behaviours reserved for elite 
interviews in contrast to non-elite interviews may be misplaced. 
Just as this study has eschewed the use of the term ‘multilevel governance’ for its 
hierarchical connotations, so too does it avoid hierarchy-implying binaries. Thus, 
rather than reproduce assumptions about elites and non-elites and their anticipated 
dispositions in the interview scenario, all the interviews and focus groups were 
considered to be research with relevant stakeholders. As Smith (2006) remarks, 
sensitivity and reflexivity are key to the interview process, such as being cognizant 
of the space in which a particular interview is conducted and the language register 
used. And these considerations were applied equally to all interviews conducted. 
Indeed, Dexter’s (2006) definition of a ‘specialized interview’ goes further than most 
in suggesting this should be so. 
It is an interview with any interviewee—and stress should be placed on the word 
‘any’—who in terms of the current purposes of the interviewer is given special, 
nonstandardized treatment. By special, nonstandard treatment I mean: stressing 
the interviewee’s definition of the situation; encouraging the interviewee to 
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structure the account of the situation; letting the interviewee introduce to a 
considerable extent (an extent which will of course vary from project to project 
and interviewer to interviewer) his notions of what he regards as relevant, instead 
of relying on the investigator’s notions of relevance. (Dexter 2006, 17) 
There was no guarantee that the officials best situated to give views about policies 
toward foreign residents—as a result of their involvement in the policy-making 
process or their work with foreign residents—would be available for interviews. 
However, certain steps were taken to increase the likelihood of getting an interview 
and to make best use of the participants who were available. Following Goldstein 
(2002), these included the creation of a suitable sampling frame (to identify key 
actors), precise letters of introduction and professional conduct to improve the 
likelihood of further introductions.  
Purposeful sampling was used to identify potential participants with knowledge of 
integration policies and policy-making processes at national and subnational scales. 
Maxwell (2005) identifies at least four goals for purposeful selection: typicality, 
heterogeneity, extremity and comparability. Focusing on typicality and heterogeneity, 
the first goal is to ‘achiev[e] representativeness or typicality of the settings, 
individuals, or activities selected’, while the purpose of the second ‘is to ensure that 
the conclusions adequately represent the entire range of variation, rather than only 
the typical members or some “average” subset of this range’ (Maxwell 2005, 89). 
Although the other goals of purposeful selection should not be ignored, this study 
was carried out with the goal of identifying cases of heterogeneity rather than 
looking for typical cases. Such an approach also helped mitigate the risk of ‘key 
informant bias’ (Pelto and Pelto 1975, 7).  
Aberbach and Rockman advocate the use of open-ended questions in the exploration 
of ‘value patterns and perceptions’ of policymakers to ‘provide a greater opportunity 
for respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks’ (Aberbach 
and Rockman 2002, 674), though the associated data may be more difficult to code 
and analyse. Flexibility is also important in the structure of the interview: semi-
structured interviews gave the participants the space to bring in details that were not 
necessarily elicited by the topic guides (see appendix A). 
Furthermore, there was a risk that civil servants or policymakers who were still in 
active service would be reluctant to offer opinions that could possibly damage their 
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working relations or compromise their positions in some way. Potentially, this 
guardedness might have led to ‘uninspiring’ interviews. Berry suggests several 
techniques to help overcome such situations, including ‘bridges’ to lead interviewees 
back on topic, the use of ‘probes’ on the interview guide as reminders to ask about 
key areas, and questions about the interviewee’s role or that of their organisation as a 
way of yielding more interesting responses (Berry 2002). Crucially, listening 
carefully to the interviewee, while referring back to the goals of the interview at 
appropriate moments, helped ensure that the time was used in the best possible way. 
Interviews with stakeholders were partly used to validate data gathered from 
documentary materials. However, interview data cannot always be cross-checked 
with other interviewees, or other sources, as it is often not possible to speak to 
another individual who can verify the information given by the original interviewee 
(Seldon 1996).  
In contrast to the interviews with policy stakeholders, the focus groups were used as 
opportunities to understand the lived experiences of migrants and other foreign 
residents in Japan. Participants were encouraged to discuss the formal and informal 
channels that they use to engage with policy-making processes—more specifically 
their engagement with civil society organisations, local governments, central 
government and others in areas that impinge on their lives as foreign residents. The 
discussions were also used to explore the dynamics that participants experience in 
terms of their relationships with these institutions—to form a material and symbolic 
understanding of their ‘citizenship’—together with the ‘strategies’ that they use to 
maintain or enhance their positions in their respective social spaces. 
5.4.2 Interviews with policy stakeholders 
As part of the purposeful sampling strategy, I produced a database of potential 
interview participants in each city based on key organisations identified in the 
existing literature and through internet searches. This enabled me to approach the 
fieldwork sites with a sense of who the key actors and institutions in the field of 
integration policy-making may be. I also produced information sheets, topic guides 
and consent forms for the interviews in English and Japanese (see appendix A). The 
Japanese versions were checked by various native speakers and revised in line with 
their feedback. 
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Although the literature suggests that ‘introductions’ are very important for gaining 
access to interview participants in Japan (Bestor, Steinhoff, and Lyon Bestor 2003), 
introductions were not found to be essential. In fact most of the interviewees were 
approached ‘cold’ (i.e. without formal introductions) and most consented to being 
interviewed. In one case, I received support from my host institution to arrange an 
interview (Interview 2). In another case, one of the earlier interview participants 
(Interview 1) was happy for their name to be used to secure a further interview. Most 
of the potential participants were initially contacted via email, but letters were used 
in two cases, as the email addresses of the target participants were not publicly 
available. One letter was unsuccessful, while the other yielded an interview with civil 
servants (Interview 20) suggesting that it was a worthwhile tactic.  
Twenty interviews were carried out involving 35 individuals in total (see Table 5.4). 
Further investigation in the initial interviews was used to understand which actors 
may be more dominant within integration policy-making, at different scales, and 
which actors may be more peripheral. The database was continually updated to take 
account of these insights and was also updated to reflect other practical issues (such 
as staff changes in particular organisations). All 20 interviews were conducted during 
the first fieldwork period: December 2014 to March 2015. The interviews lasted for 
75 minutes, on average, with a range of 50–90 minutes. I also recruited temporary 
research assistants through Jiscmail mailing lists to provide interpreting support at 
some of the interviews. Where interviews involved multiple participants, the 
contributions of the participants varied considerably; some said little or nothing and 
seemed to be present just to support their colleagues. 
Three groups of integration policy stakeholders were interviewed. First, local 
government representatives and policymakers were identified, especially those with 
specific knowledge of policies and programmes that have shaped integration 
processes as they apply to Osaka and Yokohama. Local government officials are 
often privy to information that is not readily available in policy documents and 
reports and so their knowledge of integration policies and policy-making was an 
important source of data. In particular, these stakeholders were interviewed to help 
determine whether there were any key differences between integration policies and 
policy-making at a national scale and at a regional/local scale. The interviews were 
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also used to check whether there is growing consensus in central and local 
government approaches toward integration.  
Table 5.4 Details of interviews with integration policy stakeholders 
Reference Organisation Male/female Location 
Interview 1 NPO Male (1) Osaka 
Interview 2 City government Male (1) 
Female (1) 
Yao 
Interview 3 NPO Male (1) Osaka 
Interview 4 International exchange foundation Female (1) Osaka 
Interview 5 International exchange foundation Male (2) Yokohama 
Interview 6 NPO Male (1) 
Female (1) 
Tokyo 
Interview 7 University Male (1) Tokyo 
Interview 8 International exchange foundation Female (1) Yokohama 
Interview 9 City government Male (2) 
Female (2) 
Yokohama 
Interview 10 CLAIR Male (2) Tokyo 
Interview 11 NPO Female (1) Yokohama 
Interview 12 NPO Male (1) 
Female (1) 
Yokohama 
Interview 13 Prefecture government Male (2) 
Female (1) 
Osaka 
Interview 14 City government Male (2) Osaka 
Interview 15 NPO Female (1) Kanagawa 
Interview 16 City government Female (1) Hamamatsu 
Interview 17 Migrant-supporting organisation Female (2) Yokohama 
Interview 18 NPO Female (2) Yokohama 
Interview 19 Migrant-supporting organisation Female (1) Yokohama 
Interview 20 Central government Male (3) Tokyo 
 
On the whole, local government representatives were found to be neither openly 
critical nor complimentary towards central government actors—preferring to offer 
professional opinions rather than personal ones. In line with Berry’s (2002) 
suggestions, probes and ‘bridges’ (to return to subject areas that were not fully 
explored) were used to elicit relevant information from the participants, but the 
quality of the data varied from interview to interview. 
As mentioned in chapter three, there were over 50,000 specified NPOs in Japan in 
2016. Roughly one in seven (14%) specified NPOs were registered with Osaka 
Prefecture or Kanagawa Prefecture or one of the designated cities in those 
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prefectures (see Table 5.5). A search of the ‘NPO Homepage’ (administered by the 
Japanese Cabinet Office) revealed that there were over 260 specified NPOs with 
either tabunka kyōsei or kokusaika in their names (at the end of 2014) of which 30 
were registered in Osaka Prefecture (5), Osaka City (17), Kanagawa Prefecture (4) or 
Yokohama City (4). This search helped narrow down the pool of potential interview 
participants. 
Table 5.5 Number of specified NPOs in Japan by jurisdiction, as at 30 
September 2017 




Tokurei nintei  
(‘special case’) Prefecture City 
Osaka - 1,776  8  1 
Osaka Osaka 1,548  36  0 
Osaka Sakai 269  1 0 
Kanagawa  - 1,500  40  3 
Kanagawa  Yokohama 1,512  48  1 
Kanagawa  Kawasaki 360  8  0 
Kanagawa  Sagamihara 221  9  0 
Other 44,542 791 91 
Total 51,728 941 96 
Source: NPO Homepage, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. available at https://www.npo-
homepage.go.jp/about/toukei-info/kenbetsu-ninshou 
Interviews with representatives from migrant-supporting organisations, especially 
specified NPOs, helped provide a more complete picture of integration policies, 
particularly in terms of policy implementation. The stakeholders were also 
interviewed for their perspectives on central and local government. The stakeholders 
interviewed were generally found to have well-developed insights through their work 
with migrants and other foreign residents. Moreover, some of the NPO and MSO 
representatives were willing to use their networks to help recruit migrants and other 
foreign residents as focus group participants (see below).  
The views of civil servants in key ministries were sought as they are directly 
involved with policies and programmes affecting foreign residents in Japan. This 
group was the most difficult to access and so the majority of interviews were carried 
out with participants from the first two groups. Only one group interview was carried 
out with civil servants, all working for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication (MIC). One senior civil servant was the key participant in this 
interview and he took the decision to switch from Japanese to English at the 
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beginning of the interview. Surrounded by Japanese-speaking colleagues outside the 
interview room, this appeared to be a deliberate tactic designed to allow him to speak 
more candidly. 
5.4.3 Focus groups with foreign residents 
Participants were chosen using a combination of purposeful selection—to reflect the 
ethnocultural, gendered and class-based aspects of migration experiences—and 
convenience sampling, which allowed a higher number of migrants to be included in 
the study. The focus groups highlighted the diversity of migrants, while countering 
the tendency of migration research to ‘use “ethnic community” as both the object of 
study and the unit of analysis in migration research’ (Glick Schiller, Çağlar, and 
Guldbrandsen 2006, 613). 
Participants were recruited in a variety of ways. In some cases there were ‘warm 
contacts’ (Okumus, Altinay, and Roper 2007, 14), made through earlier stakeholder 
interviews, who then acted as gatekeepers to potential focus group participants. 
Participants were also identified by approaching suitable gatekeepers in migrant-
supporting organisations with a view to obtaining their support for the project. Some 
were recruited through NPOs and international exchange foundations—especially 
those where interviews had taken place—while others were recruited through 
gatekeepers’ wider social and employment-based networks. I also recruited 
participants through my own social network, which I developed during the course of 
fieldwork, by telling acquaintances about the study and encouraging them to cascade 
this information through their own networks. Other contacts were approached ‘cold’, 
by contrast, through direct solicitation at events and particular NPOs. This strategy 
involved the use of printed flyers explaining the purpose of the research, the 
participation criteria and information on how to take part (made available in both 
English and Japanese) but this tactic was not successful. In order to compensate for 
these recruitment difficulties, I undertook an additional visit to the case study sites in 
2016. 
Cash incentives (2,000 yen) were also offered to participants. Although the original 
plan was to offer vouchers or gift cards, this plan was soon abandoned due to the lack 
of readily available, widely-used options, in contrast to the comparative simplicity of 
a cash-based system. Some participants accepted gifts in kind (refreshments, etc.) in 
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lieu of cash incentives, while some chose to donate their incentives to a good cause. 
In one case, the incentives were donated to the NPO through which the participants 
were recruited. Three gatekeeper organisations expected a donation in return for 
helping recruit participants. 
Table 5.6 Details of focus group participants 
Reference Ethnonationality (and number) Male/female Location 
FG 1 Western (8), Korean (1) Female (2) 
Male (7) 
Osaka 
FG 2 Brazilian (5) Female (1) 
Male (4) 
Yokohama 
FG 3 Filipino (5) Female (4) 
Male (1) 
Yokohama 
FG 4 Filipino (3), Western (2) Female (4) 
Male (1) 
Osaka 
FG 5 Western (6) Female (2) 
Male (4) 
Osaka 
FG 6 Filipino (4) Female (4) Yokohama 
FG 7 Brazilian (5) Female (4) 
Male (1) 
Yokohama 
FG 8 Chinese (2) Female (2) Yokohama 
FG 9 Korean (5) Female (3) 
Male (2) 
Yokohama 
FG 10 Korean (3), Chinese (2), Brazilian (1) Female (6) Osaka 
Note: Western is used as shorthand for non-Japanese nationals from Europe or North America 
In total, four focus groups were carried out in Osaka and six were carried out in 
Yokohama across two separate visits to Japan (September–October 2015 and March–
April 2016). The focus groups generally lasted for 90–120 minutes. The participants’ 
backgrounds were indicative of the ethnonational heterogeneity characteristic of 
migrants in Japan (see Table 5.6). Participants were required to have lived in Japan 
for at least two years and to be living or working in the cities in question. The 
residency requirement helped ensure that the chosen participants had had time to 
experience a range of interactions, particularly through civic participation and the use 
of services. As per the stakeholder interviews, topic guides were prepared before the 
focus group discussions, and information sheets and consent forms were given to all 
participants (see appendix A). 
Representatives from the gatekeeper organisations were given the option to be 
present at the focus groups depending on the demands of the organisations and the 
practical needs of the participants. Although there was a risk that this could affect the 
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resulting data, participants were found to be quite open in the four focus groups 
where a representative was present. In one instance, the representative asked the 
participants not to focus on the benefits of the gatekeeper organisation (an 
international exchange foundation) but to talk about their lived experiences, which 
was a welcome intervention. 
While most of the focus groups were conducted in Japanese or English, some of the 
focus groups were carried out in Filipino with the help of a Filipino-speaking 
research assistant. The research assistant acted as an interpreter, relaying the 
information from English to Filipino, and vice versa, at convenient points during the 
focus group discussions. Another focus group was carried out in a combination of 
Portuguese and Japanese, again with the help of a research assistant who acted as an 
interpreter. While the use of interpreters is inevitably more intrusive than translation 
(Jentsch 1998), I deemed it essential to use interpreters in these instances as it 
allowed the participants to speak freely in the language that they felt most 
comfortable with. 
All the interview and focus group data were transcribed before being analysed. 
Transcription is a time-consuming process, made more complex in this case by the 
fact that the transcriptions had to be transcribed in Japanese, English, Filipino and 
Portuguese. Native speakers were recruited to transcribe the non-English audio 
recordings and asked to translate the Filipino and Portuguese transcriptions into 
English. In most cases the translator had also acted as the interpreter, which helped 
ensure some level of continuity. By contrast, the Japanese transcripts were left 
untranslated and were analysed in Japanese. All Japanese-based quotations used in 
this text were kept in the original language up to the write-up stage—a strategy 
advocated by Ungerson (1996). This allowed time for the translations to be refined, 
but also meant that any nuances that might have been missed during the analysis 
phase, and that would have been lost after translation, could still be identified at a 
later stage. 
5.4.4 Reflections on being in the field 
Several researchers have spoken of their experiences of doing fieldwork in Japan and 
a common thread is the need for institutional affiliation and introductions before 
entering the field (Bestor, Steinhoff, and Lyon Bestor 2003). While institutional 
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affiliation was not essential to the fieldwork, as mentioned above, it was essential for 
the visa application process which was an important practical consideration. Access 
to an institution based in Osaka (Osaka City University) was secured through my 
supervisor. Although I did not have corresponding affiliation in Yokohama, this did 
not hinder the research as I was able to use lessons learned in Osaka to conduct 
research in Yokohama more effectively. 
Before entering the field, I had read a host of relevant Japanese scholarship and this 
helped ensure, to some extent, that I was able to adopt the appropriate vocabulary 
and jargon in my interviews. Coleman also advocates learning colloquial expressions 
used by potential participants as a way to ‘unlock whole areas of discussion’ 
(Coleman 2003, 111). Before embarking on fieldwork, I had acquired sufficient 
language skills to be able to engage with participants in Japanese without the need 
for an interpreter, but interpreting support was helpful nonetheless. Immersion in 
Japanese-speaking environments certainly helped improve my Japanese skills and 
my understanding of sociocultural norms. 
Being in Japan and having regular interaction with Japanese scholars made the task 
of identifying relevant literature much easier. Some theoretical validation was 
achieved by regular discussion of emerging findings with academics. However, I also 
gained valuable insights living as a ‘foreigner’ in Japan. Having to undertake many 
of the same processes as those required of migrants helped me develop a deeper 
appreciation of some of the issues at stake and the challenges associated with life as a 
foreign resident in Japan. These processes included registration at the local ward 
office and opening a bank account. While I already had some command of the 
Japanese language before entering the study sites, which made these activities 
considerably more manageable, I still found it difficult to perform these tasks. I could 
therefore appreciate that it would be much more difficult for people with little or no 
prior knowledge of Japanese to engage in many of the administrative activities that 
are essential for life in Japan, unless formal or informal translation or interpretation 
support were available. 
I also met many people, including migrants, outside of my fieldwork during the 
course of day-to-day tasks and activities, such as shopping or visiting restaurants. 
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These encounters helped shape my views on the experiences of migrants living in 
Osaka and Yokohama. 
5.5 Analysing the data: maintaining a relational approach 
A close reading of the transcripts and policy documents contributed to a better 
understanding of integration policies and policy-making activities, including the 
policy frames and narratives bound up with these phenomena. Although analysis is 
often seen as conceptually different from the design process, I adopted the view that 
analysis is an integral part of the design process and that informed decisions must be 
made with regards to how it should take place (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). For the 
purposes of this study, I reviewed and analysed data from the document review 
throughout the fieldwork periods. Indeed, many researchers recognise the need to 
conduct data analysis simultaneously with data collection in order to modify data 
collection methods accordingly and to make sense of emerging data.  
Strategies for qualitative analysis fall into three main groups: categorising strategies 
(such as coding and thematic analysis), connecting strategies (such as narrative 
analysis and individual case studies) and written and diagrammatic field notes. While 
much has been written on these strategies (for more detailed discussions, see Coffey 
and Atkinson 1996; Maxwell 2005), the analytical techniques employed for this 
study were designed to maintain the relational approach outlined in chapters three 
and four. 
The coding process was a vital part of the analysis, which allowed tags and labels to 
be attached to segments of the data in order to ‘rearrange it into categories that 
facilitate comparison between things in the same category and between categories’ 
(Maxwell 2009, 237). Maxwell (2005) distinguishes between three categories of 
codes: organisational, substantive and theoretical. Organisational categories allowed 
the data to be sorted into ‘bins’ and were useful for structuring the data in the final 
presentation. However, it was the substantive (or descriptive) and theoretical 
categories that allowed the connections between the data to be analysed.  
The first stage in the coding process involved identifying organisational categories 
based on the broader topics that emerged from the research questions. I then used 
NVivo to help me undertake a ‘close’ reading of the data and to apply substantive 
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and theoretical categories. Thematic analysis formed the bedrock of the qualitative 
analysis, in which the substantive and theoretical categories were used to highlight 
the relational dimensions of the production of integration policies and migrants’ 
experiences of those policies. 
Although the use of software is not a substitute for analysis, there are advantages to 
using software such as NVivo. In particular, NVivo allows users not only to create 
‘theme nodes’ (a collection of codes related to a particular theme), but also 
‘relationship nodes’ to show how different actors or categories are related. As with 
ordinary nodes, NVivo users can code content at relationships: a feature which 
proved to be particularly useful for this study. 
5.6 Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the School for Policy Studies Research 
Ethics Committee before the fieldwork was carried out. Informed consent was 
obtained from all participants and no data were collected without consent. As 
mentioned above, all participants were given an information sheet explaining the 
interview procedure, research aims and topics of discussion. It also explained the 
consent procedure and issues relating to confidentiality and data management.  
The consent forms and information sheets were written in Japanese (including a 
furigana version) and English (see appendix A). Information had to be translated 
sufficiently well to enable participants to understand the scope and aims of the 
research, as poor translations might have resulted in misunderstandings or, more 
seriously, misinformed consent. Hence, I checked the accuracy of the translations 
with several native Japanese speakers before using them. The information sheets and 
consent forms were shared with participants at the start the interview or focus group 
to ensure that they had adequate time to read both documents. A verbal explanation 
was also given, even where participants filled in the forms without questions. This is 
because some people might have ticked the boxes without fully understanding what 
they were consenting to. It also gave the participants an opportunity to ask any 
questions they might have had. 
Focus groups with foreign residents took place in suitable public locations, which 
were identified with the help of gatekeepers. As mentioned above, research assistants 
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were able to act as interpreters in situations where the participants felt uncomfortable 
speaking in Japanese, and a female gatekeeper and/or research assistant was always 
present in interviews or focus groups involving female participants. Participants were 
engaged in preliminary conversation, for example about their jobs, before any 
discussion of confidentiality issues was initiated. All participants signed the consent 
forms, but one interview participant did not consent to the interview being recorded. 
Participants were given copies of the consent form to keep, along with the 
information sheet. In most cases, there was a second person who witnessed this 
consent.  
With respect to data reporting, I explained to the participants that direct quotes from 
their interviews and focus groups may be used for publication. Migrants and other 
foreign residents might have particularly been concerned that ‘sensitive information 
may be intentionally or inadvertently disclosed to the authorities’ (Mackey and Gass 
2011, 27). Therefore, I took time to explain to participants how their data would and 
would not be used and how confidentiality and anonymity would be maintained. All 
of the quotes used here have been anonymised: the names of organisations (including 
employers) and other personal information were obscured so that participants cannot 
be identified. Some of the participants made comments that have the potential to 
affect how other people view them, such as their employers, so extra care was taken 
to ensure that participants cannot be identified from potentially harmful comments. 
The data for this project consisted of participants’ contact details, electronic 
recordings, interview notes, transcripts of electronic recordings, consent forms and 
email correspondence. During fieldwork, I identified secure locations to hold the data, 
including physical documents which were securely held at my host institution in 
Osaka. Consent forms were scanned and stored on an encrypted hard drive, while the 
original documents have been destroyed. Electronic recordings, transcripts, contact 
details and notes from the interviews have also been stored on an encrypted hard 
drive, using unique identifiers, and no physical copies of these have been kept. An 
identification code was assigned to each participant in a log, which was created from 
the surnames of the participants. This log has been stored as an encrypted file, 
separately from the hard drive containing the actual contact details. All email 
correspondence with the participants was eventually deleted. 
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5.7 Summary 
One of the aims of this study was to understand the relationships at the heart of 
policy-making processes related to the settlement and integration of foreign residents 
in Japan, using conceptual notions drawn from governance and citizenship-based 
research. These policy-making processes were explored through detailed case studies 
of the policies and practices involving institutions and actors operating within and 
across two particular cities, namely Yokohama and Osaka. These two cities have the 
highest number of foreign residents of all the designated cities in Japan, as well as 
rich histories of migration, hence offering pertinent case study sites for this project. 
A key element of the data collection process was interviews with integration policy 
stakeholders, the majority of which were carried out with actors from local 
governments, international exchange foundations and civil society 
organisations/migrant-supporting organisations based in Osaka and Yokohama. The 
interviews carried out for this study allowed policymakers and other policy 
stakeholders to put forward their accounts of the processes and relationships involved 
in the production of integration policies. This was a crucial step towards 
understanding the ‘insider’s view’ of the development of current policies.  
The assumptions and perceptions that underpin policies toward foreign residents—as 
well as the expectations that are placed on foreign residents in the design of 
particular services, initiatives or measures—were investigated through focus groups 
with foreign residents. In total, ten focus groups were conducted across the two 
cities—with the majority of participants hailing from non-Zainichi backgrounds. 
Along with the interview data, the focus group data were analysed thematically. 
The data from the interviews and focus groups were complemented with data 
gathered through a review of policy documents produced by the national government 
and local governments—government legislation, white papers, briefings and 
bulletins—supplemented with reports produced by civil society organisations, 
industry associations and businesses. These were analysed not in terms of content, 
per se, but to determine how and why various integration policies have come into 





6 The field of integration policy-making 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws on the interview and documentary material to explore the 
production of integration policies in Japan, beginning with information on the key 
actors involved in the governance of these policies. The findings are then used to 
understand the competing narratives in the field, namely the way in which 
integration-related issues are framed and interpreted. They also suggest how policy 
targets or subjects are constructed within these policy-making processes and what 
this reveals about the nature of the integration regime(s) in Japan. 
Looking at some of the key actors and institutions in turn, the findings are also used 
to examine the relationships between the dominant actors and the roles they play 
within this field, particularly in terms of agenda setting and policy formulation. To 
the extent that the interview participants talked about change, some of the findings 
indicate important changes that have occurred with respect to integration policies or 
policy-making activities. Attitudes and opinions towards various actors were also 
expressed and where these reveal something about the nature of the relationship 
between the speaker and the actor or institution in question, these are included in the 
discussion. 
The findings also reveal some of the ways in which actors’ positions in the field 
enable them to influence the production of integration policies, both directly (e.g. 
through advocacy) and indirectly, for example by controlling certain policy-making 
mechanisms. The focus group material is then considered in the next chapter.  
6.2 Participants’ perceptions of other integration policy 
actors 
Within government, various ministries have some role in terms of integration policy-
making. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC) was frequently 
discussed as a key actor, mostly due to its relationship with local government and in 
relation to the 2006 report produced by the TKSK (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni 
kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) was also mentioned, 
mostly in relation to immigration control rather than integration policies. However, 
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one interview participant, from an international exchange association, spoke of the 
considerable ‘administrative discretion’ (gyōsei sairyō) that the MOJ has in terms of 
policy-making and how this creates uncertainty for local government actors 
(Interview 5). 
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT), and the Cabinet Office were also mentioned by various 
participants, either in direct relation to integration policies or in relation to related 
policies (e.g. immigration policies). For example, when one of the interview 
participants was asked whether or not she thought that central government wants to 
create immigrant policies, she immediately point out that MEXT has become more 
active in developing policies for migrant schoolchildren: 
I think so. I really think so. So now, because the number of children in schools 
who have roots in a foreign country is increasing, MEXT too is gradually making 
new policies on various things. For example, with Japanese education now, it 
seems as if the special curriculum [for migrant children] has really been made 
part of the curriculum. Still, absolutely no budget has been put towards this… 
There may be difficulties, but I feel they want to promote it further. (Interview 8, 
female international exchange foundation representative, Yokohama) 
Aside from the bureaucracy, two of the non-government interview participants also 
talked about the role of the executive. One interviewee commented that ‘there are 
times when it’s better to say things are difficult because of the Abe administration 
rather than because of the jimintō [LDP] administration’ (Interview 6). This implies 
that there are challenges for integration policy stakeholde-rs in the current climate, 
but also suggests that Prime Minister Abe’s policies are not necessarily in line with 
those of his party. 
The interviews also confirmed the importance of prefectural and city governments in 
the development of integration policies at a local scale. The key local government 
departments charged with the formulation and implementation of policies and 
programmes that fall under the banner of tabunka kyōsei or kokusaika varied in terms 
of size and organisational/administrative position across the local government 
fieldwork sites. 
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Looking at the four governments shown in Table 6.1, it is clear that there are 
divergent practices in terms of where formal responsibility lies for tabunka kyōsei or 
internationalisation-related policies. Within Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City these 
policies are either linked to wider economic or ‘urban appeal’ strategies, while in 
Kanagawa they are regarded as an issue affecting the lives of prefectural residents. 
Yokohama City has a specific department for ‘international’ issues, but there seems 
to be considerable overlap between the functions of all four sections. 
Table 6.1 Local government organisational structures with respect to tabunka 
kyōsei or kokusaika policies 




culture (fumin bunka-bu) 
Urban appeal creation 
(toshi miryoku sōzō-kyoku) 
International 
(kokusai-ka) 


















Note: Departmental names were correct at the time of publication 
Source: Local government websites 
Positioned at the interface between central and local government, CLAIR (the 
Council of Local Authorities for International Relations) was mentioned by three of 
the local government interview participants, particularly in terms of the financial 
support it provides for local internationalisation activities. 
While it may be regarded as an important actor, CLAIR has also been criticised in 
recent years for its lack of efficiency and effectiveness by high-profile policymakers. 
This includes criticisms by the jigyō shiwake (‘budget screening’) working group set 
up by the former DPJ (the Democratic Party of Japan, or Minshutō, which was the 
ruling party between 2009 and 2012) and strained relations with Osaka City 
Government, as discussed by a representative from CLAIR: 
Well, there’s Mayor Hashimoto of Osaka, and then there’s the Minshutō 
party’s—you know about shiwake, right? There’s a Diet member called Renhō, 
who was previously working on issues such as money management for national 
activities, budget cuts and those kind of things. At that time, CLAIR was 
certainly being criticised. Has CLAIR been spending money on things it ought to 
be doing? Is it carrying out its work properly? Those kinds of things. And then 
there’s Mayor Hashimoto, too. As I mentioned before, CLAIR collects money 
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from local government and so there was a period where they did not want to pay 
that money. The relations between CLAIR and Osaka City certainly worsened at 
that time, but now Osaka City is also paying money regularly and hasn’t said 
anything especially critical of CLAIR. (Interview 10, male representative from 
CLAIR, Tokyo) 
Interview participants also confirmed the importance of international exchange 
foundations/associations (kokusai kōryū zaidan/kyōkai), which provide various 
services for foreign residents, and the importance of local government advice 
services for foreigners (sōdan madoguchi). Other institutions were also mentioned in 
relation to specific areas of social policy—for example, local education boards 
(kyōiku iinkai) were discussed in relation to the education of children with a migrant 
background. These institutions are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Representatives from NPOs felt that NPOs play a key role in the delivery of services 
(which is discussed further in the following chapter) and, to a lesser extent, in 
helping to shape government policy. The former role was confirmed during the 
interviews with local government representatives, while the latter was more difficult 
to confirm. 
Private sector companies/businesses were viewed as having a peripheral role in 
integration policy-making by the interview participants. One participant suggested 
that they have an occasional role in terms of sponsorship, mentioning that cities such 
as Toyota may have stronger links with businesses due to the dependence of local 
manufacturing firms on migrant workers (Interview 5). However, the findings from 
the focus groups suggest that the role played by companies may have been 
downplayed in previous research (see the next chapter). In addition, Keidanren (the 
Japanese Business Federation) has issued a number of policies and recommendations 
that advocate for support for ‘non-Japanese residents’, as the following two examples 
illustrate. 
There is a need for private enterprises, local governments, international exchange 
associations, non-profit organizations and other entities to work together to 
successfully address such issues as finding housing, Japanese language teaching, 
and education for the children of non-Japanese workers. Furthermore, a study 
should be conducted into the establishment of schemes for the disbursement of 
funds in each region by the national government and local governments, with 
private companies also contributing on a voluntary basis, to provide the financial 
assistance some non-Japanese workers may require for their livelihood. (Nippon 
Keidanren 2007) 
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The role of social integration policies will be important in building an 
environment where Japanese and foreigners can understand each other's cultures 
and customs, and live without difficulties in local communities. (Nippon 
Keidanren 2008) 
Although Keidanren has said little about (social) integration in the period following 
the global financial crisis, these examples demonstrate the organisation’s concern not 
only for policies that facilitate the migration of skilled workers to Japan, but also for 
policies that facilitate migrants’ settlement and integration. 
Other organisations were also mentioned during the interviews, but these were 
regarded as having a weak role in terms of integration policy-making. For example, 
one of the interviewees cast doubts on the importance of the Commission for the 
Protection of Human Rights (Jinken Yōgo Iinkai), suggesting that it is a talking shop 
rather than an active player. 
The Ministry of Justice has so-called Commissioners for the Protection of Human 
Rights. Well, those people act by talking about this and that but basically all they 
do is talk and listen. […] Well, as for the government, they are mostly, um, 
unhelpful. When we get consulted for various things, we never think “Let’s take 
this to the human rights commissioners” [laughs]. (Interview 3, male NPO 
representative, Osaka) 
The interviewee’s misgivings about the effectiveness of the Commission suggest that 
it is a minor actor within the MOJ and, by extension, within the field of integration 
policy-making more generally. Indeed, no other interview participants mentioned the 
Commission, and subsequent checks revealed that the Commission has been 
criticised for its lack of independence by organisations such as Human Rights Forum 




6.3 Migration, tabunka kyōsei and competing narratives 
6.3.1 Desirable migrants 
One of the biggest changes in recent times to the Japanese immigration system was 
the introduction of a points-based system which gives preferential treatment to 
‘highly-skilled migrants’ (kōdo jinzai). A leaflet produced by the Immigration 





Bureau of Japan enthusiastically states that ‘foreign nationals recognized as “highly-
skilled foreign professionals” will be given preferential immigration treatment!’ (see 
appendix C). However, the artwork for the leaflet also appears to portray these 
migrants as being ‘white’, suggesting a racialised view of skilled migration. 
Commenting on the points-based system, one of the interview participants stated that 
‘people had lots of different ideas about it, but [he] personally didn’t think it would 
work’. When asked why, the interviewee felt that Japan’s restrictive approach to 
immigration policies should be viewed in the context of Japan’s changing role in 
regional politics. 
Japan’s—that way of thinking, like it was still 20 years ago when people had this 
image of Japan as being the number one power in Asia, and because of that, they 
think that if you open the gate, foreigners will flood in! That was in the past. 
They won’t come like that [group laughter], because other countries are better. 
They can’t understand that—the Japanese government in particular can’t 
understand that. (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka) 
As Japan has given way to China as the economic powerhouse of Asia, and as other 
countries across Asia continue to exhibit much stronger economic growth than Japan, 
the interviewee is suggesting that there may be more attractive destinations for 
migrants than Japan. Implicit in his comments is that economic capital drives many 
of the decisions that immigrants and policymakers make in terms of immigration 
policy. However, he went on to say that ‘nobody will come if there aren’t proper 
social integration policies in place […] social integration policy is more important 
than immigration policy’ (Interview 1). 
This view was echoed by another interviewee, who believes that many things are 
needed to make Japan a more attractive destination for foreigners (Interview 8). She 
also commented that ‘the Japanese alone cannot maintain the country as it is’, 
pointing to the demographic imperative often cited by pro-immigrant groups as the 
key reason for making Japan’s immigration control policies less restrictive. 
Speaking from an international exchange foundation perspective, another interview 
participant believed that having more certainty over immigration would allow cities 
such as Yokohama to plan more (Interview 5). Like many people, he described 
Japan’s approach to immigration as a ‘side door’ rather than an ‘open door’ approach, 
but he believed that having a basic law on immigration (kihon-hō) would allow local 
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governments to budget accordingly. Linking this back to Yokohama, he felt that 
Yokohama City can create policies around tourism and ‘make the city a place where 
it is easier for foreigners to lead active lives’. 
In terms of the advantages provided by more transparent immigration policies, the 
interviewee seemed to be suggesting that an immigration plan would give local 
governments more certainty about the numbers of immigrants that they can expect, 
which should lead to greater budget certainty. Again this underlines the economic 
logic that seems to be at the heart of the immigration policy-making field, and which 
seems to characterise its relationship with the field of integration policy-making. 
6.3.2 Tabunka kyōsei and the subjects of integration policies: 
competing narratives 
As one of the key policy approaches associated with integration policies in Japan, 
participants’ views about tabunka kyōsei reveals some of the competing narratives 
inherent in the integration policy-making field. 
For at least two of the interview participants, tabunka kyōsei seemed to be well 
regarded as a policy approach but they recognised its translation into English as 
problematic. For example, one of the interview participants felt that the term should 
be translated as ‘intercultural living’ rather than the more literal ‘multicultural 
coexistence’ (Interview 1). This suggests that tabunka kyōsei is considered to be 
more akin to interculturalism, in the interviewee’s eyes, than to multiculturalism. 
Despite emanating from ‘civil society’, however, two of the NPO stakeholders were 
dissatisfied with the term tabunka kyōsei to the point where they felt it should be 
discarded. One interview participant, who happened to be Zainichi Chinese, said that 
she dislikes tabunka kyōsei due to its exclusivity. 
The phrase tabunka kyōsei is an expression made by the state. When the Japanese 
government was thinking about tabunka kyōsei, the way they were thinking about 
it was, to put it simply, “people called newcomers and Japanese people, please 
coexist multiculturally”. […] Oldcomers like us aren’t included. […] Not only 
that, but the phrase tabunka kyōsei was made just to cover foreigners who have 
come to Japan since the 80s. So I dislike it. (Interview 18, female NPO 
representative, Yokohama) 
This is in line with Kibe’s (2017) argument that tabunka kyōsei seems to exclude 
migrants of Korean origin. However, the participant suggests that it has developed 
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for ‘newcomers’, as opposed to ‘oldcomers’, while Kibe proposes that it targets 
Nikkeijin immigrants rather than non-Nikkeijin. It is also worth noting that the 
participant believes that the term was developed by the ‘state’ (kuni) rather than by 
civil society organisations, as is commonly suggested. The interviewee seems to be 
implying that the term tabunka kyōsei has been constructed or appropriated by the 
state in such a way that it seems to exclude Zainichi Koreans and Taiwanese—the 
two most established migrant groups in Japan. 
Another issue raised by several interview participants was the meaning of the term 
‘foreigner’. For one interview participant, foreigners, like other citizens, are residents 
who pay their taxes and so it is ‘reasonable’ for them to receive the same services 
(Interview 4). This seems to suggest that economic contributions entitle foreign 
residents to be treated like other citizens, but it is not clear whether unemployed 
migrants, for example, should also be treated thus. 
For another NPO representative, the discussion should be about ‘identity’ rather than 
‘nationality’ in a legal sense (Interview 3). So, for instance, ‘special permanent 
residents’ should be able to identify as Japanese without having to naturalise. He was 
also critical of tabunka kyōsei, but for different reasons. Focusing on the term kyōsei 
(or ‘coexistence’), he suggested that kyōsei implies tolerance towards ‘so-called 
foreigners’ but not acceptance. 
Basically, according to the way Japan way of thinking, the idea that people who 
hold so-called foreign nationality can live in Japan as seikatsusha [ordinary 
citizens] is extremely exceptional. Therefore, the fact of living in Japan as a so-
called foreigner is not recognised as a right. Accordingly, well, the term kyōsei 
[coexistence] began to be used as a policy term in the 2000s, from about 2005, 
2006, but the term kyōsei wasn’t used as a policy issue, nor perceived as the 
target of social integration. (Interview 3, male NPO representative, Osaka) 
This points to a division not just between ‘oldcomers’ and ‘newcomers’, but between 
Japanese ethnonationals and non-Japanese ethnonationals (qua seikatsusha) more 
generally. 
This division was also evident in an exchange with a local government official in 
Yokohama City. Having enquired about the use of the word imin (‘immigrant’) in the 
information sheet connected with the project, he went on to explain that he could not 
use the word in an official capacity as it goes against government policy, which does 
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not officially recognise Japan as an immigrant-receiving state. Whether or not he 
agreed with that position was unclear, but he was certainly unwilling to contest that 
position in the presence of his colleague and the interviewer.  
6.3.3 Local interpretations of tabunka kyōsei 
Yokohama and Osaka are among two of the 400 cities and prefectures that have 
developed their own ‘tabunka kyōsei promotion plans’ (or five-year integration 
plans) as stipulated by the TKSK report (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru 
Kenkyūkai 2006). As noted by one NPO interview participant (Interview 1), about a 
quarter of all local governments have plans in place, so the developments that take 
place in large cities such as Osaka and Yokohama could have some bearing on 
developments in a high number of other local governments.  
The prevalence of the plans notwithstanding, what is particularly relevant is how 
tabunka kyōsei is applied in those plans. The 2007 Yokohama City plan 
acknowledges the language of tabunka kyōsei but is framed in terms of kokusaisei 
yutakana machizukuri, more akin to ‘building a community rich in internationality’. 
The plan notes that terms such as tabunka kyōsei have become more prominent 
recently, but ‘uses the phrase kokusaisei yutakana machizukuri as a general rule’ 
(Yokohama City 2007, 5). The plan describes its aim as: 
Building a community where people living within the city overcome differences 
of nationality, ethnicity and so on, and recognise one another’s differences, and 
making an appealing city where it is easy for temporary visitors such as tourists 
and business trip-makers to carry out their activities. (Yokohama City 2007, 5) 
In the section on tabunka kyōsei community building/planning, the aims of this 
process are described as ‘exchange’ (kōryū), ‘mutual understanding’ (sōgorikai) and 
‘everyday mutual support’. This section also mentions the importance of the 
independence or autonomy of foreign residents, and Japanese language proficiency is 
regarded as a prerequisite for this. Other mentions of tabunka kyōsei in the plan 
include tabunka kyōsei kyōiku which could be translated as multicultural or 
intercultural education. 
The 2009 Osaka City plan points towards the realisation of a ‘society of coexistence’ 
(kyōsei shakai), involving ‘respect for the human rights of foreign nationals’, the 
‘realisation of a society of multicultural coexistence’ and ‘community participation’ 
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(Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2009). In the English language version of the report, the 
title is translated as ‘building a tolerant community’, signifying that kyōsei has been 
translated as ‘tolerance’ rather than ‘coexistence’. All eleven items that appear under 
the theme of tabunka kyōsei are related to education policies (including learning the 
Japanese language), while other social policy areas appear under the theme of 
‘respect for human rights’. In other words, the Osaka City government views 
tabunka kyōsei as a way of framing education policies towards migrant children or 
the children of migrants. 
It is also worth noting that social and civil rights issues affecting foreign residents in 
Osaka are subsumed under human rights apart from education, even though 
education issues have also been associated with the human rights discourse in 
previous decades (Okano 2008). 
To a large extent, the association between tabunka kyōsei and education was 
reinforced in the interviews with stakeholders from NPOs and government 
foundations, with all of the Osaka-based interviewees using primarily education-
based examples when talking about key policies affecting foreign residents in Japan. 
When asked what they think the key issues are for foreign residents in Japan, 
stakeholders from both Osaka and Yokohama invariably said learning the Japanese 
language. 
These examples from Osaka and Yokohama illustrate that the term tabunka kyōsei 
has not been adopted in a uniform fashion, but it seems to be heavily associated with 
education policies and Japanese language learning. In Yokohama City, its use is 
closely correlated with its use in the original TKSK report, while other social policy 
areas are linked to the machizukuri (‘community building/planning’) discourse.  
In terms of chiikizukuri [or machizukuri] activities, one of the pillars of tabunka 
kyōsei, along with our work to help Japanese people better understand, we try to 
provide proper living information to foreign residents, and to promote everyone’s 
safety. Then, in terms of support to facilitate foreign resident’s lives, we’re trying 
to build this model area—it’s a bit of a trial, this kind of work that we’ve been 
doing.
 
 (Interview 8, female international exchange foundation representative, 
Yokohama) 
In Yokohama, at least, one of the local government officials was keen to point out 
that issues are not just peculiar to migrants: many issues are shared by immigrants 
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and Japanese people. He recognised these issues not just as individual or ‘group’ 
issues but as community issues (Interview 9). This view was also shared by an NPO 
representative in Osaka, who believes that issues affecting foreigners have been 
reframed as ‘community issues’ as part of the tabunka kyōsei policy approach. 
For one thing, within tabunka kyōsei, there’s been a reframing of “foreigners’ 
problems” as “community issues”. That’s been the biggest change—a change in 
how things are viewed. For example, teaching Japanese isn’t just for foreigners, 
it’s for the benefit of the community. At the same time, foreigners aren’t viewed 
as passive service recipients; they’re viewed as “players” or “stakeholders” who 
share some of the responsibility for developing their communities. For example, 
whereas before Japanese people were recruited as volunteer interpreters, about 
half are now foreigners. (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka) 
Most of the interview participants did not explicitly describe or frame issues 
affecting foreigners as ‘community issues’. However, the idea of migrants as being 
‘key players’ or ‘stakeholders’ with a stake in, or responsibility for, issues affecting 
their communities certainly reappeared in other interviews and focus groups. 
6.4 Relationships between key actors in the field: power 
struggles and partnerships 
One of the key aims of this study is to use the research findings to construct the 
overall configuration of governance operating within the field of integration policy-
making. Hence, in this section the relationships between the key actors involved in 
integration policy-making processes are explored in more detail.  
This section begins by looking at relationships between central government and local 
government, and between NPOs and central government; while the relationships 
between local governments and NPOs are reviewed in the next chapter. Findings 
concerning the relationships between local governments and the local executive are 
also analysed, before looking at how migrants are able to engage in participatory 
forms of governance. The role of transnational actors and institutions is also 
considered. 
6.4.1 Central–local government relations: contradictory accounts of 
convergence and control 
Previous literature suggests that local governments have taken hold of the reins in the 
field of integration policy-making—in terms of agenda setting and policy 
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formulation—in the absence of any overarching control by central government. To a 
large extent the interview data support the belief that local governments are in a 
position of relative influence and control within the field, at least in comparison to 
NPOs and other non-governmental actors. Central government has, arguably, shown 
less interest in integration policies than it has shown in other policy areas, leaving a 
space for local governments to fill. As one interviewee put it: 
[…] For certain problems the state makes a bigger effort and local governments 
are either given lots of money or they have to make cuts. Along with that part, I 
think there’s also a part where the state makes rather less effort. So the state has 
hardly any influence. […] Therefore, if local government people don’t think 
about it, it’s not going to happen. (Interview 5, male international exchange 
foundation representative, Yokohama) 
Without describing any specific policies, the interviewee indicated that local 
governments may play an influential role in integration policy-making processes, 
particularly in areas where central government actors are less engaged. 
Commenting on the changing nature of central–local government relations, one of 
the interview participants suggested that local government autonomy has grown, 
rather than diminished, since the 1990s. Speaking as an NPO representative, he 
observed that the ‘menu’ of services provided is now decided by local government: 
Over the last 20 years the power balance between national and local government 
has changed. Before, the national government held the power and the money and 
controlled local government, but now local governments are becoming more 
independent. The government sets the direction, but local government decides the 
‘menu’. (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka) 
This lends weight to the arguments of other scholars who have suggested that local 
governments have played an increasingly important role in terms of integration 
policy-making processes since the 1970s (for example, Tegtmeyer Pak 2006). Within 
the interviewee’s statement, however, it is worth noting that the ‘direction’ is set by 
central government. While local governments may have some freedom in 
formulating what integration policies look like locally, there is a suggestion that the 
framework for what they can do is still determined by central government. 
The most recent articulation of central government’s approach to integration 
appeared in the form of the 2006 TKSK report (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni 
kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). While a spate of tabunka kyōsei promotion plans were 
prompted by the TKSK report, Osaka Prefecture already had a plan in place by 2002. 
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When asked whether any changes were made to the plan as a result of the TKSK 
report, a representative from Osaka Prefecture made the following remarks. 
In particular, there wasn’t any talk of having to transform things depending on 
what direction the state takes after we do this. As this has persistently been Osaka 
Prefecture’s way of thinking, our guidelines, to the extent that our views didn’t 
differ from those of state staff, it means that various policies have come into 
effect, you know? As the state’s way of thinking is, similarly, about looking after 
foreigners living in Japan, maintaining the environment, I don’t think we differ 
on the fundamental points. Therefore, when the state’s way of thinking appeared, 
we didn’t feel obliged to change ours. (Interview 13, male prefectural 
government representative, Osaka).  
It is not clear what Osaka Prefecture’s position would have been if there had been 
significant differences between their published approach and the policies 
recommended by the TKSK report. However, there seems to have been sufficient 
convergence in their ‘ways of thinking’ (kangaekata) to allow the prefectural 
government to press on with its policies.  
This contrasts with what was said by another interviewee, who believes that a gap 
has grown between central and local government: 
In Japan, to put it bluntly, central government needs policy transformation. 
Policy transformation—how shall I put it? Reality is rapidly changing, so it’s no 
good if people from local government make policies that don’t match with other 
local authorities. So it’s becoming a kind of gap, but you’d think that central 
government needs policy transformation that corresponds with reality? But it 
hasn’t become like that, you know. Especially now, with the Abe administration, 
it’s particularly difficult. (Interview 6, male NPO representative, Tokyo). 
While some local government officials seem to think that there is a shared 
understanding with central government of what a desirable integration policy 
approach may look like, this particular NPO representative believes that central 
government has not done enough to keep up with real-world changes. This apparent 
contradiction may reflect different expectations about the role of central government. 
Aside from the publication of the TKSK report, another key event in recent history 
was the global financial crisis. When asked about the impact of the global financial 
crisis (or ‘Lehman Shock’ as it is known in Japan), most participants from local 
governments felt that while the purse strings had tightened, it had not had any 
discernible impact on integration policies. At the same time, however, several 
interview participants pointed out that while local governments may seem to hold 
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some power, their financial capital is very much controlled by central government—
any deviation from government policy could result in funding changes. In addition to 
the material value of economic capital, this points to its symbolic value as a tool for 
compliance. The fear of losing economic capital may be used by central government 
to subtly modify local government behaviour. 
6.4.2 Local executive power and local government partnerships 
The interview findings suggest that prefectural governors (chiji) and city mayors 
(shichō) can have a direct impact on the issues that make it on to local policy 
agendas and hence the direction of policy-making in their jurisdictions. 
A female interview participant from an NPO in Yokohama felt that a former 
governor played an instrumental role in the direction that Yokohama City 
subsequently took in terms of its ‘internationalisation’ (kokusaika) policies.
10
 Based 
at an organisation set up under the auspices of Governor Nagasu, the interviewee felt 
that subsequent policy developments ‘would not have been possible had another 
governor been in place’ (Interview 8). Her take on the minsai gaikō approach, or 
‘people-to-people diplomacy’ promoted by the Governor, was that ‘if citizens are 
better able to interact, then the world would probably become more peaceful’. 
This contrasts sharply with the experiences outlined by stakeholders in Osaka. One 
particular participant related how their NPO had previously maintained a good 
relationship with Osaka City Government, but less so under the former mayor, 
Hashimoto Tōru (Governor of Osaka Prefecture, 2008–2011, and then Mayor of 
Osaka City, 2011–2015).  
Moreover, the interviewee felt that key figures within the local government executive 
can influence whether policies are implemented or not. 
Tabunka kyōsei has no legal basis so it’s not essential. If, for example, the mayor 
changes, it may not be done. If the governor changes it won’t get done. If the 
head of a [local government] department changes, it won’t get done. It’s that kind 
of uncertainty. (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka) 
                                                 
10
 For two decades, Kanagawa prefecture was overseen by Nagasu Kazuji (Governor from 1975–
1995) who believed that international diplomacy should not just be enacted between states, but 
could also involve subnational actors, such as local governments and NPOs. Governor of one of 
the so-called ‘progressive local authorities’ (kakushin jichitai), Nagasu described this approach as 
minsai gaikō (‘people-to-people diplomacy’).  
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In the case of Osaka, there is an on-going battle to turn Osaka Prefecture into a 
metropolis organised along the same lines as Tokyo. As one interview participant 
described it, a bigger challenge than the global financial crisis, as far as Osaka’s 
Mayor is concerned, is ‘reconstructing’ the city (Interview 1). Although the plans 
were defeated by a narrow margin in a 2015 referendum, the legislative changes 
brought about by Osakan politicians have paved the way for other prefectures and 
cities to restructure if they wish to do so, while the door is open for Osaka to re-
attempt to become a metropolis in the future. In fact, both the current Mayor of 
Osaka City (Yoshimura Hirofumi) and the Governor of Osaka Prefecture (Matsui 
Ichirō) are members of the Osaka Restoration Association (Ōsaka Ishin no Kai)—a 
political party presided over by former mayor Hashimoto with the aim of fulfilling 
the plan to create ‘one Osaka’ (Ōsaka-to kōsō). 
These structural changes could have practical or substantial implications for the way 
in which integration policies are formulated or implemented in the future. For now, 
however, these discussions seem to be pushing integration-related issues further 
down the policy agenda. 
Speaking about other cities, it was also suggested that the wrong kind of people were 
in post when Tokyo made a bid for the 2020 Olympics. The then-Governor, Ishihara 
Shintarō, ‘knew nothing about foreigners’ according to one interviewee (Interview 1). 
He is certainly known for making negative, and at times incendiary remarks, about 
foreigners in Japan (Shipper 2005). 
In addition, local governments and migrant-supporting organisations have also 
changed the scope of their activities to manage the issues presented by integration, 
and new organisations have sprung up specifically to support immigrants living in 
Japan. This includes umbrella or network organisations such as the GSTK 
(Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi), which Tegtmeyer Pak (2006) translates as the 
‘Committee for Localities with a Concentrated Foreign Population’.
11
  
                                                 
11
 Although several variations of this translation are present in the literature, they all convey a broadly 
similar meaning to Tegtmeyer Pak’s translation. However, Tegtmeyer Pak then goes on to refer to 
the organisation as the CLCFP. I believe that an abbreviation of the original Japanese name is 
preferable to an abbreviated translation. 
129 
The GSTK was established by 13 cities in May 2001, with Hamamatsu being the 
largest by population. The membership has since grown to the point where there are 
currently 22 members, of which 21 are cities (see Table 5.2). The group made its 
policy intentions clear with the publication of the ‘Hamamatsu Declaration’ 
(Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi 2001). 
Despite its name, GSTK members are primarily cities with comparatively high 
concentrations of Brazilian Nikkeijin, which means that cities such as Yokohama and 
Osaka are not currently members. However, the impact of the GSTK’s activities has 
certainly been felt by other cities. The GSTK was established to facilitate horizontal 
knowledge sharing and to lobby central government for greater involvement in 
integration policies, which is discussed in more detail below.  
Table 6.2 Population of GSTK members and observers, as at 1 April 2017 
Municipality Prefecture Total population Foreign resident 
population 
Foreign residents 
as percentage of 
local population 
(%) 
Ōta Gunma 223,786 9,856 4.4 
Ōizumi (town) Gunma 41,740 7,341 17.6 
Ueda Nagano 158,881 3,414 2.1 
Iida Nagano 103,023 2,132 2.1 
Minokamo Gifu 56,293 4,438 7.9 
Hamamatsu Shizuoka 806,407 21,842 2.7 
Fuji Shizuoka 255,060 4,740 1.9 
Iwata Shizuoka 170,430 6,716 3.9 
Kakegawa Shizuoka 117,685 3,815 3.2 
Fukuroi Shizuoka 87,274 3,660 4.2 
Kosai Shizuoka 60,306 2,656 4.4 
Kikugawa Shizuoka 47,827 2,831 5.9 
Toyohashi Aichi 376,886 14,956 4.0 
Toyota Aichi 423,916 15,341 3.6 
Komaki Aichi 153,335 8,153 5.3 
Tsu Mie 280,710 7,566 2.7 
Yokkaichi Mie 311,672 8,339 2.7 
Suzuka Mie 200,151 7,294 3.6 
Kameyama Mie 49,530 1,691 3.4 
Iga Mie 93,369 4,540 4.9 
Koka Shiga 91,587 2,804 3.1 
Sōja Okayama 68,237 1,039 1.5 
Total - 4,178,105 145,164 3.5 
Source: Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi, http://www.shujutoshi.jp/member/pdf/2016member.pdf 
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6.4.3 NPOs as (unequal) partners with central government 
Although the relationships between local governments and central government are 
not always clear, NPOs and other civil society organisations seem to be more vocal 
in terms of their asks to central government and the kinds of relationship they wish to 
have with respect to ‘the state’. Hence, this section reviews findings concerning the 
relationships between NPOs and central government, while their relations with local 
governments are discussed in the next chapter. 
To begin with, one of the NPO stakeholders suggested that the relationship between 
government and NPOs should change (Interview 1). In his view, the government is 
set up to provide universal services with little specialisation, but this conflicts with 
the differing needs of migrants with respect to the Japanese. He suggested that NPOs 
should decide what services to deliver, and how, and that the government’s role 
should be to distribute funds accordingly. 
[…] The government’s job is about gathering taxes, and producing the same 
services. It’s a great system, but, what should I say, services—when various 
different services are needed, the government system doesn’t really work. 
Because the things that Japanese people want and the things that foreigners want 
are different, it’s very difficult for the government to specifically provide 
services which are needed by foreigners. And so that’s where it’s better for NPOs 
to do it. So having more NPOs—it’s not just for foreigners though. Because 
various minorities have social issues, it’s better if those people think about what 
kind of things are they concerned about and what kind of services they want. And 
when they’ve thought about it… it needs to be firmly backed up with money and 
by the system. And that’s the government’s role… It’s better if NPOs do the 
project management. But, all the, the planning etc., how do I put it? The 
government distributes the money. I think that kind of relationship would be 
better.
 
 (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka) 
The interviewee recognised this as a partnership model, but one with serious 
limitations. In particular, he suggested that it is not a partnership of equals. At the 
moment, if the government agrees to a certain policy or initiative, the semblance of a 
partnership is maintained; but where the government is unsupportive, the partnership 
no longer holds. While NPOs are also able to end the partnership—by withdrawing 
support for a particular project, for example—this is unlikely to happen unless 
alternative forms of support for migrants are in place. Otherwise, it jeopardises the 
mission of the NPOs. By contrast, the material and symbolic loss to the government 
is, arguably, much smaller. 
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The interviewee went on to highlight potential policy learning (more specifically, 
policy transfer) to improve the relationship between the state and NPOs, highlighting 
Australia and Canada as places where state–NPO relations do not seem to follow the 
principal–agent model. He also suggested that NPOs need to wrestle more power 
from the government.  
In Japan, responsibility for social issues, responsibility for resolving issues has, 
up to now, been held by the government. So, the money too—it’s distributed by 
the government. And, that—now NPOs have to gradually shift it towards us, we 
have to shift the power. When the Japanese economy was doing really well, of 
course the government held a great deal of power. But that was then, and 
gradually its power’s becoming smaller. NPOs have to take back power once 
again. We’re now on the way, well, we’ve only got about 10%. […] If we can do 
it, I think that Japanese communities would still be sustainable, but if we can’t, 
it’s a lot to ask. (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka) 
While it is impossible to tell how likely it is that the relationship between the state 
and NPOs will change as a whole, what is of relevance is that NPOs (or one, at least) 
seem to be questioning the nature of their ties with the government. Indeed, the 
interview data also revealed some of the ways in which NPOs are trying to influence 
government politics and policies, which are discussed later in this chapter. 
It is also worth noting that the interviewee felt that NPOs held more sway in the past. 
It is likely that he was referring to the early 2000s when Japan’s economy was 
showing signs of recovery under the Koizumi administration—a period where local 
governments, NPOs and other organisations were pushing the government for 
immigration and integration-related changes with some success, as discussed in 
chapter two. 
6.4.4 Participatory governance in Osaka and Kanagawa 
There are notable differences between Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City and Kanagawa 
Prefecture in terms of their approaches to participatory governance, namely the ways 
in which they engage foreign residents in integration policy-making processes as 
discussed in chapter two. 
Osaka Prefecture established an expert group in October 1992 charged with 
discussing policy measures concerned with foreigners living in Japan (Ōsaka-fu 
Zainichi Gaikokujin Shisaku Yūshikisha Kaigi). The meetings currently comprise no 
more than ten members identified as academic and professional experts, with the 
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most recent meeting attended by university lecturers, NPO representatives and other 
professionals. The majority of current attendees seem to have a migrant background, 
but not all of them. 
The ‘Osaka City foreign resident policy expert group’ (Ōsaka-shi Gaikokuseki Jūmin 
Shisaku Yūshikisha Kaigi) was established in November 1994 but abolished in March 
2014. Its membership consisted of 14 academic and professional experts and its 
meetings were open to the public, but its records suggest that few or no members of 
the public attended the last few meetings. From August 2017, a new group policy 
coordination group tasked with developing tabunka kyōsei related policies has been 
in situ (Ōsaka-shi Tabunka Kyōsei Shisaku Renraku Kaigi). Unlike the previous 
meetings, these are cross-departmental meetings comprising internal staff only. It is 
not clear how many attendees have a migrant background, but it is likely to be low 
given that foreign residents are unlikely to have managerial or leadership roles within 
local government. 
The Kanagawa Foreign Residents’ Council (Gaikokuseki Kenmin Kanagawa Kaigi) 
was established in 1998 following in the footsteps of the ‘Kawasaki City 
Representative Assembly for Foreign Residents’ (Gaikokujin Shimin Daihyōsha 
Kaigi)—the first of its kind in the prefecture. There does not seem to be a separate 
assembly for Yokohama City, but nine of the 20 attendees at the last meeting were 
from Yokohama City. At the time of its establishment, the Governor promised to 
‘respect as much as possible’ the assembly’s views, but it has no statutory footing 
(Yoshida 1998). 
The criteria for membership was having lived, worked or studied in Kanagawa for at 
least one year. Members also have to be able to speak Japanese as all meetings are 
conducted in Japanese. Applicants were initially selected for two-year terms by an 
independent committee of scholars and other experts on issues pertaining to 
foreigners, although it is not clear how this committee was selected. 
Overall, there seems to be a strong difference between the approach taken by Osaka 
City and that taken by Kanagawa Prefecture. While the latter provides a forum where 
foreign residents can raise issues and try to influence the policy-making process, 
albeit without statutory backing, Osaka City seems to have no forums in which 
foreign residents can participate. Osaka Prefecture seems to have developed an 
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approach combining aspects of both of the aforementioned approaches, incorporating 
a selection of experts with a mix of Japanese and non-Japanese ethnonational 
backgrounds. 
6.4.5 Transnational institutions and influences on Japanese policies 
While the interview participants spoke predominantly about actors and institutions at 
the national and local scale, some of the interview participants also touched on 
transnational activities and institutions that may have a bearing on integration policy-
making within Japan. These include activities generated by actors operating 
primarily at the transnational scale, as well as activities instigated at the transnational 
scale by actors operating at the subnational scale. 
One of the NPO stakeholders noted that they were interested in the work of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
specifically mentioning the work of the Human Rights Committee which had 
completed its consideration of the sixth periodic report of Japan on its 
implementation of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Interview 3). Of particular relevance for the interviewee were the concluding 
observations in the report, which noted that Japan has made little progress on the 
recommendations outlined in the fourth and fifth periodic reports (see Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2012). 
As mentioned above, organisations such as Ijūren have forged their own 
transnational links and networks. This includes links with the Asian Migrant Centre: 
a regional NGO based in Hong Kong, which, according to its website, ‘carries out 
action oriented research on migration issues, policy and media advocacy, and 
capacity building for organisations working to empower, protect and promote the 
rights of migrants in Asia’. Since 2002, the AMC has enjoyed a Special Consultative 
Status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations. 
Ijūren also has ties with its Korean counterpart, the Joint Committee for Migrant 
Workers in Korea (JCMK). 
Another interview participant commented that ‘the biggest difference between 
Europe and Japan/Asia is, of course, the fact that there is no EU’ (Interview 1). 
Although he did not make any specific comments about the UN, he was implying 
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that the lack of a transnational governance structure made it more difficult to 
challenge the Japanese government’s policies. He felt that broader politics in the 
region would be different if there was an institution like the European Union, but 
also felt that the prospects of such an institution being created seemed unlikely. 
6.5 Field strategies: using capital to influence integration 
policies 
This section explores how organisations have been trying to influence integration 
policies produced at the national scale. It looks at actors’ relative positions in the 
field of integration policy-making—including the forms of capital (or power) that 
they are endowed with—and the kind of strategies and behaviours they have 
employed to influence the policy-making process. 
6.5.1 NPO advocacy: negotiation and strategies of succession 
This study found that a certain number of NPOs, but by no means all, are trying to 
build up their relationships with central government, which includes negotiating with 
various government departments and lobbying Diet members to influence 
government policy.  
As one participant noted, a single NPO may not have much bargaining power, but 
multiple NPOs speaking in concert may be able to wield greater influence. 
In particular, when we make policy proposals, requests and so on to the 
government, because our influence is weak as a solo organisation, if we work 
with various other people and refine [our argument] before negotiating […] 
That’s the form it takes. (Interview 3, male NPO representative, Osaka) 
Of all the network organisations or alliances that migrant-supporting organisations 
have formed, Ijūren is probably the most well-known and the most influential. Set up 
to provide collective support for migrant-supporting NPOs and to lobby the Japanese 
government, all the NPO representatives interviewed for this study had links to 
Ijūren, either as members or in an informal capacity. Its mission is described as 
follows. 
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Reforming policies and regulations at the national level, combined with local 
level efforts is key to securing the rights of migrants and people with foreign 
nationalities. Ijūren plays an important role in connecting both.
12
 (Ijūren website) 
There seem to be good practical reasons for having such a network in place: many of 
the NPOs spoken to had a handful of staff and relied heavily on volunteers, making 
the economies-of-scale offered by lobbying the government through Ijūren attractive. 
In fact, the majority of NPOs in Japan have fewer than six staff, who are likely to be 
paid much less than their counterparts in the private sector (NPO Homepage, Cabinet 
Office). 
According to one of the representatives of Ijūren, the organisation has held ‘opinion 
exchanges’ with ministries on such issues as labour, poverty, gender, refugees, 
education and health. 
In addition, it was found that Ijūren is lobbying not only institutions based in Japan, 
but also transnational institutions. One example is around working visas. There are 
currently several problems with the working visa system in Japan, making it 
vulnerable to abuse, and it has been argued by NPOs that this has led to 
infringements of the rights of migrant workers. In particular, Ijūren has been 
lobbying the United Nations (via the Migrant Forum in Asia or MFA) to urge the 
Japanese Government to reform the working visa system. 
While there are several issues that local governments are in a position to deal with, 
issues such as reforming the visa system can only be dealt with by central 
government, as one interview participant explained.  
There is a gap between central government and the circumstances that local 
government are facing but policy change is particularly difficult at the moment. 
That’s because of the policies of the Abe administration rather than the party 
itself (LDP). But local government cannot deal with all the issues that affect 
foreigners by themselves—they need support from central government for issues 
such as working visas. (Interview 6, male NPO representative, Tokyo) 
The interviewee also seems to be implying that difficulties in engaging with the Abe 
administration may be one of the motives for approaching transnational institutions, 
which could be described as a ‘strategy of succession’ (Swartz 2003). In addition, his 
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 See http://migrants.jp/activities 
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claim that it is difficult to get any traction under Prime Minister Abe suggests that the 
current climate is not conducive to achieving policy change at the national scale. 
6.5.2 Local government advocacy: the struggle for recognition  
While NPOs in Japan seem to be using various strategies to influence policies at the 
national scale, local governments seem to be employing their own strategies. Unlike 
smaller governments, Osaka and Kanagawa Prefecture seem to be large enough to be 
able to approach central government directly with their concerns. For example, a 
representative from Osaka Government noted that Kanagawa Prefecture plays an 
important intermediary role between central government and local governments. 
As I said before, even for relations between the Prefecture and the municipalities, 
there are renraku kaigi [‘liaison conferences’], as Osaka Prefecture occupies an 
intermediate position between the state, the wards and the cities. It’s a kind of 
situation where we’re always coordinating. Because it’s focused on shared issues, 
the prefectures gather various issues such as these, and within those, these issues 
are particularly important, so let’s make a request to the state… (Interview 13, 
male prefectural government representative, Osaka) 
Although neither Osaka nor Yokohama, nor their respective prefectures, are 
represented in the GSTK, their absence does not preclude the possibility of the 
activities of the GSTK having an impact on the policies affecting migrants residing 
in Yokohama, Osaka or beyond. Like Ijūren, the GSTK has more influence than 
individual members would be able to have, as pointed out by one of its 
representatives. By lobbying central government on issues such as the 
comprehensive coordination of policies affecting foreigners and calling for the 
establishment of organisations that can provide the technical expertise and resource 
to implement these policies (Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi 2001), the GSTK is 
effectively calling for policy changes that would ‘reach’ into Osaka and Yokohama. 
In the future, however, the GSTK may hold an open conference which any city can 
attend, not just those with high concentrations of Nikkeijin residents (Interview 16). 
The interview participant confirmed that Osaka and Yokohama would be able to 
attend this conference if they choose to participate. At the moment, the GSTK 
members represent areas which are home to about 6% of the total foreign resident 
population in Japan, but expanding its membership could increase this tremendously. 
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The GSTK seems to have had an impact on various integration policies and 
initiatives adopted by central government, but not always directly or in their entirety. 
While central government has made some concessions to the GSTK, e.g. by 
establishing a portal website where ‘long-term foreign residents’ (primarily 
Nikkeijin) can access information related to integration, there are still many areas 
where the GSTK continues to push for changes. In particular, the GSTK has 
continued to call on the government to ‘establish a gaikokujin-chō [foreign residents 
agency] to comprehensively implement policies for foreign residents in line with 
tabunka kyōsei’ (Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi 2017). 
6.5.3 Influencing by committee: controlled expertise 
Another way in which national integration policies may be influenced is from the 
‘inside’, using ‘outside’ expertise. As mentioned in chapter two, the policy-making 
process in Japan is replete with ‘advisory committees’ of various kinds, including 
shingikai (‘commissions’) and kenkyūkai (‘research committees’) specifically, and 
iinkai (‘committees’) more generally. Although these committees have received 
scant attention in recent scholarship on integration policies in Japan, they were 
mentioned by several stakeholders during the interviews. 
Of particular note is the tabunka kyōsei no suishin ni kansuru kenkyūkai or TKSK: 
the ‘study group’ or ‘research committee’ that was set up in relation to the promotion 
of tabunka kyōsei, which produced the 2006 TKSK report (Tabunka Kyōsei no 
Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). The committee included a dozen 
representatives drawn from various sectors (public, private and voluntary) and was 
chaired by the scholar Yamawaki Keizō, known for his work on integration policies 
in Japan. One of the committee members was Tamura Tarō—director of the Osaka-
based NPO called Tabunka Kyōsei Center—who is regarded as having had 
considerable influence on the content of the final report.
13
 
The committee met seven times in the run up to the publication of the report, 
including hearings with representatives from Keidanren (the influential Japan 
Business Federation), the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (or MEXT) and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government respectively. The 
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 Personal correspondence with one of the committee members. 
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input of these organisations is also likely to have shaped the content and framing of 
the report. 
As with committees at the national scale, local-scale actors such as NPOs are also 
able to influence the direction of policy by local governments. One NPO stakeholder 
in Osaka explained that he was a member of the local ward committee tasked with 
producing a local welfare action plan (chiiki fukushi akushon puran). Had they not 
been a member of this committee, the stakeholder felt that they would still engage 
with the local ward office to exchange ideas, but this role gave them the opportunity 
to help shape the local welfare action plan 
As discussed in the next chapter, many of the activities associated with tabunka 
kysōei seem to involve education in some form, and several participants spoke of 
interactions with local education boards (kyōiku iinkai). One interviewee stated that 
they have a strong and favourable relationship with the Osaka education board, 
thereby enabling their NPO to exchange ideas with the board as an influential adviser. 
These interactions have led to support for particular projects such as minority 
education programmes (Interview 3). 
While committees allow different actors to engage in the policy-making process and 
may lead to changes in the way that policies are framed, formulated or implemented, 
committee members also have to conform to the norms and expectations associated 
with this membership. This may constrain their ability to call for transformative 
policy changes. 
6.5.4 The symbolic capital of field-specific institutions 
Drawing on data from the document review, this section looks at the way in which 
the recognition of international exchange associations or foundations (kokusai koryū 
kyōkai/zaidan) has gradually become formalised.  
In Osaka, the two main foundations are the Osaka Foundation of International 
Exchange (Ōsaka-fu Kokusai Koryū Zaidan) known as OFIX, and the Osaka 
International House Foundation (Ōsaka Kokusai Koryū Sentā) known as i-house; 
affiliated with Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City, respectively. Likewise, in 
Kanagawa, the two main foundations are the Kanagawa International Foundation 
(Kanagawa Kokusai Koryū Zaidan) or KIF, and the Yokohama Association for 
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International Communications and Exchanges (Yokohama Kokusai Koryū Kyōkai) or 
YOKE. 
What all these organisations now have in common is a government-designated 
abbreviation in front of their names: kōeki zaidan hōjin or ‘Public Interest 
Incorporated Foundation’. 
The early years of the 21st century witnessed remarkable changes in Japan’s legal 
and regulatory frameworks for public benefit corporations as part of the 
government’s administrative reform. Most recently, on 1 December 2008, the new 
Public Interest Corporation laws (PIC Laws) went into effect. Six different types of 
Public Interest Corporations (PICs) exist as a result of these changes. 
The timeline below shows show the various international exchange 
foundations/associations in Osaka and Kanagawa gained legal recognition at various 
times (see Table 6.3) 
Table 6.3 Timeline of the establishment of key international exchange 
foundations in Osaka and Yokohama 
Date Event 
Feb 1977 Kanagawa International Association (KIA) established—the forerunner to KIF 
Jul 1981 YOKE established as a voluntary organization (originally called Yokohama-shi 
Kaigai Kōryū Kyōkai) 
Dec 1982 YOKE recognised as a Foundation 
Feb 1987 i-house established with permission from MOFA 
Jan 1989 OFIX established as a Corporate Foundation 
Jan 1990 i-house authorised as a regional international association by the MHA 
Oct 1992 Kanagawa scientific study interchange foundation (K-FACE) establishment 
Mar 1993 YOKE authorised as a Specific Public Interest Promotion Corporation 
Apr 1993 i-house authorised as a Specific Public Interest Promotion Corporation by 
MOFA 
Apr 1999 YOKE changed its Japanese name 
Apr 2007 KIA merged with K-FACE and renamed as KIF 
Nov 2010 YOKE re-registered as a Public Interest Incorporated Foundation 
Apr 2012 OFIX re-registered as a Public Interest Incorporated Foundation, as recognised 
by the Governor of Osaka Prefecture 
 
These labels may not be regarded as being particularly important by migrants who 
are more interested in the kinds of support they can access, than the legal status of a 
particular organisation. On the other hand, migrant-supporting organisations which 
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lack the ‘legitimacy’ conferred by these labels may be less well regarded by local 
governments and other actors in the field than those who hold such symbolic capital. 
As one of the focus group participants explained, migrants themselves are accorded 
greater legitimacy if they are endorsed by an NPO. 
Interviewer: Do you think when the local government talks to NGOs—do they 
actually listen to you? Like, “look, we want you to change this, we don’t like 
this…”? 
Participant: Well, we can say that it’s yes and no. Yes, because they have a 
system of endorsement. If you’re a migrant endorsed by an NGO, you are 
recognised and given assistance. Number two, the NGOs are the ones who can 
stand for you. This is what we always tell our members. If you do not want to be 
discriminated, ask somebody to go with you to the city hall. Never go alone. That 
is what I always tell them. (FG 3, female NPO representative, Yokohama) 
6.6 Summary 
The findings in this chapter highlight how the issues related to migrant integration in 
Japan are interpreted and addressed by actors through the lens of tabunka kyōsei. 
Although different actors have different understandings of tabunka kyōsei and the 
policy approaches that it seems to describe, it seems to be heavily linked with 
education policies, particularly in Osaka. At the same time, it is certainly not free of 
criticism. 
Documentary evidence and interview data have also been used to shed light on some 
of the key actors and institutions involved in the development of integration policies 
in Japan—especially the assymetric relations between them, which shape the policies 
affecting migrants in Japan. What is particularly notable from the analysis is the 
minor role that migrants themselves are permitted to play within these processes. 
For the more dominant actors in the field—central government, local governments 
and NPOs—various strategies are being used to influence existing policies or control 
the processes through which they may be changed. While local governments and 
NPOs are in dialogue with central government-based actors to try to influence 
integration policies, mainly through negotiation, NPOs are also trying to challenge 
government policies through transnational mechanisms. At the same time, central 
government has considerable control over ‘visible’ institutions such as committees 
and also over symbolic institutions (such as the power to create legal entities) which 
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allows it to control which actors may ‘legitimately’ engage in policy-making 
processes. 
The findings also illustrate the complexities of policy-making which are not 
adequately captured when policy-making is viewed as a sequence or cycle of 
chronologically ordered events or stages (see, for example, Borkert and Penninx 
2011). For integration policies in Japan, talking about problem framing, agenda 
setting, policy formulation and implementation as a sequence of activities and 
processes is belied by the fact that it is often very unclear when any of the activities 
that fall under those headings were started or finished. It also seems to be the case 
that many of the activities involved in policy-making seem to proceed 
simultaneously, especially at different scales. For example, Osaka City published its 
integration plan and proceeded on to policy implementation before the policy agenda 
was even recognised by central government. 
Overall, this chapter has sought to illuminate the dynamic relationships between the 
key actors involved in the governance of integration policies, and the mechanisms by 
which those actors have tried to control or influence those policies. The next chapter 
presents the findings from the focus groups carried out with foreign residents, with 
the aim of understanding how integration support is provided to, and experienced by, 
migrants.  
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7 Social services and integration support for foreign 
residents 
7.1 Introduction 
While the previous chapter presented findings about the nature of the field of 
integration policy-making—and the roles and relationships of actors within the 
field—this chapter explores the delivery of integration support and services. In 
particular, it focuses on the capital that migrants and service providers are endowed 
with and the relationships between and among these actors. 
It is clear that local governments and migrant-supporting organisations (especially 
NPOs and international exchange foundations) provide or help provide a range of 
social services that are either specifically designed for migrants or foreign residents 
or offered to all prefectural/city residents including foreign residents. Hence, this 
chapter explores the relationships between migrants and service providers from two 
perspectives. On the one hand it looks at the way services are delivered by ‘service 
providers’ (or policy implementers); on the other hand, it unpicks how migrants 
engage with those services, primarily as ‘service users’ (or policy subjects). 
The findings presented in this chapter are based primarily on the data gathered 
through the focus groups and interviews (see chapter five). To a lesser extent, 
findings have also been included from the document analysis, particularly 
questionnaire data from surveys carried out by local government departments in the 
study sites. (In order to avoid confusion, foreign residents who took part in these 
local government surveys are described as respondents, while the individuals who 
took part in this study are described as participants.) 
To help contextualise the findings further, data have also been included from the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 2015: a tool designed to compare national 
government efforts to promote the integration of migrants across multiple 
dimensions in a number of European countries, as well as Australia, Canada, Japan, 
New Zealand, South Korea and the USA. 
143 
7.2 Problem framing at the frontline 
7.2.1 Language issues: problem framing and ‘linguistic agency’ 
Language and communication support was regarded as a key policy issue by both 
migrants and non-migrants alike. However, participants’ perspectives on the issue 
revealed that the way in which the problem is framed from a policy perspective is not 
necessarily how it is understood by migrants. 
When asked what they felt to be the key issues facing foreign residents in Japan, the 
majority of the interview participants spoken to as part of this study identified 
learning Japanese as one of the main issues, if not the main issue. This corresponds 
with the findings of an attitudes survey carried out by Yokohama City, where the 
issue that foreign residents identified as the one they were most worried about was, 
by far, a lack of Japanese language skills (Yokohama-shi Seisaku-kyoku 2014).  
In fact, Japanese was cited as a concern by a quarter of respondents to the Yokohama 
survey. A further 14% of respondents reported that not having someone who can 
understand foreign languages in a hospital or clinical setting was a concern, and 11% 
were worried that an interpreter would not be available when they were seeing a 
clinician in a hospital or clinical setting. Just over 9% of respondents were concerned 
that foreign languages would not be understood at government advice services and 
almost 8% were worried about a lack of information in their native language. 
Respondents to the foreign resident survey carried out by Osaka City reported that 
they thought they needed interpreting support when visiting the hospital (26%) or the 
ward office (21%), for emergency evacuation drills (17%) and for explanations at 
work (13%) (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015).  
Speaking from an international exchange foundation perspective, one of the 
interview participants in this study described what he felt to be the consequences of 
not being able to speak Japanese fluently. 
Of course there’s an issue there right? If you have a lack of Japanese, you could 
call it a problem, but that’s because being unable to understand Japanese can lead 
to other problems in one way or another. Because you can’t understand Japanese, 
you won’t be to find work and not being able to find work is a problem, so for 
that reason if you can speak Japanese, you’ll probably find work. But even if you 
can speak Japanese, there are still other problems around whether or not you’ll 
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find work. For things like—it’s just a difficult thing, but basically as I said before, 
because we take the results of the survey seriously, we grasp that a lack of 
Japanese is probably the biggest problem. (Interview 5, male international 
exchange foundation representative, Yokohama) 
The narrative that this interviewee is describing, echoed by another interview 
participant working at an international exchange foundation in Osaka, was presented 
as a logical sequence of events. To some extent this narrative was also supported by 
the focus group participants. For example, one young person explained that Japanese 
fluency was essential for his career prospects. 
I really want to move to this one company but they require programmers to have 
N2 or N1 level Japanese [the highest levels of the Japanese Language Proficiency 
Test]. So you need to obtain a higher level of Japanese in order to get better 
opportunities. (FG 7, male Brazilian, Yokohama†) 
However, while there was some support for this narrative, other findings seemed to 
challenge the way in which the language issue has been framed. In particular, these 
findings suggest that migrants are affected by a lack of information in their native 
language in addition to, or rather than, a lack of Japanese language skills.  
For example, when respondents to the Osaka survey were asked which language they 
prefer to receive information in, the highest response was from those who said that 
they wanted information in their native language (39%) with a further 11% saying 
that they wanted information in English (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015). About 20% 
of respondents wanted information in simplified Japanese and 21% wanted 
information in standard Japanese with ruby characters (furigana). Just 5% wanted 
information in standard Japanese without ruby characters. In addition, the majority of 
respondents felt that Osaka City’s ‘Multilingual Information at a Glance’ was very 
useful (53%) or somewhat useful (24%). 
Describing situations where migrants or their family members might require medical 
services, one focus group participant, M, described how individuals may be 
adversely affected by their Japanese language ability, but positively affected by the 
availability of translation or interpreting services. 
For example, getting immunisation. When you go to a hospital, of course you 
don’t know how to say [the word for immunisation] right? If your child gets 
vaccinated, you wouldn’t know what it’s for, right? You’d feel worried and 
anxious at the same time you cannot speak Japanese, unlike when there's an 
interpreter assisting you, at least you will learn the purpose of the vaccine. It's 
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been one of my experiences so I’d like to help other mothers this time. And at 
times, they don’t want to study [Japanese]. (FG 6, female foundation 
representative/Filipino, Yokohama†) 
This quote shows that the ‘language issue’ may be viewed as both an individual issue, 
in terms of a migrant’s Japanese language skills, and a structural issue—for example, 
in terms of multilingual assistance. 
However, for some migrants, being able to speak the Japanese language appeared to 
be much less of a concern. For example, when asked whether some migrants do not 
want to learn Japanese, M light-heartedly replied that ‘They have no interest in it’. 
This response could be interpreted as an indication that, for some migrants at least, 
Japanese language proficiency is much less of a concern than implied by some of the 
interview participants. An alternative interpretation is that migrants are actively 
resisting linguistic integration, despite the pressure they may feel to learn the 
language. 
Indeed, the Yokohama survey found that just 36% of respondents were learning 
Japanese compared to 60% who said they were not (Yokohama-shi Seisaku-kyoku 
2014). At the same time, while 55% of respondents said that they want to learn 
Japanese, 18% felt there is no need to learn Japanese, 14% would learn Japanese if it 
is free and just over 4% reported that they did not really want to learn Japanese. 
7.2.2 Disaster management: a problem of responsibility 
On the other hand, not all focus group participants felt that actors at the local scale 
should take responsibility for providing disaster-related information to migrants. One 
focus group participant, S, felt that embassies and consulate-generals, as 
representatives of one’s own national government, could do more in this regard. 
For example, when the Tōhoku earthquake occurred, what did [the Philippine 
government] do? The American government, as well as other governments—they 
constantly monitored the situation or status of their citizens here. They 
repatriated their people when in danger or in crisis. When it came to the 
Philippine government, they instructed the Filipinos to go home if they want to 
[laughs]. The embassy shouldn’t just advise its people to go home, because it’s 
not even that easy. But whenever Filipino migrants are in need, they tend to rely 
on the Japanese government since they can provide emergency response. But 
when it comes to the embassy’s actual presence…? I think this is because they 
lack resources as well, and so many other things [laughs]. (FG 6, female Filipino, 
Yokohama†) 
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As this quote illustrates, the participant felt that the lack of capital (particularly 
economic capital) possessed by the Philippine embassy made it less effective than 
those of other countries, hence making it necessary for Filipino migrants to rely on 
the Japanese government.  
Other actors felt that migrants themselves should play a greater role in disaster 
management. An interview participant from CLAIR felt that more needs to be done 
to engage immigrants in disaster management, giving examples related to 
earthquakes and the fire brigade. 
Speaking for myself, up until now there have been a lot of foreigners who have 
been supported by Japanese people. But as the number of foreigners has grown 
and Japanese people can’t support everyone, foreigners are actually learning for 
themselves and settling down in Japan. I think there’s a need to make an effort to 
settle in Japan. Take disaster response, for example. When an earthquake has 
happened, because Japanese people have been trained to what to do and have 
been doing shelter-taking drills, up to now they’ve been the ones telling 
foreigners to come. But they haven’t really been coming. Because it’s not a very 
fun event, they haven’t really been coming. But it’s not just Japanese people, but 
also foreigners who have to learn what to do if an earthquake happens out of the 
blue. (Interview 10, male CLAIR rep, Tokyo) 
The interviewee seems to be suggesting that migrants should try harder to conform to 
the behavioural norms expected of Japanese ethnonationals. However, there also 
seems to be a suggestion that migrants are not interested in disaster response. This is 
slightly at odds with findings from the Osaka City foreign residents survey, which 
found that the community activity that foreign residents were most keen to 
participate in was emergency evacuation drills, with 30% reporting a desire to be 
involved. (The second highest score was for cooking and delivering meals for older 
people at 17%). 
7.2.3 Reframing housing issues as pro-tourism measures 
Considering how the system may change in the future, a representative from CLAIR 
felt that the Tokyo Olympics could offer an opportunity to advance policy changes 
under the banner of tabunka kyōsei. For example, he felt that the law should be 
changed to make it easier for foreigners to be able to rent rooms in Japan.  
Even now, as the number of tourists has substantially increased, Japanese people 
are holding the idea that, for example, signs must be written in English and 
Chinese, etc. When the Olympics start, because more foreigners will come and 
because we need to prepare for that, we should provide more multilingual 
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information and things like that. And the law needs to change to make it easier 
for foreigners to rent rooms. I think that there’s a high likelihood that tabunka 
kyōsei will rapidly increase as an increasing number of foreigners arrive. I think 
that the Olympics will become a big opportunity to promote tabunka kyōsei. 
(Interview 10, male CLAIR representative, Tokyo) 
At the time of speaking, the Olympic Games were still five years away. Yet, the 
interviewee clearly felt that the best way to precipitate changes in the rental system 
would be to link it to increased tourism. While the interview participant made this 
connection in relation to tourists, his argument seems to suggest that such a change 
could also benefit foreign residents in Japan in the long run.  
7.3 Controlling capital and collaborating at the frontline 
Local governments and migrant-supporting organisations in both Yokohama and 
Osaka seem to have well-developed networks in a number of policy areas affecting 
foreign residents, such as education. This section looks at how these networks allow 
these organisations to gather, share and make use of information, as well as deliver 
support and services to migrants. 
7.3.1 Accumulating information, capitalising on knowledge 
All of the interview participants spoken to said that their organisations shared and 
exchanged information and expertise with other organisations. In many cases this 
included examples of existing support and services that are offered to foreign 
residents. As one international exchange foundation representative explained 
(Interview 4), this allows organisations to inform others that they are working on 
similar projects, presumably to share ideas and examples of best practice. 
All of the NPO and international exchange foundation interviewees said that their 
department/section was collaborating with organisations within the same city or 
prefecture, while roughly half said that their department/section was supporting or 
working with organisations located in other cities or prefectures. For example, an 
interview participant in Yokohama said that they had received local government 
visitors from places such as Kyoto City and Okinawa Prefecture to discuss what kind 
of services they could provide for foreign residents (Interview 5). 
The interviews with NPO representatives confirmed that those NPOs not only 
provide services but often carry out or commission research on issues concerning 
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migrants and other foreign residents in Japan. Both experiential learning and 
research-based learning have the potential to increase the expertise of the NPOs and 
may give them the legitimacy to try and influence policy, as evident in the presence 
of NPO representatives in various committees and expert advisory groups (as 
highlighted in the previous chapter). 
One of the international exchange foundation representatives explained that her 
organisation arranges meetings, akin to focus groups or deliberative workshops, to 
gather information about particular issues. 
So if you have a question or something like that, we gather a group of foreigners 
here [deliberately] because they’re unlikely to come here by chance. If it’s a 
small organisation within the municipalities, they may be offering Japanese 
classes to people who live in the area or something like that […] It doesn’t really 
happen with organisations at the prefectural level, but we may gather a certain 
group of people, for a particular theme or something, and we have a meeting 
based on that theme, with people representing foreigners coming too. […] We do 
it twice a year, and now we call out to 35 organisations, so that even if it’s not 
convenient for everyone, we still get about 20 people coming. Everyone gets on 
reasonably well, and among other things we announce things that are necessary 
for our work.
 
 (Interview 8, female international exchange foundation 
representative, Yokohama) 
In one sense, these organisations are pooling informational capital from migrants, 
and ‘people representing foreigners’, which they are then able to use for advocacy 
purposes, service development and other strategic purposes. At the same time, it 
helps these organisations develop the label of ‘experts’ on integration-related issues, 
which carries its own symbolic capital within the field. 
The activity of sharing and accumulating information is not just achieved through 
informal institutional links but also encouraged by organisations such as CLAIR. As 
discussed previously, CLAIR was set up to support local governments in their 
internationalisation efforts. Over time its remit has expanded to include the 
promotion of measures that fall under the heading of tabunka kyōsei (Interview 10). 
At one level, the role of CLAIR can be seen as practice diffusion, supporting local 
governments and international exchange foundations to develop and implement 
measures to support foreign residents. For example one of the staff members at 
CLAIR described his role as follows. 
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Since international exchange associations are very small, there are many 
problems which they can’t solve just on their own. So we gather everyone here, 
and actually hold a renraku kaigi [liaison conference] for people to resolve issues 
together. A lot of this is linked to my work. For example, twice a year we gather 
representatives from all the [regional] blocks, and we hold workshops together, 
and so on. I’m particularly involved with meetings connected with the liaison 
conference. (Interview 10, male CLAIR representative, Tokyo) 
Another duty discharged by CLAIR is the allocation of central government funding 
to local government and NPO projects.
 
Many scholars have suggested that central 
government left a void in terms of integration policy-making, which was filled by 
local government and later NPOs. Yet, this description ignores the role of 
organisations such as CLAIR, which acts as an intermediary between central and 
local government, helping to control the flow of finance and information between 
these institutions. 
Furthermore, many of the staff working at CLAIR are seconded from local 
governments across Japan for one or two years, while the remainder come from MIC 
or MEXT. Hence this model could be viewed as a habitus-reinforcing mechanism—
helping align the behaviours of local government staff with those of central 
government staff, and vice versa, during their interactions at CLAIR. 
Despite the fact that NPOs and local governments use their knowledge and expertise 
to provide advice and consultation services to foreign residents, few focus group 
participants seemed to rely on these services for their information needs. The 
majority of focus group participants said that they obtained much of their 
information from the Internet and through Facebook groups or other social 
networking sites.  
In fact, the kinds of sources used seemed to vary according to factors such as the 
participant’s country of origin and age. For example, one of the younger focus group 
participants of Filipino origin said that he obtained information about current events 
through Rappler, a social news network based in the Philippines and Indonesia (FG 
9). Other participants talked about relying on internet resources such as GaijinPot—
an English language site holding a plethora of information on subjects such as jobs, 
travel, apartments and studying in Japan. 
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These findings correspond with the results of Osaka City’s foreign resident survey, 
which asked respondents in which ways they preferred to receive important 
information (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015). Most respondents to the survey 
selected the Internet (23%) or emails and mailing lists (12%), while a sizeable 
number (13%) also wanted to receive information through their Japanese classes 
(either teachers or volunteers). Just 5% identified local government sources (the city 
government or ward offices) as their preferred means of getting information. In a 
similar vein, 71% of respondents to an attitudes survey conducted by Yokohama City 
reported that they obtained essential information through the Internet (Yokohama-shi 
Seisaku-kyoku 2014). 
7.3.2 Networks and partnerships: using social capital to deliver 
services 
Aside from gathering information, organisations in Yokohama and Osaka were found 
to be using their ties with local governments or migrant-supporting organisations to 
provide various services to migrants. The findings also suggested that these ties were 
deliberately and strategically cultivated. 
Local migrant-supporting organisations seem to be pragmatic—willing to cooperate 
with other partners to deliver services. For instance, when talking about his 
foundation’s relations with other organisations, a representative from an international 
exchange foundation felt that ‘cooperation’ was the most appropriate descriptor. 
Rather than influence, [I’d say] cooperation with whom; because in order to solve 
a problem, we can’t just do it on our own. As I said before, if you need legal 
advice about divorce and so on, we’d coordinate with the bar association, as well 
as the gyōsei shoshi-kai [associations of legal specialists in administrative 
procedures]. And if it’s this kind of problem, [it would be] schools, education 
boards, and then the local ward office. So rather than influence, it’s about 
resolving issues through cooperation. That’s how it’s become. (Interview 5, male 
international exchange association representative, Yokohama). 
There are several points to note here. The picture of cooperation depicted in the 
following quote contrasts sharply with the ‘partnership of unequals’ between central 
government and NPOs described in the previous chapter. It is also clear from this 
quote that organisations such as these have been able to cultivate considerable social 
capital and that they are able to draw on their relationships with other organisations 
to support migrants in a range of policy areas such as education.  
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It is also worth highlighting that the participant went on to justify the organisation’s 
cooperative approach by pointing out that they are neither legal nor education experts, 
hence the need to work with other organisations. However, it was clear from the 
conversation that the people working at this particular association held considerable 
knowledge and expertise in a range of areas. What they lacked were the credentials 
(i.e. the symbolic capital) that come with being a certified expert. 
In addition to these kinds of links with professional organisations, international 
exchange organisations were also found to be building community-based connections. 
For example, an interview participant from another international exchange 
foundation explained that her organisation was forging links with community leaders 
through ‘information exchange meetings’, before going on to describe the various 
issues and projects that are discussed at these meetings.  
And, another thing we do is hold an information exchange meeting with migrant 
community leaders twice a year. […] we, the foundation, want to form better 
relations with those people, and we’re forming relationships but we do this too 
because we’d like to form horizontal connections. It’s about empowering these 
people too. (Interview 8, female international exchange foundation representative, 
Yokohama) 
According to the interviewee, her foundation identifies ‘key persons’ (kiipāson) in 
migrant-supporting organisations who can distribute information on their behalf. 
Much of their work involves outreach to community or organisational leaders, who 
were said to not know about the full range of services available to migrants in their 
local areas, and whose ability to circulate information among their communities was 
described as being weak, despite their efforts to support their compatriots. 
Hence, the foundation set up a website—where migrant community members can 
post their own messages, such as notifications about forthcoming festivals—which 
receives an average of 3,000 unique visitors a month. The foundation also provides 
information that may be useful to foreign residents, such as the location of advice 
services or medical centres, and summarises statistics and reports for Japanese 
ethnonationals who want more information about the issues affecting migrants. 
What is clear from this account is that the interviewee’s organisation has expended 
considerable effort to forge community links—both through ‘community leaders’ 
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and via a web-based platform—and to use these links to gather and deliver advice 
and information and promote services for foreign residents. 
In addition, international exchange foundations have also used their positions to 
bring migrant-supporting organisations together. Speaking about her experiences of 
engagement between migrant-supporting organisations, a Filipino NPO 
representative described how YOKE acted as a hub for networking. 
Here in Yokohama, I had the chance to get involved with YOKE because my 
organisation is connected to it. When we were still in [another city in Kanagawa], 
we were pioneering participants in NGO-sponsored cultural festivals in 
Yokohama. So we're always having meetings at YOKE together with other NGO 
representatives. I’ve been here in Yokohama for 28 years—so compared to 
Tokyo, it’s more progressive when it comes to mobilising NGOs and 
encouraging local participation in symposiums and other events involving both 
Japanese people and migrants. (FG 3, female Filipino/NPO representative, 
Yokohama†) 
It is worth highlighting that the focus group participant felt that Yokohama is more 
progressive than Tokyo—by which she is referring to specific local governments in 
Tokyo—in terms of ‘mobilising NGOs’. (In fact, another participant in the same 
focus group pointed out that ‘there are so many networks here in Kanagawa’). These 
comments suggest that networks of migrant-supporting organisations in Yokohama 
have not appeared haphazardly, but have in fact been cultivated through the actions 
of organisations such as YOKE. 
7.3.3 Informational and social capital in disaster management 
The use of networks and information sharing is particularly evident in relation to 
disaster management. Japanese history has been punctuated by earthquakes and both 
Osaka and Yokohama are in regions that have been affected by major earthquakes. 
Against this backdrop, the local government and NPO interview participants in both 
cities highlighted the need for cross-sector collaboration in terms of disaster 
management as it relates to foreign residents. 
According to Osaka City’s foreign residents survey, over half (54%) of the 
respondents did not know where to evacuate to in case of emergency (including 
natural disasters and other emergencies such as fires), and 61% did not know how to 
obtain real-time information on emergency situations or evacuation procedures 
(Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015). Against this backdrop, actors at the local scale are 
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providing targeted information and support for migrants, especially those with lower 
levels of Japanese language proficiency, as the following example demonstrates. 
Together with Kanagawa Prefecture, we opened an information centre for 
foreigners here, which among other things provides disaster information in 
foreign languages, and we’ve also decided to create a system that can respond if 
there’s a request for advice. Although that was done by Kanagawa Prefecture, 
even Yokohama City, Kawasaki City and Sagamihara City are talking about 
setting up these kinds of centres. (Interview 8, female international exchange 
foundation representative, Yokohama) 
Various cities in Kanagawa Prefecture have these information centres, but in order to 
avoid duplication of effort they collaborate in a number of ways, such as sharing 
information and carrying out joint training procedures. 
Similarly, an interview participant from an international exchange association in 
Osaka suggested that one of the benefits of collaborating with other organisations in 
the Kansai region lied in the increased capacity available to collaborating partners 
during times of crisis (Interview 4). For example, an earthquake may mean that local 
governments cannot function normally. In such cases, a neighbouring authority could 
mobilise volunteers (e.g. volunteer interpreters). The Kansai region was said to be 
the first region to develop this kind of partnership, which was later formalised. 
7.3.4 Collaboration in education 
Japan has unfavourable or slightly unfavourable scores for all four dimensions of 
education identified in MIPEX, namely access to education, targeting migrants’ 
needs, leveraging new opportunities and developing intercultural education. Yet, this 
obscures the considerable differences between policies and practices at the national 
and local scales. 
After showing a manga (a Japanese-style comic book) made by a schoolteacher to 
illustrate the issues affecting migrant children, one of the interviewees went on to 
describe what they do to support migrant children. 
We also make things like this [manga], and we also organise information-
exchange type meetings where we gather the education boards from the 
municipalities [in Kanagawa], and the Prefectural Education Board, and we ask 
everyone what they’re concerned about. So we also listen to these kinds of 
conversations, and we collate everything we want to communicate to school 
teachers. While working with education boards, we do that—we produce things 
like this and we distribute them. Then there are some real differences between the 
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various municipalities. So we introduce places where they’re developing 
advanced initiatives, and for things that people from education boards and 
ourselves are really worried about and there isn’t any money—there isn’t any 
money but we’re creating a space for people to share their knowledge about what 
to do as the number of children keeps increasing like this. And once a year we 
also hold networking meetings with NGOs and the government, and create 
spaces where education boards and NGOs that support children can talk to each 
other. Those are the kinds of links we have. As for links with other organisations, 
we have a funding system called [name of fund] and this is just [shows a 
document]… on page 8 and page 9 you can see what kind of projects we’ve 
funded, but with this fund, we have an annual budget of about 6 million yen and 
we provide funding support to NGOs and NPOs. So, we get applications from 
NGOs and we choose the best projects and try to support them. Those are the 
kinds of things we do. (Interview 8, female international exchange foundation 
representative, Yokohama) 
Once again, it is worth highlighting the considerable social capital that organisations 
such as these are able to leverage in order to create spaces where organisations can 
meet and discuss how social policies are developed or delivered—in this case 
education policies for migrant children. It is also clear that unless migrants are 
present in any of the NGOs or other organisations involved, either as staff or 
volunteers, they are likely to have very little say in these discussions or the kinds of 
projects that will attract funding. 
International exchange associations also hold conferences with local education 
boards (from different municipalities as well as the prefectural board) to share and 
discuss information and consider potential collaborations. They also hold a separate 
conference between the prefectural education board and civil society organisations 
that support immigrant children’s education.  
Generally, the findings suggest that siloed ways of working seem to have been 
challenged by migrants and other actors at the local scale, as the following quote 
illustrates. 
Within the ward, I think there’s been a particularly big change in terms of 
learning support for children. Put simply, children who’ve accompanied their 
parents here and have suddenly been entered into Japanese schools, where they 
don’t understand the language, are bound to have problems. So, in terms of 
having to provide more support there, we gather head teachers, from within the 
ward as well as the neighbouring ward, and we run network sessions. So, as 
you’d expect, each school raises things which have become issues for them, and 
for us it’s become a place to think about what we can do [to help]. There 
probably haven’t been any initiatives like that within the city until now. I think 
it’s been an extremely big change, moving from a situation where you feel like 
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schools are schools, wards are wards and YOKE is YOKE, and where everyone’s 
been dealing with these issues in a disconnected way, to one where we’ve 
become able to tackle things together. (Interview 9, female local government 
representative, Yokohama) 
On the face of it, this approach seems to be encouraging collaborative ways of 
working and creating new forms of social capital with the aim of supporting migrant 
children with education issues. Although it may not be clear from the translation, 
however, there was a nuance in the way in which the participant spoke about migrant 
children, which implied that they are not to blame for being brought to Japan, 
seemingly suggesting that their parents have created this problem for them and it us 
up to statutory bodies to try and resolve these issues. At the same time, there is no 
suggestion that the parents themselves should be involved in the sessions. Arguably, 
there are administrative and practical challenges associated with expanding these 
sessions to include migrant parents, but their stake in the education of their children 
could warrant such an expansion. 
Indeed, the focus group discussions suggested that parents, particularly mothers, 
seem to engage much more with their children’s education than with other issues—
either directly through schools or via local education boards and education 
committees. In Yokohama, there are several international schools which serve the 
large English-speaking ‘ex-pat’ communities living there. The focus group 
participants whose children attend these schools seemed keen for them to be 
educated in an international environment that would not disadvantage them if they 
continued their higher education elsewhere—a sentiment that seemed common 
among migrant families with a relatively high socioeconomic status, and with a less 
apparent inclination to settle in Japan permanently. 
7.3.5 Cooperation in housing and employment 
When asked what kind of problems foreign residents experienced in terms of housing, 
respondents to the Osaka City foreign residents survey identified high rent (16%) and 
issues in searching for a home (13%, including issues such as not letting to 
foreigners) as two of the key problems. Just 3% reported not understanding waste 
disposal rules. 
Few of the focus group participants touched on housing issues without prompting. 
Some participants noted that they received support from their company to arrange 
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rental accommodation, particularly those participants with European and North 
American backgrounds employed in relatively well-paid jobs. However, one of the 
interview participants was able to discuss some of the housing and community issues 
that affect foreign residents in more detail. 
If you talk about what kind of issues there are with real estate agents, [they’ll 
say] they’re noisy, messy, don’t dispose of their rubbish properly, and when they 
come home from work in the evening they drink and sing and make too much 
noise. And then there’s smelly food, subletting, debt defaults… (Interview 18, 
female NPO representative/Chinese, Yokohama) 
The interview participant noted that while many of these issues affect immigrants, 
Zainichi people are also affected by discrimination in housing/renting on the basis of 
their ethnicity/race, despite the fact that they can speak Japanese, understand 
Japanese sociocultural norms, and are generally indistinguishable from Japanese 
ethnonationals. 
Again, the interview participant noted that collaboration with other organisations was 
vital for addressing these issues. 
From the beginning, we didn’t intend to coordinate with various places. By 
which I mean, as I said before, when you get introduced to real-estate agents and 
when problems happened, while we consulted with business people we were 
thinking about how we should address these problems, but in practice, as I said 
before, because we’re consulted about various problems, we have to get in touch 
with the bar association. We have to get in touch with shihō shoshi [people 
qualified to handle real-estate transactions]. With school teachers, with hospitals. 
Basically if you don’t cooperate with various people, you can’t solve various 
problems, so we cooperate with various places. (Interview 18, female NPO 
representative, Yokohama) 
Another social policy area in which NPOs are collaborating with government, albeit 
at arm’s length, is that of employment. Support with employment and unemployment 
insurance benefits in Japan is provided primarily through Hello Work, a government-
funded employment agency roughly equivalent to Jobcentre Plus in the UK. NPOs 
are increasingly working jointly with Hello Work to deliver advice-based services for 
migrants looking for work, such as where to look for job openings. One of the 
interview participants, from an international exchange foundation, talked about joint 
projects with Hello Work to provide seikatsu hogo (‘livelihood protection’): 
Unions, right? Again, they’re different. They, somehow—when workers have 
problems or when they’ve been dismissed or their wages haven’t been paid, they 
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provide advice for them. But, recently, the government and Yokohama have also 
been doing so [?] but they’ve been doing a joint project with Hello Work. Do you 
know about public assistance? Hello Work has set up an advice counter together 
with Yokohama City for people who are claiming public assistance and looking 
for job opportunities. That’s the kind of joint projects we’ve been starting up 
recently (Interview 5, male international exchange association representative, 
Osaka) 
This suggests that support is given to those people claiming public assistance who 
are looking for paid employment, which would either reduce or eliminate their need 
for public assistance. Hence, it seems to have a dual aim of increasing employment 
rates while reducing social security claims. 
7.4 Field strategies among migrants: leveraging limited 
capital 
The findings from the focus group discussions suggest that many migrants are not 
able to access or secure the social services or integration support that they need. 
Instead, they may require additional support from other actors or institutions in order 
to make the most of the limited capital at their disposal.  
7.4.1 Navigating the social security system with expert support 
Findings in relation to social security claims illustrate how migrants are supported by 
actors with expertise in this area. Very few focus group participants had made social 
security claims, but those that did had done so with the support of local governments 
or migrant-supporting organisations—and, by extension, those organisation’s wider 
networks—which facilitated the claim-making process. 
Focus group participants with a comparatively low socioeconomic status were more 
likely to be employed to do part-time or casual work, and some of these participants 
had had experiences of claiming social security benefits. (See appendix B for 
background information on the social security system in Japan.) Without generalising 
beyond the sample, this also seemed to be a gendered experience, with female 
participants more likely to claim than men.  
Japan does not have any specific forms of social security for migrants or foreign 
residents, as C, one of the focus group participants, pointed out when asked about the 
topic. 
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I’ve been here for 28 years and I never received any support. Because in my time, 
there was not even—there was no support for children. And then they had this 
maternity insurance, but they paid for delivery. (FG 3, female Filipino, 
Yokohama†) 
However, it was clear from the focus groups that migrants have additional challenges 
in accessing social security in comparison to Japanese nationals. Without assistance 
from friends and family, migrant-supporting organisations or local government staff, 
it seems that many migrants would not be aware of the benefits that they can claim or 
could struggle with the processes by which they can make those claims. For example, 
O, who had divorced her husband three years earlier, commented that: 
That was the last time I went to the ward office! So, first I went to the ward office 
for registration, then for maternity needs, children’s needs. I had to get a child 
book to give birth at the hospital. My ex-husband knew about this requirement. 
Then for day care, I needed to know which day care I could leave my child in. 
For the divorce, the ward office staff explained the process. (FG 3, female 
Filipino, Yokohama†) 
It is clear from O’s comments that there is a gender dimension to this situation in 
terms of the kind of support she was claiming. In addition, the majority of so-called 
‘international marriages’ (kokusai kekkon) in Japan are between male Japanese 
nationals and non-Japanese women, and O’s story suggests that many women may 
initially rely on their husbands’ understanding of the social security system in order 
to make claims. 
While O was supported by her local ward office to claim support, others may receive 
support from civil-society organisations, especially migrants who are not aware of 
the assistance they can claim or their rights in respect of those claims. For example, 
when asked about migrant workers who were injured at work, C, an NPO 
representative, explained how migrants injured at work could benefit from social 
security. 
There were a lot of Filipino workers who lost a finger [at work], who had a 
permanent disability. The labour standards here are perfect. There are slight 
difficulties if the victim is undocumented, but under the law, you’re protected 
whether you’re documented or undocumented.  We have cases where people 
went back to the Philippines with a permanent disability but are still receiving 
pensions. (FG 3, female NPO representative/Filipino, Yokohama†) 
It is clear that C has a working knowledge of the law, and it is likely that her 
organisation has been able to use this knowledge to support migrants with their 
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claims and to secure assistance for those who do not know what kinds of support 
they are entitled to. 
Of the different forms of social security available to migrants in Japan, ‘public 
assistance’ (seikatsu hogo), a residual form of support, was highlighted most often by 
focus group participants as a form of support that they had claimed. In 2014, just 
over 4% of households in Yokohama and fewer than 7% of households in Osaka 
claiming public assistance were headed by a foreign resident (see Table 7.1). Given 
that 2.4% of residents in Yokohama and 4.7% of residents in Osaka are registered 
foreign residents, this suggests that foreign residents are somewhat more likely to 
claim than Japanese nationals, but it is difficult to draw any other inferences from 
this comparison. 
However, this situation could change. A recent court ruling found that foreign 
residents are not legally entitled to claim social security as they are not considered to 
be Japanese nationals (kokumin). While there have been no reports of substantial cuts 
to this support since the ruling came out, it could potentially have an impact on 
future social security claims by foreign residents. Local governments who continue 
to support foreign residents are doing so at their own discretion and are therefore 
expanding the de facto coverage of social security in Japan. 
Table 7.1 Number of households receiving public assistance in 2014 
Public assistance claims Osaka Yokohama 
Claims by households 
headed by a foreign 
resident (A) 
7,955 2,964 
No. of claims by any 
households (B) 
117,611 70,931 
A as percentage of B 6.76 4.18 
Sources: Osaka City Government (http://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/fukushi/page/0000086901.html), 
Kanagawa Prefecture Government (http://www.pref.kanagawa.jp/cnt/f152/p2909.html) 
However, one of the NPO representatives felt that Filipino women should avoid 
claiming public assistance altogether if possible. 
Actually, as an NGO leader, I don’t encourage my members to be on public 
assistance, because if you’re physically fit to work, why would you choose to be 
a government dependant? You don’t need to be on public assistance. There’s 
another type of government support, boshi katei, which is a single mother’s 
allowance given every four months. For me, that’s okay, because you need to 
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support your children, plus you can work. What’s more important here is to have 
dignity. (FG 3, female Filipino, Yokohama†) 
When asked what she meant by dignity, C went on to say the following. 
Having dignity means working for your own money, through your own sweat. It 
gives you a good feeling so that even if you receive a meagre income, it’s yours, 
you worked hard for it. As an NGO leader, I also encourage them not to work at 
night, in clubs, because it breaks up family relationships. There’s a lot of 
temptation. Many families have been ruined because of it. And I told the 
members that if they want to settle in Japan, they must quit being on public 
assistance because it would be a liability for them if they seek permanent 
residence here. (FG 3, female Filipino, Yokohama†) 
It is worth noting that although the focus group participant began by linking welfare 
receipt to dignity, she ended by noting that welfare claims can have a detrimental 
impact on migrants’ ability to settle in Japan. In other words, those migrants who 
need to claim public assistance seem to be viewed less favourably than those 
migrants who do not. 
7.4.2 Overcoming barriers to healthcare services 
MIPEX health indicators suggest that Japan is ‘halfway favourable’ in terms of its 
responsiveness to the needs of immigrants. In particular, Japan scored 75 out of 100 
for entitlement to health services, and 90 out of 100 for its policies to facilitate 
access—ranking it number one among the countries covered by the Index.  
According to MIPEX, foreign residents are relatively well covered by the health 
insurance system in Japan, with Japan being ranked fifth overall in terms of access. 
Many migrants work for companies who pay for their health insurance (kenkō hoken), 
while those who are self-employed or unemployed have to pay for the state-provided 
National Health Insurance (kokumin kenkō hoken). However, despite the fact that 
foreign residents are required to have health insurance if they live in Japan for more 
than three months, many do not. For example, a local government representative 
from Hamamatsu City mentioned that at one point up to 80% of foreign residents in 
the city did not have health insurance, prompting the city to take measures to reverse 
this trend (Interview 16). 
The process of registering for National Health Insurance is not straightforward, 
particularly for those who lack Japanese language proficiency. While migrants with 
well-paid jobs are likely to benefit from Employees’ Health Insurance, migrants in 
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casual or precarious work may take the decision not to register and use their income 
for other purposes. 
The high MIPEX score for policies to facilitate access to healthcare acknowledges 
the fact that much information is available in multiple languages in print and online 
and that medical interpreters are available at certain institutions and provided by 
some local governments. However, what is not immediately clear from the MIPEX 
report is the difficulty of accessing healthcare services in Japan without Japanese 
language skills. 
When asked what kind of problems foreign residents experienced in terms of health 
and illness, respondents to the Osaka City foreign residents survey identified 
communication problems with hospital staff (14%), high costs (12%) not knowing 
which hospital to go to (10%). 
One organisation that has sought to support migrants with medical interpreting is 
MIC Kanagawa. MIC Kanagawa is unique to Kanagawa and its founding mission is 
to ‘create a society where everyone can enjoy full access to medical services, 
regardless of their race, nationality or cultural background’. As M explained: 
It’s a system of medical support that was initially an NPO enterprise. Now they 
coordinate with Kanagawa Prefecture. But they’re not connected to all hospitals, 
just those within the prefecture. Right now they have links with 60 hospitals. So, 
say there’s a Filipino patient who goes to one of those hospitals and she can’t 
speak Japanese… As you know, everyday Japanese is different from the Japanese 
taught in school, more so the Japanese used in hospitals. So when a foreigner 
seeks help from a case worker to explain a certain illness, the case worker seeks 
the assistance of an interpreter. I’m also one of those who interview incoming 
interpreters. (FG 6, female foundation representative/Filipino, Yokohama†) 
Clearly, MIC Kanagawa plays an important ‘bridging’ role between the healthcare 
system and non-Japanese-speaking migrants who would otherwise struggle to access 
medical services. It is also apparent that the organisation’s ties with Kanagawa 
Prefecture seem to have grown over time, presumably as its value as a service has 
become more evident. While medical interpreters are available in several cities and 
prefectures, including Osaka, there is no comparable organisation in Osaka. 
In addition, M mentioned that she had sent a proposal through to Kanagawa Foreign 
Residents’ Assembly to extend the service offered by MIC Kanagawa. 
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Before, MIC Kanagawa used to be independent from the local government, but 
when [the latter] realised the importance of giving support to foreigners by 
having language interpreters, they began to reach out and coordinate with MIC 
by sending interpreters to hospitals. In my proposal, I suggested that if there was 
an interpreter available at a hospital, they could attend to walk-in foreigners in 
need of medical aid. […] So that's what I’m lobbying for, and [Kanagawa 
Foreign Residents’ Assembly] is still reviewing it as of now. (FG 6, female 
Filipino/foundation representative, Yokohama†) 
This example provides a good illustration of how Kanagawa Foreign Residents’ 
Assembly enables foreign residents to engage with policy-making processes that 
affect the provision and delivery of local services. 
7.4.3 Tackling discriminatory practices in the workplace 
According to the MIPEX indicators, employment (labour market participation) is one 
of the few areas where immigrants seem to be well integrated into Japanese society. 
According to the Osaka City foreign residents survey, while many foreign residents 
did not experience problems at work (27%), others experienced issues such as being 
unable to understand conversations at work (16%), problems with colleagues (12%), 
problems finding work despite a desire to work (10%) and unsatisfactory pay/work 
hours (10%) (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015). 
However, for immigrants in less economically desirable/valued roles, the situation is 
more difficult. One of the Filipino participants spoke of her frustration at the lack of 
support for migrant workers with respect to discriminatory behaviours.  
More the absence of job contracts than violation of job contracts. Even before 
they come to me, even those Philippine Nikkei from the Philippines who’ve 
approached me for help—they let me check their contract. Well, we try to do 
something about that. Most contracts are made in the Philippines. There are 
trainees from the Philippines whose contract was made in the Philippines, so I 
consulted the prosecutors in the Philippines and they determine if there’s a 
violation. So one trainee was asked to go home [to the Philippines] because she 
got pregnant and had to quit work. Her boyfriend, who was also a trainee, also 
left. The Japanese employers didn’t charge them but simply asked them to return 
to the Philippines. Japanese employers are very smart, they really don’t fire 
employees. (FG 3, female Filipino/NPO representative, Yokohama†) 
This quote demonstrates the considerable differences between migrants supported by 
their employers or by NPOs and those that are not. While some employers are using 
their resources to secure a range of support for migrant workers—such as support to 
find accommodation and benefits in kind such as health insurance—focus group 
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participants in less well-paid jobs seemed to receive little support from their 
employers. Others, such as the ones described in the quote, may even require support 
to tackle problems created or exacerbated by their employers. In this particular case, 
an NPO representative with transnational links and some knowledge of worker’s 
rights was able to support the ‘trainees’ to challenge infringements. 
7.5 Migrant influence and identity  
7.5.1 Not just service users: migrant influence as ‘insiders’ 
Much of this chapter has looked at service providers’ interactions with migrants as 
‘service users’. However, apart from being service users, migrants also engage in the 
delivery of activities and services in their capacity as staff and volunteers. As M 
explained: 
In terms of educational support, it is very clear that the government and migrants 
are working together, like here, the staff members are foreigners. (FG 6, female 
foundation representative/Filipino, Yokohama†) 
However, Japanese language proficiency is often a prerequisite for this engagement 
(Interview 4), which means that many migrants are excluded from taking on these 
roles. It is almost a double whammy: potential exclusion from accessing services and 
from providing services due to language barriers. 
It is not clear how much influence migrants may have as staff or whether they are 
able to input into key decision making processes. However, it is likely that they have 
more input into how services are targeted or delivered than they would as service 
users.  
While influencing services is one option, migrants are also able to influence one 
another’s behaviours, as the following quote illustrates. 
Despite differences in culture and language, those of us who receive support from 
the Government or have lived here for quite a while—we’ve committed to acting 
as a bridge to other Japanese people. We can’t just be getting support all the time; 
it should be a give-and-thank kind of assistance. (FG 7, male Brazilian, 
Yokohama†) 
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7.5.2 Rights and identity: permanent residence versus nationality 
Some of the focus group participants talked about the differences between permanent 
residence and citizenship in terms of the benefits and challenges. When asked about 
permanent residence, a focus group participant, M, remarked that even if you acquire 
permanent residence, ‘you can’t get the same benefits as a citizen’.  
He went on to say that ‘You can’t be a citizen here’. Discussing the situation with 
another focus group participant, he highlighted the residence requirement for 
citizenship as a barrier to naturalisation. 
M: If you don’t stay here for ten years, let’s say, you can’t be a citizen here. 
S: But you can naturalise as Japanese. You can give up your Filipino nationality. 
M: Not really. For example, if you work in the US for five years, it’s like you 
becoming a citizen there. Here, you need to work for ten years to achieve that. 
[…] For example, if you go to Australia, New Zealand, the benefits may not be 
the same. (FG 6, Filipinos, Yokohama†) 
This exchange highlights the migrants’ awareness of the differences between 
national citizenship and permanent residence. They recognised that national 
citizenship and permanent residence may confer different benefits in different 
national contexts, but concluded that national citizenship is associated with more 
benefits (or rights, perhaps) than permanent residence. 
While the majority of the focus group participants did not have Japanese citizenship 
or permanent residence, one explained why she could not conceive of changing her 
nationality. S had recently acquired permanent residence, but went on to say that she 
does not want to naturalise. 
[…] I don’t want to change nationality. I’m not Japanese. For me, if you change 
nationality, you change your true identity. So Grace Poe [a senator and former 
presidential candidate in the Philippines]—I don’t like her. To her, nationality is 
just something you can renounce and revert easily, based on convenience. For 
me, it’s your ultimate sense of identity so you shouldn’t renounce that. You can 
never take it back when you lose it for the sake of convenience. (FG 6, female 
Filipino, Yokohama†) 
The participant referred to Grace Poe who is currently serving as a senator in the 
Philippines and mounted an unsuccessful presidential bid in 2016. Poe became a 
naturalised US citizen in 2001, but reacquired Philippine citizenship in 2010. Despite 
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the legality of Poe’s decision, the focus group participant clearly felt that nationality 
should not be treated as a legal status, but instead as a form of identity more akin to 
ethnonationality. Hence, changing her nationality was not a strategy she could 
conceive of using to secure more rights. 
7.6 Summary 
The findings from this study suggest that actors at the local scale tasked with 
implementing or delivering integration-related policies and services, especially 
international exchange foundations and NPOs, have focused considerable energy on 
building networks and partnerships. In general, these relationships are presented as 
being collaborative or cooperative. While some of these connections have been used 
to gather and share relevant information, others have been used to enhance the 
delivery of services and integration-related support.  
At the same time, migrants have developed their own networks. Among other things, 
the focus group findings suggest that migrants use their personal or social networks 
to access information, often through social networking sites such as Facebook. 
Although the findings suggest that migrants generally rely on the Internet for their 
information needs, it is also worth considering who makes this information available 
online. For instance, even though migrants may not physically visit international 
exchange foundations for their information needs, it is possible that they access 
information through such organisations’ websites.  
The focus group participants were also found to receive support from civil society 
organisations, especially ones identified through their own coethnic networks, to 
access or make better use of existing services. What is of particular relevance to this 
study, however, is how migrants use these links to amplify their limited capital and 
to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions or normative ideas. It was clear from the 
findings that NPOs or coethnic associations can enhance migrants’ abilities to turn 
their civil or social rights into substantive rights, assisting migrants to make social 
security claims, for instance. However, the focus group participants also 
demonstrated agency in these processes, challenging some of the expectations 
seemingly placed upon them. For example, some focus group participants challenged 
the normativity of learning Japanese, particularly those from the Philippines. Some 
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did so implicitly, by calling for greater use of medical interpreters; others did so 
explicitly—simply refusing to learn Japanese.  
While the interview participants tended to describe migrants as service users or 
passive policy recipients, with some exceptions, there were indications from the 
focus groups of different ways in which migrants may be able to influence 
integration policy-making processes. For example, some of the interview and focus 
group participants who held directorial positions in migrant-supporting organisations 
were from a migrant background themselves. Others worked as members of staff or 
volunteers in international exchange foundations and other organisations which 
provide services and support to foreign residents. 
In sum, the findings from this chapter and the previous chapter have highlighted the 
cast of actors and institutions, and the relationships between them—in the form of 
networks, partnerships or asymmetric relationships, formal or otherwise—which 
shape the policies affecting migrants in Japan. In the next chapter these findings are 
discussed in more detail, with reference to the frameworks developed in chapters 







Having reviewed the findings in the previous two chapters, it is now possible to 
discuss the field of integration policy-making in more detail. Returning to the 
research questions set out at the beginning, this chapter considers the key actors and 
institutions involved in the development of integration policies at the national and 
local scale. More specifically, it reflects on the specific dimensions along which the 
field of integration policy-making is organised, and what separates those who occupy 
the relatively more privileged nodes or positions within the field from those who 
occupy relatively less privileged positions. 
While integration policy-making actors, and to some extent their relationships, have 
been explored in previous studies, I argue that the narratives regarding integration 
policy-making processes warrant further attention. Taking this a step further, the next 
section of this chapter explores how migrants and other foreign residents are 
constructed within integration policies and what this tells us about the nature of 
integration politics in Japan. 
The following section looks at two particular junctures that allowed the configuration 
of actors involved in the production of integration policies to change, leading to a 
reconfiguration of their relationships. The first is the Kobe earthquake, a ‘critical 
juncture’ (P. Pierson 2003) or ‘break in equilibrium’ (Bourdieu 1988, 156–58) which 
led to the proliferation of (specified) NPOs. The second is the inclusion of central 
government as a more dominant actor in integration policy-making processes in the 
mid-2000s, which was largely precipitated at the insistence of local government and 
non-governmental stakeholders. 
Using field analysis, the next two sections analyse the relationships between the key 
actors identified in chapter three in order to understand strategies used to influence 
integration policies at the national scale and to help explain variations at the local 
scale. The final section considers the kinds of capital that migrants have at their 
disposal and the ways in which this capital may be used in the pursuit of social 
citizenship. 
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8.2 Tabunka kyōsei and the construction of ‘foreigners’ in 
integration policies 
8.2.1 Foreigners as anything but immigrants 
The restrictive approach to immigration that has characterised the Japanese 
immigration regime for decades, underpinned by a belief in the uniqueness and racial 
homogeneity of Japanese people, seems to be part of the doxa (taken-for-granted 
principles) of the immigration policy-making field. This is evident in official 
statistics, for instance, where nationality is recorded for foreign residents but 
ethnicity is not recorded for Japanese nationals. Thus naturalised citizens such as 
‘Korean Japanese’ are simply counted as Japanese nationals, while data related to 
their ethnonational heritage simply are not collected. 
This logic extends to the integration policy-making field, where there seems to be 
tacit agreement between actors about the kind of terminology that is acceptable. For 
example, even where interview participants were not completely comfortable with 
the terms ‘oldcomer’ or ‘newcomer’—describing them as ‘so-called oldcomers’ 
(iwayuru ōrudokamā) or ‘so-called newcomers’ (iwayuru nyūkamā) instead—they 
continued to use these terms.  
The term imin or ‘immigrant’ is hardly ever used outside of academic discourse (see, 
for instance, Kawamura, Kondō, and Nakamoto 2009; Kondō 2009; Roberts 2018). 
Immigrants used to be described as ‘foreigners’ (gaikokujin) or ‘foreign workers’ 
(gaikokujin rōdōsha), but now tend to described as ‘foreign residents’ (gaikokujin 
jūmin) or ‘foreign nationals’ (gaikokuseki jūmin). Even non-governmental 
interviewees seemed reluctant to use the term, generally referring to migrants as 
‘foreign residents’ instead. In some cases, however, frontline practitioners used more 
nuanced expressions such as ‘people/children with foreign roots or roots in a foreign 
country’ (gaikoku ni aru/motte iru rūtsu no kata/kodomo). On the one hand, this is 
recognition of the fact that some people (particularly children) might have been born 
in Japan, rather than a foreign country, and may have very different needs to those 
born outside of Japan, whose primary socialisation experiences may be markedly 
different. On the other hand, it does little to challenge the underlying logic of the 
field—that non-Japanese ethnonationalities have less symbolic value than Japanese 
ethnonationality. 
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‘Skill’ has also been used as a way of categorising migrants, with migrants divided 
between the ‘highly skilled’ (kōdō jinzai) and ‘low skilled’ workers (rōdōsha). While 
difficulties in measuring a person’s skills abound, this does not stop immigration 
regulations from wielding ‘skill levels’ as a cleavage to differentiate between 
‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ migrants, alongside other axes such as race, ethnicity 
and gender. Highly-skilled migrants are essentially presented as economically 
desirable migrants, which is in keeping with the economic logic of the Japanese 
immigration policy-making field. However, there are also indications that the 
concept of highly-skilled migrants within the Japanese context is racialised. This is 
evident in artwork for a poster about the points system introduced in 2012—
described as preferential immigration treatment for highly-skilled foreign 
professionals—which appears to present highly-skilled migrants as ‘white’ migrants 
(see appendix C). 
What is clear is that the ability to categorise migrants lies predominantly with central 
government. The ‘power to name’ is an important device that central government can 
use to regulate the entry and exit of foreign nationals and the activities that those 
nationals can undertake during their time in Japan (Roberts 2018). Other actors can 
contest these labels, as the Korean Community has tried to do, but the state’s 
‘monopoly over legitimate naming’—as Bourdieu (1989, 21) describes it—is not 
easy to challenge. 
8.2.2 Tabunka kyōsei: a habitus-reinforcing concept? 
In constructing the field of integration policy-making, we need to reject the ‘common 
sense’ narratives that are perpetuated by dominant actors and question the taken-for-
granted categories that those actors use. In order to do so, we need to critically 
review the various ways in which tabunka kyōsei is understood and used by key 
actors and institutions in the field. 
Many scholars have been critical towards tabunka kyōsei as a unique approach to 
integration (Burgess 2004; Chapman 2006). Their criticisms have generally been 
levelled at the second component of the expression—the idea of ‘coexistence’. 
Japanese and non-Japanese ethnonationals living side by side, as an act of toleration, 
is how many observers perceive tabunka kyōsei. For others, it represents assimilation 
of difference into a homogeneous state.  
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Although the term has become increasingly widespread since the 1990s, several 
interview participants mentioned their dissatisfaction with tabunka kyōsei. One 
participant was dissatisfied with the way the term is translated as ‘multicultural 
coexistence’, suggesting that ‘intercultural living’ is a better translation. This echoes 
the arguments that Yamawaki (2007) has made, with the suggestion that the 
translation of the term as ‘multicultural coexistence’ implies an overt similarity to 
‘multiculturalism’ that belies the differences between the two policy approaches. The 
latter is a pluralist approach, while the former lies somewhere between the ideal 
types of pluralism and assimilation. 
The tabunka kyōsei policy approach appeared at a time when a ‘new wave’ of 
migrants were coming to Japan, ostensibly different to previous ‘waves’ (Sellek 
2001). The distinction between policies aimed at ‘oldcomers’ and ‘newcomers’ was a 
feature of tabunka kyōsei that was heavily criticised by the Zainichi interview 
participants. The oldcomer–newcomer dichotomy implies that integration policies 
are based on need and duration/permanence of residence. Put another way, less-
established migrants have not had time to familiarise themselves with Japanese 
norms or, depending on their inclination, time to acquire Japanese language 
proficiency. As a result, integration policies directed at this group of migrants are 
presented as being designed to address practical needs. By contrast, more-established 
migrants are unlikely to require Japanese language assistance (with the possible 
exception of older people, who may require language support in social care settings 
due to dementia) but are engaged in a struggle to win greater political capital (Chung 
2010). 
Another way to look at this issue is as a division between immigrants who are of 
concern and those who are deemed to be sufficiently integrated (or assimilated) as to 
warrant little or no concern. To a large extent this division is racialised. The majority 
of those who are permanent residents (or naturalised citizens) are of Korean or 
Chinese descent. If these individuals are able to speak Japanese fluently and operate 
in Japanese society unaffected by sociocultural barriers, they become, to all intents 
and purposes, ‘hidden’ migrants; and once hidden, they are of less concern to 
policymakers. At the same time, tabunka kyōsei seems to represent an ideal of 
inclusivity through a narrative of ‘coexistence’ that seemingly ignores Japan’s 
colonial and post-colonial history and decades of assimilationist policies.  
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While participants recognised the division that tabunka kyōsei creates between 
‘newcomers’ and ‘oldcomers’, they seem to have lost sight of a much more 
fundamental division. What tabunka kyōsei, or simply kyōsei, masks is that all people 
who are not ostensibly Japanese ethnonationals lack the embodied cultural capital to 
‘live in Japan as seikatsusha’—fully contributing members of Japanese society. 
8.2.3 Tabunka kyōsei and the welfare regime 
This study has found some evidence to suggest that the Japanese welfare regime is 
restrictive, or differentiated, but none to suggest that this is peculiar to tabunka 
kyōsei as per Kibe’s (2017) assertion that tabunka kyōsei is characterised by ‘welfare 
chauvisinism’: the notion that social security should be restricted to Japanese 
nationals. Instead, the findings were more in keeping with Zincone’s (2011) work: 
the Japanese welfare regime is not particularly favourable or unfavourable towards 
migrants, but the strength and configuration of the regime may indeed influence the 
way in which migrants are treated. 
Some of the focus group participants, particularly Filipino mothers, had made social 
security claims and none had spoken of experiencing a rejected claim. Although 
welfare stigma was evident in the way some of the focus group participants spoke 
about their experiences, or the experiences of other migrants, participants who 
claimed welfare assistance did not suggest that it was a particularly difficult process. 
However, this may be to be due to the fact that they received assistance in making 
their claims. 
It is worth highlighting that social security seemed to be regarded as a less 
‘legitimate’ form of economic capital than income earned through paid employment. 
This is evident in the permanent residence application process, as noted by one of the 
focus group participants, where those whose economic capital is derived through 
employment are looked upon more favourably than those who receive some level of 
state support. Many migrants could face a dilemma as a result of this policy—forced 
to choose between social security and security of residence status.  
While this could be regarded as a form of governmentality—an implicit way for the 
government to discourage social security claims—it did not seem to be recognised as 
problematic by the focus group participants. Instead, claiming social security was 
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regarded as a moral failing and, against this backdrop, discouraging claims was 
viewed as an acceptable policy. Although it is beyond the scope of this study, this 
alludes to a narrative of welfare shame that seems to be part of the doxa of the 
Japanese welfare regime (Sutton et al. 2014). 
Although welfare stigma is likely to affect all social security claimants, a recent court 
ruling has called foreign residents’ entitlement to claim social security into question. 
The ruling found that local governments are not legally obliged to provide social 
security to non-Japanese nationals, as the legislation in its current form states that 
only kokumin—taken to mean ‘Japanese nationals’—are legally entitled to claim 
welfare assistance (Osaki 2014). This means that local governments now have the 
authority to decide whether to continue with the status quo, or whether to restrict 
provision to kokumin. As yet, there is little sign that local governments will adopt a 
more restrictive approach, not least because it could propel many foreign residents 
into destitution, but this could change. 
Scholars such as Chung believe that ‘shifts in Japanese civil society following the 
1995 Hanshin earthquake and the passage of the Nonprofit Organization (NPO) Law 
in 1998 have created subtle yet significant changes to the language of citizenship in 
Japan, so that foreign residents are increasingly recognized as citizens’ (Chung 2010, 
176). However, if local governments adopt more restrictive policies in the future, it 
could fundamentally change the relationship between foreign residents and the 
Japanese welfare state. 
8.2.4 Unravelling the conundrum of tabunka kyōsei 
A number of scholars have commented on the ambiguous, and even contradictory, 
nature of tabunka kyōsei (Chapman 2006; Nakamatsu 2014), but how do we make 
sense of it? Following Medvetz’s (2015) approach, I argue that conceiving of 
tabunka kyōsei as an evolving discourse that has emerged as the outcome of multiple, 
intersecting fields is one possible way of proceeding. Such an approach has the 
potential to make sense of the competing views in the literature in a more 
theoretically-grounded way. 
Of particular pertinence to this study is the intersection between the field of 
immigration policy-making and the field of integration policy-making. The current 
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focus of immigration policies in Japan is to attract the ‘best and the brightest’, while 
allowing labour migrants to continue to work in various sectors. The findings of this 
study suggest that tabunka kyōsei is linked to the differential integration of these 
migrants into Japanese communities, but is less concerned with the needs of 
permanent residents such as Zainichi Koreans. Although all registered foreign 
residents in Japan are described as gaikokujin jūmin, this term seems to refer to more 
recent immigrants when used in conjunction with tabunka kyōsei, thereby excluding 
‘special permanent residents’ such as Zainichi Koreans. 
In addition, the terminology of integration policies and immigration policies seems to 
be heavily influenced by political discourse. For instance, while the term imin 
(meaning ‘immigrant’ or ‘immigration’) is used within academic discourse, the 
findings suggest that it is not used by government or non-government stakeholders in 
the field of integration policy-making, where the ‘power to name’ seems to have 
been monopolised by central government. 
At the same time, we also need to pay attention to discourses operating in other fields, 
such as the field of welfare. As stated above, Kibe’s (2017) claim of a link between 
tabunka kyōsei and welfare restrictions was not supported by the findings of this 
study. However, it was clear from some of the focus group participants that other 
issues such as welfare stigma were affecting their decision making-process with 
regards to social security claims. Understanding the interactions between the welfare 
field and the field of integration policy-making could help explain how welfare 
discourses impinge on tabunka kyōsei, or vice versa. 
While scholars and activists are happy to debate the representation of Japan as a 
‘zero-immigration country’, this narrative persists at the national scale. Decades of 
assimilationist policies have allowed policymakers to continue to portray the 
Japanese citizenry as consisting uniquely of Japanese nationals (kokumin), aided by 
the the lack of statistics on the actual ethnonational diversity of Japanese nationals. 
Meanwhile, tabunka kyōsei seems to represent a mode of integration for foreign 
residents as denizens or quasi-citizens, but not as citizens. The exclusion of Zainichi 
communities from the narrative of tabunka kyōsei seems to reinforce this distinction. 
Hence, tabunka kyōsei seems to represent a first or second order change in Japan’s 
policy approach towards integration rather than a paradigm shift (Hall 1993). In other 
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words, there have been changes in the policy instruments used in integration policy-
making and changes in the scale at which these policies are made, but no radical shift 
in Japan’s approach to integration at the national scale. 
8.3 Reconfiguring the governance of integration policies: 
critical junctures and ‘new’ actors 
8.3.1 The institutionalisation of NPOs after the Kobe earthquake 
Despite a long history of activity by civil society organisations in Japan, it was only 
in the mid–late 1990s that these organisations became institutionalised through the 
1998 NPO Law (tokutei hieiri katsudō sokushin hō). As specified NPOs, these 
institutions have continued to advocate for the implementation of integration policies 
at the national scale, while developing closer ties with local governments to deliver 
services to migrants. However, institutionalisation has come with a tacit acceptance 
of a degree of government oversight in exchange for tax-related benefits (economic 
capital) and greater recognition as legitimate service providers (symbolic capital). 
Hence, we should examine the circumstances that led to this institutionalisation more 
critically than has been the case in the literature on the subject to date. 
Several interview participants confirmed that the Kobe earthquake (known as the 
Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Japan) was a ‘critical juncture’ in terms of its 
impact on integration policies in Japan. Here, I argue that this period changed the 
structure and balance of power between the state and civil society and fundamentally 
altered the way in which integration policies are made and implemented. 
With over 6,400 casualties, hundreds of thousands of buildings destroyed and more 
than 200,000 people forced to find temporary shelter in other areas, the impact of the 
Kobe earthquake was catastrophic. The victims included a high number of migrants 
who were not prepared for the disaster and many ‘visa overstayers’ who were 
deemed ineligible for national government assistance (Takezawa 2008). Shaw and 
Goda (2004) note that the earthquake drew mass media attention to voluntary and 
non-governmental activities in Japan, as a result of the help provided by NGOs and 
over a million volunteers during the weeks that followed. 
By the time of the earthquake, Japan was experiencing the effects of the 1990 
amendment to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in terms of a 
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growing number of ethnoculturally diverse migrants entering Japan, resulting in a 
relatively rapid rise in the foreign resident population stock from just under 1 million 
people in 1989 to 1.36 million by 1995 (see Figure 1.1). The vast majority of these 
new migrants were not proficient in Japanese, which was painfully evident in the 
aftermath of the Kobe earthquake when many foreign residents struggled to access 
information that was only available in Japanese (Takezawa 2008). 
Scholars such as Takao (2001) have noted that the Kobe earthquake encouraged a 
spate of volunteerism that allowed civil society organisations to renew calls for the 
legal recognition of civil society activities. The ‘policy window’ (Kingdon 1995) 
opened up by the disaster led to discussions, disagreements and negotiations between 
non-governmental actors, politicians and bureaucrats which eventually led to the 
enactment of the NPO Law in 1998 (for a fuller discussion of the process, see Takao 
2001). As mentioned previously, the NPO Law liberalised the process for volunteer 
organisations to acquire legal status as ‘specified NPOs’ and hence benefit from tax 
breaks and access to public and private funding. 
However, this was not the only outcome. Central government bureaucrats viewed the 
institutionalisation process as a way of delegating certain government functions to 
the soon-to-be non-profit sector. Despite efforts by some politicians to curb these 
bureaucratic impulses, Takao points out that civil society organisations still lost a 
certain level of autonomy in choosing to become specified NPOs. 
The individuals and groups already participating in organized activities stand 
ready to exploit opportunities to take local initiative and voluntary action outside 
state control. However, even though they may operate independently and be 
transparently accountable in their activities, the projects such organizations 
undertake nonetheless must correspond with and satisfy the specific interests and 
concerns of those institutions and others who provide them with funds. Thus, it 
seems certain that the increasing availability of official funding will have a 
significant impact on the roles played by third-sector organizations. (Takao 2001, 
292–93) 
Seventy years prior to the Kobe earthquake, tens of thousands of lives were lost in 
the Great Kantō earthquake of 1923, but thousands more people were killed in the 
days that followed owing to a proliferation of pernicious rumours about Koreans in 
the Kantō region. Newspaper reports suggested that Koreans were taking advantage 
of the destruction through various nefarious activities which had little basis in fact 
(Yoshimura 2004). 
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This turn of events contrasts sharply with the events of the mid–late 1990s. While the 
earlier earthquake created an opportunity for state-sanctioned violence, the media 
attention given to volunteerism during the Kobe earthquake paved the way for civil 
society organisations to gain formal recognition as NPOs. As the power of civil 
society actors grew after 1995, associations which had been set up to support 
migrants and other foreign residents in Japan were now able to become specified 
NPOs. With the symbolic capital conferred on these organisations by the NPO Law, 
migrant-supporting NPOs seem to have gained a stronger foothold within integration 
policy-making processes than civil society groups which lack this symbolic capital. 
Although many groups have chosen to remain ‘outside the system’, hundreds of 
NPOs now exist to advocate on behalf of migrants and to provide services and 
support to foreign residents, often with some level of local government coordination 
or cooperation. Although their political capital is still relatively weak in comparison 
to local governments, and other actors such as Keidanren, these NPOs have been 
able to use their institutional legitimacy to increase the range of social policy 
provision available to foreign residents in Japan and to challenge central government 
on integration policies (as discussed in the next section). 
The findings of this study reinforce the suggestion that tabunka kyōsei was able to 
gain traction quite quickly during the window of opportunity created by the disaster, 
first as an ideal, then as a policy approach (Takezawa 2008). The term was quickly 
adopted by newly formed NPOs and an increasing number of local governments in 
the late 1990s, and was later incorporated into central government discourse with the 
publication of the TKSK report (Aiden 2011).  
As Pierson (2003) suggests, however, it is important that we analyse earthquakes and 
other ecological events using appropriate time horizons, rather than shoehorning 
them into ‘temporal structures’ that are based on our own assumptions about event 
sequences and the links between events. That is to say, when we consider the 
outcomes of the Kobe earthquake, we should not discount the importance of all the 
incremental changes that gradually led to the institutionalisation of NPOs in Japan. 
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8.3.2 Engaging central government, rescaling integration policies 
Looking at the development of Japan’s integration policies from the early 2000s to 
the present day, it is clear that local governments have been able to use their social 
capital (in terms of their ability to mobilise central government actors) and their 
political capital (in terms of being able to recommend ‘credible’ policy solutions) to 
bring about incremental changes that have led to the emergence of integration 
policies at the national scale. Unlike previous scholars who have argued that local 
governments have more or less developed integration policies in a vacuum left by the 
lack of central government involvement (Nagy 2008), I suggest that this is an 
outdated view of integration policy development in Japan. 
Through the course of the nineties and into the new millennium, local governments 
gradually reached a point where they felt that much greater change was needed at the 
national scale and it seems that they were able to contribute towards such policy 
changes. For example, by the time of the Hamamatsu Declaration it had become 
clear that the registration system for foreign residents was no longer fit for purpose 
(see chapter two). Local governments seemed keen to press their ministerial 
counterparts for central government support to deal with these issues. 
However, what is also clear from the findings is that local governments lacked the 
political capital on their own to call for changes. This is evident in the development 
of the tabunka kyōsei promotion plan by the TKSK, which was itself the result of 
combined lobbying from the GSTK and other government and non-governmental 
actors (though it is impossible to say which actors were most influential). However, 
it was not until the Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi (‘Council on Economic and Fiscal 
Policy’, hereafter the CEFP) took the plan on board that it was able to gain traction. 
At the time, the CEFP was an influential ‘supra-ministerial’ agency directly 
accountable to the Prime Minister (Yamawaki 2007). Its adoption of the ideas 
developed by the TKSK generated the political capital needed to create the first 
cross-ministerial integration policy in 2006—a comprehensive policy concerning 
foreigners as members of society (‘seikatsusha to shite no gaikokujin’ ni kansuru 
sōgōteki taiōsaku). As Komine notes, ‘Japan’s integration policy was first 
established in 2006 and gradually thickened thereafter as new measures were layered 
on top of old ones’ (Komine 2014, 209). 
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While the institutionalisation of NPOs was an important development for integration 
policies in Japan, the increasing involvement of central government actors through 
the 2000s has, I would argue, fundamentally reconfigured the field of integration 
policy-making. Although the events of the 2000s have been documented by several 
scholars (Komine 2014; Milly 2014), this section reconsiders that period in terms of 
its impact on the configuration of governance over integration policy-making. 
Milly (2014, 72–73) notes that several actors lobbied the national government in the 
early 2000s, following a decade of increased migration flows into Japan which led to 
a relatively rapid increase in the number of foreign residents living in Japan 
compared with previous decades. While the NPO interview participants in this study 
felt that it has been difficult to effect policy change under Prime Minister Abe, actors 
at the turn of the millennium saw opportunities to gain traction with the Koizumi 
administration. 
As we have just discussed, civil society organisations were active within the field of 
integration policy-making even before the NPO Law, but the field still lacked a 
strong central government presence. This lack of central government involvement 
has been acknowledged by several scholars (including Tegtmeyer Pak 2000), but this 
situation seems to have changed gradually over the first decade of the 21
st
 century. 
As noted in chapter two, a number of organisations developed policy positions in the 
early years of the Koizumi administration, including the GSTK, Ijūren and migration 
studies scholars based at Japanese institutions. This study has found that the TKSK 
included NPO representatives such as Tamura Tarō, whose NPO was one of the first 
(if not the first) to adopt the term tabunka kyosei. Three academics were also present 
in the TKSK—Yamawaki Keizō, Kashiwazaki Chikako and Angelo Ishi—two of 
whom wrote an influential pro-migrant policy paper before joining the committee 
(see Yamawaki, Kondō, and Kashiwazaki 2001). The TKSK also included a 
representative from Yokkaichi City, one of the members of the GSTK, and a 
representative from Gunma Prefecture, which is home to two member cities of the 
GSTK. 
There are several points to note here. To start with, this array of local government 
and non-governmental actors—akin to the kind of horizontal associational network 
that Dingwerth (2004) has spoken of—were able to use their collective capital to 
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formally draw the MIC into a more active integration policy-making role, which 
fundamentally altered the governance of integration policy-making in Japan. 
Arguably, it would have been difficult for local governments and other actors to 
consistently call for national policy changes without firm central government 
commitment to the integration agenda. Although the formation of an agency with 
formal responsibility for developing integration policies has still not been fully 
realised (as urged by the GSTK and others) the acceptance of responsibility for those 
policies by the MIC, however partial, has rescaled the nature of integration policy-
making in Japan. While the raison d’être for the first report of the TKSK was to urge 
local governments to formulate or continue to develop local policies, it also paved 
the way for a more comprehensive national approach to integration (Aiden 2011). 
Numerous scholars have commented on the involvement of the MIC in integration 
policies from the 2000s onward, but it is also worth noting that some of the actors 
who helped secure the Ministry’s involvement were then able to influence the 
direction of the TKSK report as members of the research committee tasked with 
producing it. In other words, the political capital that those actors had gained by 
lobbying central government was rewarded with closer involvement in the policy-
making process. 
The development of further integration policies seems to have stalled under the 
incumbent Abe administration, but there are good reasons to believe that this will not 
remain the case in the long run. With the involvement of central and local 
government, NPOs, businesses and academics in the development and 
implementation of integration policies, it is difficult to imagine that these actors 
would want to dismantle their links and relinquish their authority in the field of 
integration policy-making. While some actors, such as Keidanren, can focus their 
attention on other policy issues, other actors are dedicated to integration-related 
issues. It is likely that these actors will continue to push for national integration 
policies when further windows of opportunity open up. 
8.3.3 Towards a better understanding of governance reconfigurations 
Most accounts of integration policies and policy-making in Japan begin by pointing 
out that the lack of national government in this arena left a void that was eventually 
filled by local governments and civil society organisations—an outcome at least 
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partly attributable to the campaigning efforts of Zainichi Koreans (Chung 2010). As 
part of this narrative, the Kobe earthquake response is often seen as a prime example 
of cooperation at the local scale and the unconditional support offered by civil 
society actors to foreigners affected by the disaster (Shaw and Goda 2004; Takezawa 
2008).  
More recent accounts acknowledge the role that the national government has played 
since 2006, following the publication of the TKSK report (Aiden 2011; Komine 
2014; Milly 2014). However, what has been lacking is a theoretically-grounded 
exploration of how and why the configuration of governance has changed. 
This study has shown that the key developments of the 1990s and 2000s can be 
reconsidered from a field analytical perspective. The institutionalisation of NPOs, as 
precipitated by the Kobe earthquake, allowed certain migrant-supporting 
organisations, such as Ijūren, to exchange symbolic capital for a modicum of 
political capital. As discussed above, migrant-supporting organisations with the 
status of specified NPOs, along with local governments, organisations representing 
business interests and influential academics, were able to use their capital to catalyse 
central government involvement in integration policy-making. 
While scholars such as Milly have described the governance of integration policy-
making as multilevel governance—which she depicts as ‘the trend of dispersing 
power away from central states and the increasing role of collaborative networks in 
governance, regardless of the role of supranational organizations’ (Milly 2014, 4)—I 
would argue that this is problematic. Aside from the conceptual problems with 
multilevel governance that are discussed in earlier chapters, the decentralisation of 
power is not an accurate description for the nascent governance of integration policy-
making in Japan. Instead, this governance evolved from a predominantly local-scale 
phenomenon into a multi-scalar configuration.  
Speaking to the broader literature on governance, this study reinforces the findings of 
other studies (Scholten et al. 2018), which highlight the relevance of the agency of 
local governments in the development of a multi-scalar configuration of governance. 
Unlike previous studies, however, this study demonstrates the value of using a field-
based approach to examine how and why governance configurations change. While 
the social and political capital of local governments alone was insufficient to garner 
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central government interest in integration policy-making, the collective efforts of 
multiple actors in this field amounted to greater capital leverage. The additional 
leverage was sufficiently high as to lead to a governance reconfiguration. 
The next section discusses the strategies employed by governmental and non-
governmental actors to achieve policy preferences at a local scale, through efforts to 
influence governance processes at other scales, particularly the national scale. 
However, the findings of this study also point to the strategies used by central 
government to resist these influencing activities. 
8.4 Integration policy-making at the national scale: policy 
influencing strategies 
8.4.1 Influencing strategies used by local governments and NPOs 
As discussed in chapter four, in many of Bourdieu’s own studies the field he 
constructed was often characterised by a bipolar economic/cultural structure, which 
was used to differentiate between actors who were rich in economic capital but 
lacked cultural capital, and vice versa. Depending on the forms of capital that were 
valued by the dominant actors, which forms they were able to accumulate, and based 
on those actors’ dominance in relation to one another, Bourdieu was able to construct 
the field in question. 
Within this study, the findings do not suggest that constructing the field along 
economic–cultural lines would help us better understand the motivations of actors 
within the field of integration policy-making. While both cultural capital and 
economic capital appear to be relevant to the field, they do not seem to be the 
principal forms of capital within the field. 
Instead, the findings suggest that two forms of capital are particularly important for 
the struggle to influence integration policies in Japan: political capital and 
informational capital. Whereas political capital allows its holders to define the 
politics of integration policy-making and, ultimately, to define integration policies at 
some scale, informational capital endows its holders with a seemingly ‘authentic’ 
understanding of the integration issues affecting ‘foreigners’ in Japan. While other 
forms of capital are also important (including economic capital and social capital) a 
discussion of the role of political and informational capital may help us better 
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understand the relationships between, and behaviours of, the key actors involved in 
the development of integration policies. 
The importance of political capital is clear in the case of network organisations like 
the GSTK and Ijūren. By channelling their political capital through the GSTK, 
several local governments have been able to gain more influence than they otherwise 
would have, as pointed out by one of its representatives. 
The GSTK has had various successes, but one of particular interest is its contribution 
towards the reform of the Alien Registration Act. In 2005 and 2006, the GTSK 
submitted formal requests for regulatory change to the Council for Regulatory 
Reform (CRR). Founded in 2001, again under the Koizumi administration, the CRR 
recommended the GSTK’s requests in its reports to the Cabinet. The 
recommendations were approved, leading to the rescindment of the Alien 
Registration Act in 2009. From 2012, the foreigner registration system was 
subsumed into the national registration system (jūmin kihon daichō or ‘basic resident 
registry’), thereby eliminating the differences in terms of registration for Japanese 
and non-Japanese nationals. Administratively speaking, at least, this was another step 
forward in terms of integration (Komine 2014). 
While local governments appear to be positioned somewhere in-between the political 
and informational ‘poles’ of the integration policy-making field, the findings suggest 
that NPOs possess lower levels of political capital than other actors in the field and 
are more geared towards accumulating informational capital. Perhaps a greater level 
of political capital would enable NPOs and other migrant-supporting organisations to 
challenge central government more effectively in the long run. In the short-term, 
however, it appears as if NPOs have tacitly accepted the configuration of governance 
in the integration policy-making field as it currently appears.  
Although NPOs have engaged in direct lobbying with central government actors, the 
interview findings suggest that others have tried to use alternative ‘strategies of 
succession’ to gain influence. In particular, it was found that Ijūren is lobbying not 
only institutions based in Japan, but also transnational institutions. For example, 
Ijūren has been lobbying the United Nations (via the Migrant Forum in Asia) to urge 
the Japanese government to reform the working visa system. This example highlights 
a clear difference between NPOs and local governments in their advocacy strategies. 
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While local governments have greater political capital than NPOs, they also seem to 
be constrained in the ways that they can lobby government. NPOs, on the other hand, 
are more willing to use innovative channels to try and leverage more political capital, 
as Ijūren has demonstrated. Of course, this may just be a case of necessity being the 
mother of invention. With ‘conventional’ lobbying channels not yielding the results 
that NPOs desire, NPOs might have been compelled to try less conventional routes. 
Organisations such as Ijūren have forged their own transnational links and networks 
in order to influence policies at the national scale. This includes lobbying the United 
Nations (via the Migrant Forum in Asia or MFA) to urge the Japanese Government 
to reform the working visa system. The organisation has also developed links with 
the Asian Migrant Centre: a regional NGO based in Hong Kong, which engages in 
action-oriented research, capacity-building activities and advocacy in relation to the 
rights of migrants in Asia. Since 2002, the AMC has enjoyed a Special Consultative 
Status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations. In 
addition, Ijūren also has ties with its Korean counterpart, the Joint Committee for 
Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK). 
Despite these links, Ijūren has only had limited success in effecting change at the 
national scale. While one of the interview participants suggested that this was due to 
the absence of a transnational institution such as the EU, the transnational actors that 
are in situ have limited political capital within the field of integration policy-making. 
Even the focus group participants felt that foreign national governments, as 
represented by embassies and consulates general within Japan, lacked the economic 
capital to be effective in supporting their expatriate citizens. 
By developing social capital at a transnational scale, as well as at a national and 
subnational scale, NPOs seem to be trying to leverage their multi-scalar relationships 
to gain political traction on integration issues. Although it is difficult to evaluate this 
strategy in comparison to other possible strategies, it seems fair to argue that NPOs 
are trying to make the most of the capital available to them. There are also 
precedents for this kind of activity within the EU (Borkert and Penninx 2011). 
However, as the interviewees in this study were keen to point out, the one thing that 
(East) Asia very much lacks is a transnational institution like the EU. 
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Although the findings from this study cannot be generalised to other policy areas, 
they tie in with those of Tsujinaka and Pekkanen (2007), who suggest that NPOs in 
Japan are generally more focused on service provision than policy-formation 
activities. However, while the evidence on advocacy activities by civil society 
organisations presented here is only a small part of the overall picture, there are 
reasons to believe that these activities are not as niche as older studies have 
suggested (cf. Tsujinaka and Pekkanen 2007), nor confined to the boundaries of the 
Japanese nation-state (cf. Vogt and Lersch 2007). More recent studies suggest that 
migrant-supporting NPOs are increasingly engaging in advocacy activities, including 
activities involving transnational actors (Kremers 2014), and the findings from this 
study support that view. 
Furthermore, while Vogt and Lertsch (2007) argue that policy advocacy among 
Japanese migrant-supporting organisations is passive, this may be largely due to the 
limited resources (particularly economic capital) that these organisations possess. As 
noted previously, the majority of Japanese NPOs are small organisations with fewer 
than six members of staff, who generally receive lower salaries than their private 
sector counterparts. By channelling their advocacy activities through umbrella 
organisations such as Ijūren, these NPOs are able to amplify their collective capital 
(informational or otherwise) to lobby central government actors more effectively. 
8.4.2 Advisory committees: where informational capital meets political 
capital 
Although ‘advisory committees’ are frequently mentioned in the integration policy 
literature in Japan, few if any studies explore the roles these committees play in the 
policy-making process, despite a long history of research on the topic (Harari 1997; 
Schwartz 2001). However, it is clear from other policy areas that committees play an 
important role in policy change (on policies towards older people, for instance, see 
Campbell 2014).  
One way in which actors seem to be converting their informational capital into gains 
in political capital is through advisory committees. As noted in the findings, 
representatives of certain organisations have been able to gain a seat at the discussion 
table by dint of their possession of informational capital. This has been particularly 
evident in the TKSK, to which ‘experts’ were invited to help formulate the first plan 
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to promote tabunka kyōsei in local regions (see Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni 
kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). 
We could therefore conceive of these committees as spaces where one form of 
capital is converted to another; more specifically, spaces where informational capital 
allows committee members to engage in discussions with governmental actors whose 
political capital is relatively greater. The apparent success of the TKSK, in terms of 
the roll-out of their policy proposals, suggests that the capital transactions in this 
particular case were relatively successful for the actors involved. 
Alternatively, we could also view these spaces as boundary spaces. Such a 
conceptualisation would be in keeping with Scholten’s (2011) discussion on the 
policy–research nexus, where he investigates the boundary between the integration 
policy-making field and the academic field. Scholten’s discussion of the 
establishment of the government-associated Advisory Committee on Minorities 
Research (ACOM) in the Netherlands, as well as parliamentary committees, is 
particularly pertinent in this regard. 
As the findings have indicated, the TKSK has played an important role in the 
development of integration policies, but advisory committees and ‘expert advisors’ 
have seldom been the subject of scrutiny within migration studies. As Harari (1997) 
points out, the rationale for this institution is that they provide impartial advice and 
provide a space for deliberation between government and non-government experts in 
a given policy area, including academics but also those with some form of 
professional experience. Yet, one question remains: are they ‘sufficiently free of 
government control to achieve their formal goals’ (Harari 1997, 18)? 
Against this backdrop, we may wish to consider what ‘government control’ looks 
like: whether advisors feel they can act and speak freely on the issues in question. I 
would argue that some level of government control is inevitable. In contrast to the 
influencing strategies described previously, the members of these committees are 
carefully selected by central government officials. Among other things, government 
officials seem to have free reign in choosing committee members and it is anyone’s 
guess what discussions may accompany their deliberations behind the scenes. One 
would also expect government departments or working groups to set parameters for 
advisory committees, but that would not necessarily constitute the kind of control 
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that Harari is talking about. These committees are formally recognised by the 
departments or ministries which create them, which instantly endows them with the 
legitimacy (symbolic capital) that other policy influencing groups may lack. In 
essence this is a ‘conservation strategy’—the ministry is bringing in expertise 
(informational capital) but in a controlled way. 
Within the field of integration policy-making, actors within the field may be affected 
by a similar habitus: tendencies to perceive and to react to issues within the field in a 
similar way. That is, constraints on the behaviour of advisory experts may not just be 
structural, they may also be cognitive. Depending on the strength of the habitus, 
committee members may manifest similar attitudes or behaviours even without 
explicit government control over the advisory committee. For example, if immigrants 
are persistently constructed as anything but ‘immigrants’ (see above), all subsequent 
discussions will follow suit unless that construction is challenged. As Dubois 
suggests, ‘ad hoc committees set up to address a particular problem or domain can be 
analysed as the objectivation of the “hard core” of the field in question’ (Dubois 
2014b, 207).  
Within social policy, there is a long history of discussions on the dual role that many 
social policy scholars play: scrutinising policy on the one hand, while seeking to 
engage with policymakers on the other. As Bourdieu constantly reminds us, however, 
academics are no less prone to the socialising effects of habitus than other people 
unless they engage in reflexive practices (see, for instance, Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992). Committees composed of academic and non-academic ‘experts’ alike should 
not be considered beyond the purview of scholarly inquiry. Rather, they should be 
scrutinised with the same critical gaze that academics ought to apply to all objects of 
study. 
8.4.3 The dynamics of policy-influencing strategies 
For some scholars, governance involves cooperation and coordination through 
formal and informal networks of actors (Rhodes 1996; Rhodes 1997). However, the 
network concept of governance, and how best it should be analysed, remains 
somewhat problematic and unclear. As Marsh and Smith (2000) argue in terms of 
policy outcomes, it is unclear how much explanation is down to the existence of a 
particular network, and what it is about that network that delivers certain outcomes. 
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The findings of this study suggest that local governments and NPOs have used their 
networks to influence integration policies at the national scale. Some, albeit limited, 
success has been observed where local governments (acting through the GSTK) have 
been the instigators of policy-influencing strategies, but the strategies of NPO 
networks (especially Ijūren) seem to have been less successful. 
In previous studies, such strategies have been viewed through the lens of ‘venue 
shopping’, which refers to the tendency for policymakers to seek new venues for 
policy-making that are more amenable to their goals and preferences if they 
encounter obstacles in their conventional policy venue (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993). This study contributes to the literature on lobbying and policy influencing by 
suggesting that the political capital, as well as the social capital, of policymakers can 
help explain why certain strategies are more likely to succeed. 
Local governments generally possess more political capital than (specified) NPOs in 
the field of integration policy-making. While the interests of local governments may 
align with those of NPOs, local governments are more likely to seek relationships 
with actors rich in political capital. Hence, local governments would be expected to 
use their social capital to forge alliances with other local governments or government 
agencies that are relatively well endowed with political capital.  
While other scholars have focused on the activities of national or local government 
actors (Guiraudon 2000; Scholten et al. 2018), this study has also shone a light on the 
activities of NPOs. NPOs have less political capital at their disposal than local 
government actors, for instance, which means that even NPO networks such as 
Ijūren may lack the leverage they need to influence policies at the national scale. 
This may help explain why actors such as Ijūren have developed transnational links 
in a bid to enhance their leverage. It is quite likely that developing and maintaining 
transnational networks is a resource-intensive process, which suggests that the 
political capital gained from these ventures would have to be used in a targeted way. 
The activities of central government actors have also been scrutinised in this study, 
particularly through the use of advisory committees. These ‘venues’ allow central 
government actors to draw on the informational capital of ‘experts’ in exchange for 
greater political input. However, central government control over advisory 
committees means that any policy proposals put forward by committees can be 
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rejected, whereas the knowledge and expertise that central government actors gain 
from these transactions is a commodity that helps maintain their authority over 
integration policies at the national scale. 
8.5 Integration policy-making at the local scale 
8.5.1 NPOs and local governments: policy implementation and 
informational capital 
For much of the second half of the twentieth century, cities such as Osaka (and 
indeed smaller cities within Osaka Prefecture such as Yao and Toyonaka) seem to 
have pushed the boundaries of what they could do under existing national policies 
that were not specifically aimed at foreign residents. In fact, scholars such as Chung 
(2010) have shown that many of these changes were achieved through the efforts of 
Zainichi activists and migrant-supporting organisations in the postwar period, calling 
for greater equality in areas such as education. Since the 1980s, local governments 
have developed their own local policies and initiatives to address some of the issues 
affecting migrants and other foreign residents in Japan and continue to do so (albeit 
with problematic constructions of non-Japanese ethnonationals). 
Across the interviews it became apparent that local governments are working more 
closely with NPOs in terms of implementing and delivering policies that are directed 
towards foreign residents at the local scale. This increasing coordination between the 
two sets of actors was apparent in both Osaka and Yokohama and their 
corresponding prefectures. 
Yet, as Milly (2014) notes, local governments and NPOs are also able to expand and 
flex the scope and coverage of particular policies through their interpretation and 
implementation of those policies. For example, local governments may try to expand 
the scope or coverage of a particular policy or they could work with NPOs to ensure 
that more migrants access the services or support provided under a given policy or 
initiative. This is clearly the case in relation to social security and healthcare, where 
local governments and NPOs have taken steps to support migrants to make claims or 
to access medical services (with the support of interpreters) which they otherwise 
may forgo. 
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The research findings also suggest that NPOs and local governments have also been 
engaged in accumulating and leveraging knowledge and expertise on issues affecting 
foreign residents (informational capital), particularly less established migrants. For 
example, the interviews revealed that local governments have employed 
questionnaire surveys for understanding the problems facing migrants living under 
their jurisdiction, while NPOs seem to have relied on insights from service users or 
clients to gauge policy issues.  
Both Osaka and Yokohama City and their corresponding prefectures have 
undertaken surveys to investigate the ‘needs’ of foreign residents. In carrying out 
these surveys, local governments have essentially been building up their stock of 
informational capital. The rational explanation for these activities is that local 
governments need this information to better understand the issues affecting migrants 
and hence provide more tailored services. However, the design and delivery of the 
surveys reviewed for this study (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015; Yokohama-shi 
Seisaku-kyoku 2014) seemed to be very one-sided. Although the surveys were 
translated into multiple languages, the questions betrayed a sense of knowing what 
the problems were a priori. In other words, these surveys seem to have been used to 
confirm rather than to explore needs. 
In addition, the surveys also betrayed a sense of the negative attitudes that are 
pervasive in Japanese society. For example, an issue raised by several interview 
participants was that foreigners do not know how to dispose of rubbish properly, 
implying that they need to be taught how to do so. This issue has been consistently 
used by Japanese ethnonationals as an example of the ‘trouble’ or community 
tensions precipitated by the presence of ‘foreigners’ in Japan (Tsuda 2006b). The 
survey questions were used to confirm the existence of the problem, rather than to 
find out if or why the problem exists. 
Much of the informational capital gathered by local governments and NPOs seems to 
have been circulated between these actors, through networks, conferences and other 
kinds of meetings. Tegtmeyer Pak (2006) refers to these as examples of ‘horizontal 
policy diffusion’. By way of comparison, even within the EU the most important 
policy instruments for the development of integration policies are regarded as being 
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the collection and exchange of information and good practice and the mobilisation of 
civil society actors (Süssmuth and Weidenfeld 2005). 
Critically, local governments, NPOs and other migrant-supporting organisations 
seem to be gaining as much from this process as migrants are, if not more so. In 
providing advice to migrants and in carrying out surveys and other forms of data 
collection, these actors are gaining informational capital which they can use to 
advocate for policy change. Ostensibly, this is to call for changes that may improve 
the lives of migrants. Yet, this extraction of knowledge and expertise from migrants 
only serves to exclude foreign residents from the policy-making processes in which 
they too have a genuine stake.  
8.5.2 Local executive influence on integration policies 
Previous studies exploring the role of local government or local governance in 
relation to policies affecting migrants and other foreign residents in Japan have 
seldom explored the role of governors or mayors. The findings from this study 
indicate that local executives in the prefectures of Kanagawa and Osaka have had an 
appreciable input into the direction and development of policies aimed at local 
residents. As one of the interview participants noted, without support for tabunka 
kyōsei from key actors within local governments, including the local executive, 
policies designed to support foreign residents are unlikely to be implemented. 
In the case of Yokohama City, the Governor of Kanagawa from the 1970s through to 
the 1990s appears to have had a considerable bearing on the framing of local policies 
under the banner of minsai gaikō (‘people-to-people diplomacy’). Arguably, 
Governor Nagasu set the tone for Yokohama to develop a range of policies aimed at 
turning the city into a ‘global city’ (Minsai Gaikō 10-nenshi Kikaku Henshū Iinkai 
1990). While this policy agenda seems to have started life as a way of effecting 
greater international cooperation at a subnational level, it does not seem to have been 
as strongly associated with the economic imperative that has defined other 
internationalisation policies (Hook and Weiner 1992). Kashiwazaki (2003) believes 
that minsai gaikō gave cities within Kanagawa prefecture a framework with which to 
respond more quickly to rising immigration in the 1990s and this suggestion seems to 
have been endorsed by one of the interview participants from Yokohama City (see 
chapter six). 
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By contrast, the recent mayors of Osaka City seem to have expressed little interest in 
the issues affecting foreign residents in the city, as suggested by the Osaka-based 
interview participants. Instead, Mayor Hashimoto and his successor appear to have 
been more preoccupied with Osaka’s economic development and with plans to turn 
Osaka Prefecture into a metropolis organised along the same lines as the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area.  
Jou (2015) suggests that support for Hashimoto’s regional political party—Ōsaka 
Ishin no Kai, known as the ‘Osaka Restoration Association’ or ‘One Osaka’ in 
English—has been motivated primarily by support for his charismatic leadership 
than for the policies that the party espouses. Unlike Nagasu, Hashimoto’s stance has 
been one of opposition towards special interest groups and the local bureaucracy, 
while promoting the interests of taxpayers (Sunahara 2012). This libertarian narrative 
was echoed by one of the interview participants, who felt that foreign residents who 
pay their taxes deserve to receive the same services as Japanese nationals—but the 
interviewee gave no thought to the additional disadvantages that migrants may face 
as non-Japanese nationals. 
The economic development narrative supported by Hashimoto was also apparent in 
the internal structures of Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City (see Table 6.1). Within 
Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City, responsibility for integration policies lay with 
departments that were also in charge of wider economic or ‘urban appeal’ strategies. 
In Kanagawa Prefecture, by contrast, integration policies were located in a 
department that focused on the lives of prefectural residents as a whole. Yokohama 
City had a specific department for ‘international’ issues, possibly reflecting the 
influence of minsai gaikō on government administration in the city. These 
differences highlight divergent practices in terms of where formal responsibility lies 
for tabunka kyōsei or internationalisation-related policies. 
Overall, the findings on the power of the local executive chime with those of older 
studies, which have suggested that local government chief executives in Japan have 
greater discretion over policy coordination than may be expected from such a 
centralised system (Reed 1982). Other studies have documented the interest shown 
by local government chief executives in the implementation of certain policy areas, 
such as the field of social care (Eto 2001). However, more work could be done to 
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explore the symbolic and political capital of mayors and governors and how they use 
that capital (or not, as the case may be) to promote or tackle policy issues such as 
integration.  
8.5.3 The implementation of tabunka kyōsei at the local scale 
Yokohama and Osaka are among two of the 400 prefectures and municipalities that 
have developed their own ‘tabunka kyōsei promotion plans’ as urged by the TKSK 
report (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). The prevalence of 
the plans notwithstanding, what is particularly relevant is how tabunka kyōsei is 
applied in those plans. 
The findings of this study suggest that there are clear signs of convergence in the 
implementation of education policies and Japanese language learning policies as part 
of tabunka kyōsei plans, but there is also some divergence. The 2007 Yokohama City 
plan acknowledges the language of tabunka kyōsei but is framed in terms of 
‘building a community rich in internationality’ (kokusaisei yutakana machizukuri). 
This seems to cohere with the rhetoric of minsai gaikō, as discussed above, which 
seems to have given a cosmopolitan air to tabunka-kyōsei-based activities in 
Yokohama. 
In Osaka City, the 2009 integration plan points towards the realisation of a ‘society 
of coexistence’ (kyōsei shakai), involving ‘respect for the human rights of foreign 
nationals’, the ‘realisation of a society of multicultural coexistence’ and ‘community 
participation’ (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2009). However, all eleven items that appear 
under the theme of tabunka kyōsei are related to education policies (including 
learning the Japanese language), while other social policy areas appear under the 
theme of ‘respect for human rights’. Put simply, Osaka City views tabunka kyōsei as 
a way of framing education policies towards migrant children. 
The reasons for this may be historic. There is a rich history of Zainichi activism in 
Osaka, with Zainichi Koreans demanding the right to a Korean education within the 
public school system (Okano 2008). Despite local government resistance, the Korean 
community worked with educators to organise special classes outside the ordinary 
school curriculum to foster Korean children’s awareness of their ethnic identity. As a 
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result, Osaka has, since 1992, appropriated a budget for these classes, which have 
been steadily increasing in number (Kashiwazaki 2003). 
Osaka and Yokohama illustrate that the policies associated with tabunka kyōsei at a 
national scale have not been adopted in an identical fashion at a local scale. While 
educational activities have been promoted under the banner of tabunka kyōsei in both 
cities, the wider scope of activities in each city seems to be contingent on local 
contexts. This is particularly clear in the case of Yokohama, where tabunka kyōsei 
seems to have been framed in terms of minsai gaikō. 
8.5.4 Participatory governance at the local scale 
There are notable differences between Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City and Kanagawa 
Prefecture in terms of their approaches to participatory governance, namely the ways 
in which they engage foreign residents in integration policy-making processes as 
discussed in chapter two. 
There is a strong difference between the approach taken by Osaka City and that taken 
by Kanagawa Prefecture. While the latter provides a council where foreign residents 
can raise issues and try to influence the policy-making process, albeit without 
statutory backing, Osaka City seemed to have no comparable forum in which foreign 
residents can participate. 
Kanagawa has been among the leaders in implementing foreign resident-related 
policies. In 1998, the prefecture launched the Kanagawa Foreign Residents’ Council 
as an advisory body to the governor, with the stipulation that its policy 
recommendations be incorporated in the formulation of internationalisation policies 
(Kashiwazaki 2003; Shipper 2008, 150–54). On the whole, conditions in the 
prefecture seem to have been conducive to the development of policies towards 
foreign residents, especially under the auspices of minsai gaikō. 
Osaka Prefecture seems to have developed an approach combining aspects of both of 
the aforementioned approaches, incorporating a selection of experts with a mix of 
Japanese and non-Japanese ethnonational backgrounds. 
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8.5.5 Modes of integration at the local scale 
Much of the literature on integration in the Japanese context has focused on 
integration at the national scale, but a growing number of studies have used case 
studies to better understand how integration policies are made and implemented in 
cities and prefectures across Japan (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000; Kashiwazaki 2003; Nagy 
2012; Milly 2014). These studies suggest that prefectures and cities have promoted 
foreign residents’ integration through services relating to welfare, language support, 
advice, education, outreach and cultural exchange, in addition to municipal 
antidiscrimination ordinances and limited political participation through foreign 
resident councils or similar forums. 
Tsuda rightly recognises that the rights afforded under local citizenship are likely to 
vary from locality to locality (Tsuda 2006c). For example, the residents of 
Yokohama cannot be expected to receive exactly the same services as those of Osaka. 
In addition, this study has found that the policies associated with tabunka kyōsei at a 
national scale have not been adopted in an identical fashion in Osaka and Yokohama. 
There are clear signs of convergence in the implementation of education policies and 
Japanese language learning policies as part of tabunka kyōsei plans, but there is also 
some divergence, which is likely to originate from the specific circumstances of each 
city. For example, Zainichi activism seems to have had a strong impact on local 
services in Osaka. 
There are also marked differences between Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City and 
Kanagawa Prefecture in terms of their approaches to participatory governance. 
Policy-making structures in Kanagawa Prefecture seem to be more conducive to the 
involvement of foreign residents in policy-making compared with comparable 
structures in Osaka City. The findings indicate that this may be due to the impact of 
local leadership.    
Previous studies exploring the role of local government or local governance, in the 
development of policies affecting migrants and other foreign residents, have seldom 
explored the role of executive leadership at the local scale, as effected by governors 
or mayors. The findings from this study indicate that local executives in the 
prefectures of Kanagawa and Osaka might have influenced the direction and 
development of policies aimed at local residents.  
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As noted in the findings, these differences are also discernible in the internal 
structures of the local governments in the study sites. With the notable exception of 
Kashiwazaki (2003), few scholars have explored local government structures in 
detail, despite the clues these administrative arrangements can give us about the 
nature of politics and policy-making at a local scale. 
Another issue that seems to have received scant attention in the literature is the issue 
of delegation. As mentioned in chapter four, increasing reliance on delegates (such as 
‘community leaders’) poses a risk to migrants in the form of dispossession of 
political influence. This study suggests that local governments and NPOs have been 
able to capitalise on the knowledge and expertise (informational capital) that they 
have gained at the frontline, but the gains to migrants are not immediately clear. 
While integration policies at the national scale may well improve as a result of local 
government and NPO advocacy efforts, a greater number of migrants may become 
increasingly removed from policy-making processes as a result of delegation. This 
lack of representation warrants further attention. 
8.6 Migrant capital: negotiating structure and agency at the 
local scale 
8.6.1 Migrants and the policy-making process 
The field of integration policy-making in Japan is characterised by competing 
narratives. While one set of narratives objectifies migrants as passive policy targets 
or subjects, an alternative narrative has developed which views migrants as key 
stakeholders or players—or, to paraphrase Takao (2003), going from ‘beneficiaries’ 
to ‘participants’. Under the latter, migrants are portrayed as wanting to play a greater 
role in decisions that affect their settlement and integration in Japanese communities. 
This is partly evident in the role that migrants are playing in service delivery, both as 
staff and as volunteers. As one interview participant pointed out, a higher proportion 
of interpreters are now migrants as opposed to Japanese ethnonationals. It is likely 
that this was borne out of necessity (due to the growing presence of immigrants in 
Japan) rather than an active policy of recruitment. Nevertheless, it opens up the 
possibility that migrants may play a more active role in other spheres of life and 
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potentially gain a little more influence in terms of the future delivery of integration 
policies. 
Other changes make this seem increasingly likely, at least within some cities. One is 
the policy pursued by certain local governments since the 1980s or 1990s which has 
allowed foreign residents, particularly special permanent residents, to hold senior 
positions within some local governments, such as those of Osaka, Kobe and 
Kawasaki (Chung 2010, 42). Moreover, despite central government reluctance to 
allow foreign residents to vote in local elections, many local governments have 
passed ordinances to allow foreign residents to vote in local referendums on issues 
such as ‘municipal mergers’ or shichōson gappei (Mie 2014). Even though the 
results are not legally binding, some policymakers and academics have questioned 
the constitutionality of these inclusive referendums. This may be due to concern that 
local governments are acting ultra vires, or because it undermines political 
opposition to local suffrage for foreign residents. 
While voting is one way to influence local politics and policies, participatory 
governance provide another seemingly democratic route to involve migrants in 
policy-making processes at the local scale. The creation of councils for foreign 
residents in cities such as Kawasaki, and prefectures such as Osaka and Kanagawa, 
has ostensibly given foreign residents a greater voice in the policy-making process. 
For example, one of the focus group participants was found to have submitted a 
proposal to Kanagawa Foreign Resident Assembly to provide more medical 
interpreters. Her positive experience of being an assembly member, combined with 
her wait-and-see attitude, was in keeping with previous scholarship which has 
highlighted the possibilities and limitations of these assemblies (S.-M. Han 2004). 
However, as noted in the previous section, not all cities have these structures in place 
and there is no statutory requirement to keep these forums going. 
Despite the fact that migrants possess intimate knowledge of the issues and 
challenges they face, they seem unable to convert this knowledge into informational 
capital. First and foremost, informational capital must have a veneer of credibility: 
any evidence on which informational capital is based must be derived from the 
experiences of several hundred migrants, it seems. How this informational capital is 
gathered, and by whom, is another matter. Clearly, local governments are more likely 
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to have the resources needed to gather large amounts of data than individuals. 
However, civil society organisations may also be able to gather these kinds of data, 
particularly if they are relatively well-resourced. 
Of course, we should also consider the possibility that NGOs or NPOs may be led or 
managed by people with a migrant background. While the fieldwork carried out for 
this study gave the impression that smaller NPOs and civil society organisations may 
indeed be led by non-Japanese ethnonationals—including some of the participants in 
this study—the fact remains that influential organisations such as Ijūren are, by and 
large, managed by Japanese ethnonationals. This situation could change in the future, 
but for now it seems that migrants’ positions in the field of integration policy-making 
are not conducive to accumulating either informational capital or political capital. 
Alongside the ‘active stakeholder’ narrative, there also seems to be a normative 
narrative of responsibilisation. This narrative suggests that migrants should take 
more responsibility for the issues that they face and should play a more active part in 
tackling these issues—the underlying assumption being that migrants have actively 
chosen not to participate. This was evident in one of the interview participant’s 
assertions that migrants are not doing their fair share in terms of community disaster 
response training, such as preparedness drills, despite the fact that local government 
survey data suggests that this is one of the areas in which migrants are most keen to 
be involved. 
8.6.2 Social and economic capital at the frontline interface 
Although migrants generally seem to lack the political and informational capital that 
would allow them to influence the formulation of integration policies at the local 
scale, they appear to have been able to leverage other forms of capital at their 
disposal—mainly social and economic capital—to help them benefit from settlement 
and integration services. 
Generally, the focus group participants fell into one of two camps. Either they were 
likely to develop their social capital with civil society groups, or to focus on their 
employment-based relationships. Rarely did they seem to promote both. This may 
simply be due to expediency, but it seems likely to be linked to other constraining 
factors, such as the types of paid employment migrants were able to secure. Within 
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this study, the link between paid employment and ethnonationality was quite stark. 
Filipino focus group participants were generally found to be more likely to have 
insecure forms of employment and were more likely to draw on the support of civil 
society associations (although there were exceptions). By contrast, European and 
American focus group participants were offered work-based support as a matter of 
course or were able to access it quite easily. 
Many of the migrants spoken to as part of this study were supported by civil society 
groups. For some, these were friendship groups, providing migrants with links to 
coethnic migrants or leisure opportunities (particularly spouses/partners of foreign 
residents who were not in full-time employment). For others, links with migrant-
supporting organisations proved more instrumental (particularly in the case of 
Filipino migarnts). This included support to execute social security claims, support in 
finding paid employment and help to access certain services (e.g. medical services). 
The instrumental support that some focus group participants were able to garner 
seemed to be a function of their social capital—the apparent ability to capitalise on 
one’s links with the ‘right people’.  
In the examples given above, the ‘right people’ were often coethnic migrants 
working for civil society organisations with varying degrees of informational capital. 
For example, one of the focus group participants had some knowledge of Japanese 
and Philippine labour laws and was able to exploit this knowledge to assist Filipino 
labour migrants. In other cases the right people were employers, who were able to 
use the resources (especially economic capital) available to their companies to 
support their employees in a number of areas. The focus group findings suggest that 
this support may include assistance to find suitable accommodation and health 
insurance coverage.  
Migrants were also able to use their income to carry out other activities: activities to 
support their own settlement or integration (e.g. attending Japanese language classes), 
activities to promote the integration of other migrants (e.g. paying for a child’s 
education-related fees) and other activities (e.g. financial remittances). While 
migrants in relatively well-paid employment are able to engage in all three activities, 
migrants in less well-paid jobs have to make difficult choices about which activities 
they can afford to forgo. 
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8.6.3 Migrants as lacking the ‘right’ linguistic capital 
One of the key findings from this research was the consensus by the interview 
participants that an inability to speak Japanese language was one of the main issues, 
if not the primary issue, facing migrants in Japan today. It was also considered to be 
inextricably linked to other issues affecting migrants, such as an inability to access 
medical services. This chimes with countless other studies of migrants in Japan and 
other countries. 
Yet, the evidence provided by stakeholders from local governments and international 
exchange associations in support of this belief was not as robust as it was purported 
to be. Moreover, while many of the focus group participants identified 
communication barriers as being a problem, they did not necessarily consider it to be 
their main concern. Even among those who appreciated that learning Japanese would 
make their lives easier in some ways, there was not always a desire to learn Japanese. 
One way to consider this apparent paradox is through the heuristic of linguistic 
capital. As noted in chapter four, although different forms of capital, such as 
linguistic capital, may be valued in multiple fields, they are not accorded equal value 
in every field. Learning Japanese is integral to primary socialisation in Japan and 
proficiency in the Japanese language is likely to be a prerequisite for participating in 
several spheres of activity. However, this does not necessarily mean that learning 
Japanese should be looked upon as a benign activity. 
Migrants are presented as having a choice to learn Japanese or not, but choosing not 
to learn Japanese is presented as self-detrimental. Under this logic, migrants who 
lack the ‘right’ kind of linguistic capital (i.e. Japanese) are considered to be more 
likely to experience integration issues than those who have this capital. These 
individuals are also presented as having personal responsibility for the challenges 
they face with respect to integration.  
At the same time, lack of Japanese-based linguistic capital is understood to be a 
legitimate excuse for excluding migrants from the very policy discussions that may 
affect them the most. For example, foreign residents’ assemblies in Osaka and 
Kanagawa require assembly members to be proficient in Japanese. This seems to be 
based on pragmatism, but making interpreters/translators available would not seem 
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unjustifiable. As some of the focus group participants pointed out, at least some 
communication issues can be overcome through language support from individuals 
within one’s family, for example, or through greater availability of translation and 
interpreting services. The implication is that this issue is structural rather than, or in 
addition to, being individual in nature.  
Although the focus group participants understood the value of being able to speak 
Japanese, they also recognised that many of their compatriots have ‘no interest’ in 
speaking Japanese. (It was clear that some of the focus group participants also shared 
this view). While there are many reasons why migrants may not want to learn 
Japanese (such as the lack of utility of learning Japanese if you are not planning to 
stay in the country permanently) those who make an active choice not to learn the 
Japanese language are implicitly engaged in a field struggle. (The same could be said 
of those who argue that local governments should provide more interpreting services, 
or that English should become more commonplace in Japan.) Hence, non-learning of 
Japanese could be viewed as a strategy of resistance that migrants may engage in.  
The Japanese language is a form of cultural capital accorded value by Japanese 
ethnonationals. Greater competency in Japanese allows individuals to compete for 
more privileged positions in society, such as more prestigious jobs. Hence, a lack of 
willingness to learn Japanese is, to some degree, a form of nonconformity. By 
challenging the need to possess linguistic capital based on the Japanese language or 
by challenging the unquestioned primacy of this capital, these individuals are also 
challenging integration policies (especially assimilationist policies) based on the 
normative assumption that migrants should learn Japanese. 
None of this is to deny the utility of Japanese as a form of linguistic capital—merely 
to recognise that the acquisition of linguistic capital, like any other form of capital, 
often comes at the expense of other forms of capital. This could be a material cost in 
the form of giving up time that could be used for paid employment or other activities; 
a social cost through the weakening one’s ties with coethnic migrants; or a symbolic 
cost in the form of cultural distancing from one’s homeland. For some migrants, it 
seems that these costs are too dear. 
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8.6.4 Migrant capital and social citizenship at the local scale 
The concept of ‘local citizenship’, as formulated by Andrew and Goldsmith (1998), 
has been influential in studies on migrant integration in Japan since it was first 
applied to the Japanese context by Tegtmeyer Pak (2000) and subsequently 
developed by Tsuda (2006a). While numerous works have incorporated the concept 
into their own analyses (including NIRA Shithizunshippu Kenkyūkai 2001; Sharpe 
2010; Gottlieb 2012; Nagy 2012; Kashiwazaki 2013), the arguments propounded in 
Tsuda’s volume have received little critical attention to date beyond the original 
critique offered within the volume itself (in particular, Tsuda 2006c). 
The findings of this study suggest that the concept of local citizenship, as formulated 
by Tsuda and others (Tsuda 2006a), is problematic. In particular, local citizenship 
seems to be preoccupied with the structural dimensions of citizenship at the expense 
of the agency of migrants as ‘local citizens’. 
As mentioned in chapter two, Tsuda (2006c, 278–83) believes that migrants lack 
substantive (local) citizenship owing to their under-participation in integration 
programmes and services at the local scale. He attributes this lack of active civic 
participation to the instrumental economic motives of migrants, a sojourner mentality 
and ethnic segregation. This study demonstrates that a focus on migrant capital 
provides a useful way of reconsidering these issues and provides a critical corrective 
to previous work. 
To begin with, Tsuda’s assertion that migrants’ work-centred lives make them 
‘uninterested’ in using the immigrants services and programmes offered by 
municipal governments and civil society organisations (with the exception of basic 
necessities such as health insurance or emergency medical care) is only partially 
supported by the findings of this study. While the European and American focus 
group participants reported little or no reliance on local government support or 
migrant-supporting organisations, this did not seem to be due to a lack of interest in 
non-economic issues. Instead, those participants were able to execute their claims to 
certain social rights through employment-based opportunities. On the other hand, 
Filipino focus group participants (especially women in less secure forms of 
employment) were found to receive comparatively more support from civil society 
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organisations—especially ones identified through their own coethnic networks—to 
access or make better use of central and local government services and programmes. 
Tsuda also identifies linguistic and cultural barriers as a key reason for the lack of 
cultural assimilation among foreign workers in Japan. As discussed in chapter four, 
migrants may be unable to speak Japanese fluently, especially the more formal 
Japanese required in administrative environments (linguistic capital), or they project 
embodied images or institutionalised symbols of non-belonging which limit their 
access to employment, education or other opportunities. This may be particularly true 
of less established migrants and non-Nikkeijin migrants. 
While it is undoubtedly true that such barriers exist, the findings of this study suggest 
that more attention needs to be paid to the agency of migrants. In particular, some of 
the Filipino migrants in this study were found to have made an active choice not to 
learn Japanese (or, put another way, to acquire Japanese-based linguistic capital) as a 
countermeasure against cultural integration (or assimilation). This is not to suggest 
that ‘ethnic segregation’, as Tsuda describes it, is or is not a desirable state, but that 
such a phenomenon could also be studied as a form of cultural/linguistic resistance. 
Moreover, there seems to have been a tendency in the literature to view migrants 
simply as service ‘consumers’ or ‘clients’ and to ignore the possibility of migrants as 
service providers in their own right. While many scholars recognise that some civil 
society organisations are run by migrants (for example, Yamanaka 2006), less 
attention has been paid to the work that migrants undertake as local government and 
civil society organisation employees. 
More broadly, these findings suggest how Bourdieu’s ideas on capital can be used to 
reconsider citizenship as a key mechanism of distinction between migrants and 
Japanese ethnonationals (Bauder 2008). Both the formal and informal aspects of 
citizenship can render migrants more vulnerable than Japanese ethnonationals and 
this has been well-documented in the literature to date. However, a focus on migrants’ 
capital would also allow researchers to understand how migrants use their resources 
to make claims based on political, economic and social rights, or to resist 




9.1 Summary of key points 
This study has endeavoured to develop a relational approach for understanding 
integration policies and policy-making in Japan, using Osaka and Yokohama as case 
studies. In doing so, this study has drawn on the relational dimensions of the concept 
of governance in order to illuminate the configuration of actors involved in 
producing integration policies; and it has employed a relational understanding of 
citizenship to explore the relationships between migrants and the key governmental 
and non-governmental actors involved. By viewing these integration policies and 
policy-making activities through a field-analytical lens, I have sought to further 
emphasise the relational nature of the policy-making process. 
Through the findings presented here, it can be seen that the contribution of field 
theory to the analysis of integration policies goes beyond identifying and 
characterising ‘decision-makers’. In other words, it is not enough to say that central 
government, local government and civil society actors are involved in the production 
of integration policies. Rather, this study has aimed to show what the properties of 
these actors are (primarily through their use of capital) and what the logic of their 
relationships induce in terms of symbolic productions (including the 
institutionalisation of NPOs) and, inseparably, practices of intervention (especially 
integration policies and integration-related services). 
To begin with, this study has cast a critical light on tabunka kyōsei. Far from being a 
fully-fledged policy paradigm in its own right, tabunka kyōsei seems to have been 
encumbered with ideological baggage from previous paradigms, especially 
internationalisation (kokusaika) and nihonjinron. The continuing impact of the latter 
is particularly evident in the persistent taboo surrounding the use of the term imin 
(‘immigrant’) outside of academic circles. Indeed, it is not clear whether tabunka 
kyōsei has replaced previous ideas around assimilation or sits alongside this policy 
approach. In any case, the more optimistic narratives based on tabunka kyōsei seem 
to have fallen short of their goal of including migrants as ‘key players’ in the 
integration drive. Migrants continue to be excluded from policy discussions, either 
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outright through ‘delegation’ or through restrictive criteria such as Japanese language 
proficiency. 
The most significant change in the field of integration policy-making, however, has 
been the incorporation of central government actors. While previous studies have 
commented on the reluctance of the Japanese government to develop integration 
policies at the national scale, this study has shown that this is no longer the case. In 
particular, it uses field analysis to help explain how the reconfiguration of the field of 
integration policy-making was precipitated. The combined social and political capital 
of government agencies, local governments and non-governmental actors during the 
Koizumi administration seems to have disrupted the status quo, leading to grater 
involvement of central government actors in integration policy-making at the 
national scale.  
At the same time, this study has shown how local government actors and NPOs have 
used strategies to make best use of their capital assets to influence policies at the 
national scale. A number of scholars have noted that international covenants and 
rights-based instruments have had an impact on Japanese policy-making (in 
particular, Gurowitz 1999), but the transnational lobbying activities of organisations 
such as Ijūren also deserve further attention. 
Developments at the national scale seem to have stalled under the incumbent Abe 
administration due to political reluctance to relax Japan’s immigration laws (Roberts 
2018). However, given the economic and demographic arguments in favour of 
increased immigration, and given that formal institutions have developed to 
formulate and implement integration policies at the national scale (e.g. the OPMFR) 
and the local scale (e.g. the GSTK), there is reason to believe that integration policies 
will continue to be formulated in a multi-scalar fashion. 
The findings of this study also suggest that local executives may have an appreciable 
bearing on the direction of policy development locally. This has certainly been the 
case in Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City, and Kanagawa Prefecture and Yokohama 
City. While governors and mayors in these places have not led calls to implement 
specific policies, they seem to have been influential in setting the general direction 
for policy-making in those areas. In the case of Kanagawa and Yokohama, this has 
taken the form of the minsai gaikō (‘people-to-people diplomacy’) approach, which 
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seems to have created the conditions for a proactive response to migrant integration 
since the 1990s. By contrast, the political climate in Osaka has shifted towards more 
populist and economically-oriented policies in recent years, which seems to have 
pushed integration issues further down the political agenda. 
Civil society organisations have long been at the forefront of integration, supporting 
migrants in Japan to settle and to access services, particularly in urban contexts. As 
noted in this study, the institutionalisation of civil society organisations in the mid-
late 1990s led to the formation of specified NPOs. On the one hand, these NPOs have 
used this legal recognition (or symbolic capital) to build more formal partnerships 
with local governments and to engage in policy-making discussions as legally-
recognised entities. At the same time, NPOs are now subject to a slightly greater 
degree of government oversight (albeit less than that desired by central government 
bureaucrats). As the ties that bind actors in the field of integration policy-making 
have become increasingly formalised, there are signs that this field is developing its 
own habitus—a shared terminology and ways of viewing problems that are distinct 
from those of other fields. 
One of the benefits of field analysis is that it allows researchers to study structure and 
agency simultaneously. Much attention has been paid to the structures that affect 
migrants’ integration in Japan, particularly through the lens of ‘local citizenship’, but 
this study has also investigated how migrants from different backgrounds have used 
their capital resources to negotiate social citizenship at the local scale. 
9.2 Developing relational approaches in social policy 
In developing a relational approach for the exploration of integration policies and 
policy-making, this study has introduced new ways of conceptualising and analysing 
these issues within migration studies, with broader applications and implications for 
other areas of social policy. 
While this study has sought to apply a relational approach to a specific set of policies, 
other social policy areas could also benefit from adopting such an approach. While 
Bourdieu did not discuss many policy areas explicitly, sociologists have applied 
Bourdieu’s work to a number of policy areas, particularly education (Lingard, 
Rawolle, and Taylor 2005). By contrast, a perusal of key social policy journals 
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reveals very few examples of field analysis in action. Peillon’s (1998) proposal for a 
‘welfare field’ designed to provide a robust sociological analysis of welfare is one of 
the few exceptions, but other examples are hard to find in the subsequent two 
decades. 
While Bourdieu-inspired field analysis has been used in a variety of research 
applications and disciplines, there seems to be very little use of this analytical 
approach to understand policies and policy-making processes. This study has sought 
to build on the work of scholars such as Dubois (2014a; 2014b) in developing a field 
analytical approach designed to explore policy-making in relation to public policy, 
and more specifically the production of integration policies (cf. Scholten 2011; 
Uitermark 2012). 
This study is also novel in its treatment of governance and citizenship. Although the 
concept of governance is now widely used within social policy and administration, 
this study has sought to focus on the relational aspects of governance; more 
specifically, the relations between the key actors involved in the production of 
integration policies in Japan. Although Bourdieu was not a governance theorist, and 
avoided the language of governance because of its normative associations, this study 
has sought to demonstrate that his analytical toolkit can be used to illuminate 
governance relationships. 
To begin with, it has recast the configuration of actors involved in the governance of 
integration policy-making within a field setting, which allows the dynamics within 
governance systems to be scrutinised more critically. This approach also has the 
potential to challenge the behavioural assumptions of governance theories that view 
actors’ decisions as grounded in rational choice. 
While Osaka and Yokohama are, administratively speaking, cities with fixed 
boundaries under the jurisdiction of distinct local governments operating within a 
three-tier system of government, adopting such a functional perspective does little to 
improve our understanding of the way integration policies are developed in Japan. 
Rather, the findings demonstrate how the interactions and ties between similar actors 
in different ‘regional settings’ may be leading to different outcomes within those 
settings. In other words, the ‘regional assemblages’ (Allen and Cochrane 2007) of 
actors which interact to produce integration policies affecting Osaka and 
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Yokohama—either partially or entirely, concurrently or otherwise—are negotiating 
and implementing policies differently, despite the similarities of the actors and 
institutions involved. 
9.3 Implications for future research 
Qualitative research was carried out with a wide variety of stakeholders for this study, 
including local government representatives, NPO representatives and foreign 
residents, particularly those based in Osaka and Yokohama. However, a focus for 
future studies could be more research with actors at the national and transnational 
scales. While policy documents were collected and analysed to provide information 
about the role and intention of central government within the field of integration 
policy-making, interviews with central government policymakers might have 
provided information not available from these sources. In addition, future studies 
could aim to investigate the influence of transnational actors based in the East Asian 
region or beyond. 
This study has sought to analyse the integration policy-making process in a very 
specific fashion, namely through the construction of an analytic device labelled the 
field of integration policy-making. In this study, the actors involved in the production 
of integration policies were viewed as members of a single field, but there are other 
ways to investigate the same phenomenon using field theory.  
For example, another approach would be to consider the actors that help make 
integration policies as members of multiple fields, or to look at each group of actors 
as forming their own field (Medvetz 2015). Using the latter perspective, local 
government networks such as the GSTK could be viewed as members of a field in its 
own right. This could help researchers focus on the relations between the GSTK 
members in more detail, and the outputs and outcomes arising from those relations. 
However, by focusing on a few relations rather than the relations between the wider 
array of actors involved in the integration policy-making process, there is a risk of 
misunderstanding the influence of organisations such as the GSTK, so such an 
approach should be treated with care. 
Yet another approach, favoured by Eyal (2006), is to look at the spaces between 
fields, and organisations’ roles in creating and maintaining institutional divisions. 
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Viewed as ‘boundary organisations’, organisations involved in integration policy-
making processes could be considered to derive their power from their ability to 
mobilise or reinvest their capital to convert one form of capital to another.  
For example, organisations which lie at the boundary between the immigration 
policy-making field and the integration policy-making field may have an important 
role to play in determining where immigration policy ends and where integration 
policy begins, or vice versa. This brings us back to the point made in the introduction, 
namely that immigration policies and integration policies should be viewed as part of 
a continuum of migration policies. 
This study employed qualitative research methods to explore integration policies and 
policy-making processes, but quantitative research methods can also be used to 
explore these phenomena relationally. Future studies could adopt methods such as 
social network analysis or correspondence analysis to yield further insights regarding 
migration policy-making processes, either in the Japanese context or beyond. 
9.4 Final remarks 
While the field of immigration policy-making in Japan seems to be a ‘mature field’, 
in terms of the stability of the configuration of actors involved, the field of 
integration policy-making could be described as an ‘emergent field’ or ‘field in flux’ 
(Stringfellow and Maclean 2014). As discussed earlier, central government has long 
been regarded as sitting on the sidelines and it has only been through the efforts of a 
range of governmental and non-governmental actors that central government actors 
now seem to be taking a more active role in developing integration policies. At the 
same time, non-governmental actors gained greater legitimacy after the mid-1990s in 
the form of specified NPOs, which has changed their relationship with central 
government. These two developments have combined to create a new dynamic 
between central government, local government and non-governmental actors. 
What will this mean for the future of integration policies and processes in Japan? To 
begin with, as these relationships mature, and the demographic balance in Japan 
continues to change, it seems reasonable to assume that we are likely to see more 
integration policies in the future. 
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What will the nature of these policies be? This is less clear, but the findings from this 
study suggest that the integration policy paradigm in Japan is gradually changing. 
One possibility is that there will be a full shift to tabunka kyōsei. However, it is not 
clear what this could look like. There has certainly not been a clean break between 
previous policy paradigms, favouring assimilation, and tabunka kyōsei. Moreover, 
there has been growing criticism of tabunka kyōsei by migrants, particularly Zainichi 
communities. Whether this will lead to a new policy paradigm or incremental 
changes in the tabunka kyōsei/kokusaika paradigm is difficult to tell.  
What is clear, however, is that researchers should continue to investigate these issues 
in Japan, and other Asian contexts, in order to challenge the Eurocentric scholarship 
that has characterised ‘Western’ literature on migration studies for far too long. This 
study offers a new contribution to these debates in the form of a multi-scalar study of 
integration policy-making processes as found within specific Japanese contexts. It 
has found that there is value in scrutinising integration policy-making processes at 
local scales as well as at the national scale. In doing so it has sought to challenge the 
idea of the ‘nation-state’ as having a single integration regime. In the case of Japan, I 
would argue that there are multiple integration regimes at the local scale. Even if we 
consider just two major Japanese cities, namely Osaka and Yokohama, there are 
many similarities, but also idiosyncrasies including local politics, the priorities of the 
local executive, and sites of democratic engagement by foreign residents, all of 
which may be socially, politically or historically contingent variables. 
But we can go further. Greater cross-national research involving Asian and non-
Asian contexts, comparing subnational regions or cities as well as countries, could 
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Appendix A: Interview and focus group materials 
1. Information sheet for interview participants (English) 
2. Information sheet for interview participants (Japanese) 
3. Information sheet for focus group participants (Japanese/furigana) 
4. Topic guide for semi-structured interviews (bilingual) 
5. Topic guide for focus groups (English) 
6. Consent sheet for research participants (English) 






School for Policy Studies 
 
 
Information sheet for interview participants 
 
You will be given a copy of this information sheet 
 
Project title: Governance, citizenship and migration policies in Japan 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research 
project. You should only participate if you want to. Choosing not to take part 
will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to 
take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The aim of this study is to understand how foreign residents in Japan are 
being integrated into Japanese society. We’re trying to find out how foreign 
residents engage with the national government, local government and NGOs 
in decisions which affect their lives. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen because, as a representative of an NGO that 
supports foreign residents, you have first-hand experience of the issues that 
affect the integration of migrants in Japan. 
 
What will happen if I take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. If you decide to take part 
you will be invited to take part in an interview with the researcher. The details 
of the interview will be confirmed shortly. Please allow up to 1.5 hours for the 
interview, but it is likely to be shorter. An audio recording of the interview will 
be made. 
 
If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep 
and you will be asked to sign a consent form. 
 
Regardless of whether you agree to take part or not, you are still free to 
withdraw from the study at any point before 31 December 2015 and without 
giving a reason. 
 
What will my information be used for? 
Your information will be used in the researcher’s Ph.D. thesis and may be 
used in other research outputs such as presentations at conferences and 
journal articles. You will be given an opportunity to see any outputs from the 
research before they are published. 
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Your personal information will be held stored securely on a University 
computer for up to ten years after the interview, but only the researcher will 
be able to access this information. 
 
Will my information be treated confidentially? 
Any information you give us will be treated confidentially. This means that no 
one will be able to identify you from the information that you give us. If you 
are quoted in the researcher’s Ph.D. thesis or any other research output, 
your quote will be anonymised and pseudonyms will be used. 
 
There are some limits to confidentiality: if the researcher sees or hears 
something in the interview that makes him think that you, or someone else, is 
at significant risk of harm, he may have to break confidentiality and speak to 
a member of staff about this. If possible, the researcher will tell you if he has 
to do this. 
 
Further contact details 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, 
please contact the researcher using the following contact details: 
 
[Personal information removed] 
 
In the event that any issues arise from the actions of the researcher, you can 
seek further advice from the University of Bristol using the details below: 
 
[Personal information removed] 
 
N.B. Please contact the University of Bristol only if you feel that these issues 
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Interview topic guide 
予備 Preliminaries  
挨拶を交わすこと Exchange formalities 
対象者の個人情報の確認：氏名や役
職など 
Confirm the participant’s details: name 
and position in organisation 
説明シートの頂戴の確認 Check that participant has read 
information sheet and whether they have 
any questions 
同意書の紹介と説明 Introduce the consent form with a verbal 
explanation 
対象者が録音に同意の確認 Check that the participant is happy for 
the interview to be recorded 
外国人住民のイメージ Perceptions of foreign residents 
外国人住民の問題と「ネイティブ」の住民
の問題は異なるように見られていますか。 
Are the problems faced by foreign 
residents regarded as different to those 
faced by ‘native’ residents?  
その問題は在留外国人のグループによって
違いますか。 





How does the public perceive foreign 
residents? How are they portrayed in the 
media?  link this to integration policies 
多文化共生や社会統合政策 Integration policies 
外国人住民が直面している課題は最大
の課題は何ですか。 
What do you view as the major 





What policies and programmes have 
been introduced to tackle cohesion / 
promote coexistence?  prompt to 




How are these policies addressing the 




How have these policies been developed, 
i.e. who is involved (formally or 
informally) in the development of 
integration policies?  has the 
interviewee’s organisation played any 
role in the development of these policies? 
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NGOのバックグラウンド／活躍 Background / current activities 
NGO の設けた状況は何でしたか。 What were the circumstances that led to 




What is the purpose of your 
organisation? What role does your 





How is your organisation run (e.g. 
governance structures)?  
How is the organisation funded?  





Do foreign residents get a say in the 





How many / what kind of foreign 
residents does the organisation support? 
 come back to this point in the Close 
regarding focus groups 
外国人住民は NGO の活躍についていか
に知ることになりますか。 
How do they find out about the 
organisation?  What is the 






What changes (socio-cultural, political, 
economic, etc.) or major events has the 
organisation seen / been affected by 
since its inception?  
 link back to immigration / integration 
 Prompt around Immigration 
Control Act, Hanshin Awaji 
Earthquake, “Lehmann Shock, 
hate speeches, etc. 
 Probe around other “critical 
moments” during the rest of the 
interview 
他の組織・機関 Other institutions 
日本における外国人住民を支援している
機関はどのような感じですか。 
What is your impression of the 
institutions designed to support / 
integrate foreign residents?  prompt 
around changes among these 
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What is the relationship between this 
organisation and other local 
organisations?  prompt around other 










What are the major challenges for 
foreign residents and organisations 
supporting them (such as yours) going 
forward? 
終わり Close 
次のステップ Explain what will happen next and how 
the interview data will be used  
mention focus groups if appropriate 
同意を収めること Obtain written consent from the 
participant to use their information 
感謝と終わり Thank you and close 




Focus group topic guide 
Introduction (5-10 mins) 
 Introduce the research project (what it’s about, why I’m doing it) 
 Explain what the focus group will involve and check that everyone’s happy to 
be there 
 Check that participants are happy for the focus group to be recorded 
 Ask participants to do a quick jiko-shokai (N.B. this will help with the 
transcription) 
 Ask participants to fill in a short questionnaire about themselves during the 
focus group or at the end (N.B. this will help with the analysis) 
 Briefly explain about the consent form and ask them to sign it before they 
leave 
Exercise (5-10 mins) 
Ask participants to think about different sources of support that may be important to 
them:  
 Government: national government, prefectural government, city government, 
local ward 
 Civil society: migrant-supporting NGOs/NPOS, other NGOs/NPOs 
 Employment-based: trade unions, employers, professional groups 
 Social networks: family, friends, clubs, hobby groups 
 Media: internet, newspapers, social media 
 International: embassy, home country government, etc. 
 Other 
 
Ask participants to rate their importance on a Likert scale OR rank them in order of 
most to least important. 
Briefly ask participants to give feedback to the group. 
Discussion (40-60 mins) 
Starting with the most important source of support, get participants to discuss the 
following: 
Who and what? 
 Who have been the key sources of support?  
 What kind of support have they provided? 
Relationships and influence 
 How would you describe your relationship with these sources? E.g. provider-
user 
 How involved do you feel?  
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 Have you been able to feedback to different orgs about the services or support 
they provide? Did it make a difference? 
Outcomes and impact 
 Have your experiences encouraged you to get more involved in supporting 
migrants?  
 In what ways? E.g. volunteering with an NGO/NPO 
 In what ways has it helped? What else could they have done? Or what didn’t 
they do? 
 
Repeat the discussion for the second most important source, the third, etc. 
N.B. Allow participants to flow on to other sources but bring the discussion back if it 
begins to drift OR if there are outstanding questions 
Prompts 
Look for opportunities to encourage participants to discuss the following (if 
appropriate): 
Time 
Think about key events—pre-arrival, post-arrival, getting a job—what were the 
biggest challenges you faced as you entered Japan? 
Space / scale 
Do you feel part of your local community? Or part of Japanese society more 
generally? What scale is the most important for people? 
Collaboration 
Do you think the different orgs work with each other? Do you have examples of this? 
If they don’t, do you think they should? 
Close (5-10 mins) 
 Thank participants for taking part and explain next steps 
 Make sure all participants receive their gift cards 
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Consent sheet for participants 
 
Complete this form after you have read the information sheet and/or 
listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Project title: Governance, citizenship and migration policies in Japan 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising 
the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If 
you have any questions arising from the information sheet or explanation 
already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to 
join in. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep and refer to at 
any time. 
 
 Yes No 
I have read and understood the information about the 
project, as provided in the information sheet dated 
________________. 
   
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about 
the project and my participation. 
   
I voluntarily agree to participate in the project. 
 
  
I understand I can withdraw at any time without giving 
reasons and that I will not be penalised for withdrawing 
nor will I be questioned on why I have withdrawn. 
   
Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to withdraw 
my data at any point before 31 December 2015. 
   
The procedures regarding confidentiality have been 
clearly explained (e.g. use of names, pseudonyms, 
anonymisation of data, etc.) to me. 
   
The limits regarding confidentiality have been explained 
to me. 
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The use of my anonymised data in research and 
publications has been explained to me. 
   
I understand that at the end of the project my data will be 
anonymised and stored securely at the University of 
Bristol for up to ten years.   
I, along with the researcher, agree to sign and date this 







agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to 
my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the 
notes written above and the information sheet about the project and I 









confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any 



























１つにチェックを入れてください → はい いいえ 
o 私は＿年＿月＿日付けの説明シートを読んで、プロジェクトに
関する情報を理解しています。   
o 私はプロジェクトの参加についてやインタビューに関しては質問





いては質問されないことを理解しています。   
o さらに２０１５年１２月３１日までにいつでもプロジェクトを
撤回することができることも理解しています。   
o 私は機密性に関する手続きは完全に説明されています。





ます。   
o 研究のプロジェクトが終わったら、データの秘密が確保されて、
最大１０年間ブリストル大学で厳重に保存されていることを
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Appendix B: Social security systems in Japan 
 
Scheme Category 
Public pensions (kōteki nenkin) National basic pension 
Income-related pension: 
For employees of private firms 
For mainly public sector employees 
For the self-employed (non-mandatory) 
Health services and health insurance (kenkō 
hoken) 
Employees and their families’ health insurance 
National health insurance for the self-employed and 
their families 
Health services for the elderly (aged 70 and over) 
Personal social services  
Unemployment insurance (koyō hoken) and 
related policies 
Unemployment allowances 
Employment promotion projects 
Work-related accident insurance (rōsai hoken)  
Family benefits Child allowances (kodomo teate) 
Maternity leave allowances  
Day-care services for children 
Public assistance (seikatsu hogo)  
Source: http://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/japan/socsec/maruo/table1.html#2 
 





Public pensions Social 
insurance 
 X Old age, survivors, invalidity 
benefits 




X  Sickness and health 
Personal social services Tax* X  Old age, invalidity benefits 




 X Unemployment, family 
benefits 
Work-related accident insurance Social 
insurance 
X X Employment injury 
Family benefits Tax X X Family benefits 
Public assistance (seikatsu hogo) Tax X X Social assistance and others 
*except for long-term care insurance 
Source: http://www.ipss.go.jp/s-info/e/ssj2014/PDF/ssj2014.pdf  
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Appendix C: Artwork from a government leaflet about the 
points system 
 
Source: Immigration Bureau of Japan, Ministry of Justice, revised on 26 April 2017, 
http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/newimmiact_3/en/index.html 
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